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Abstract
A common function of anonymity systems is the embedding of subjects
that are associated to some attributes in a set of subjects, the anonymity
set. Every subject within the anonymity set appears to be possibly asso-
ciated to attributes of every other subject within it. The anonymity set
covers the associations between the subjects and their attributes. The limit
of anonymity protection basically depends on the hardness of disclosing
those hidden associations from the anonymity sets. This thesis analyses
the protection limit provided by anonymity sets by studying a practical
and widely deployed anonymity system, the Chaum Mix. A Mix is an
anonymous communication system that embeds senders of messages in an
anonymity set to hide the association to their recipients (i.e., attributes),
in each communication round. It is well known that traffic analyses can
uniquely identify a user’s recipients by evaluating the sets of senders (i.e.,
the sender anonymity set) and recipients using the Mix in several rounds.
The least number of rounds for that identification represents a fundamen-
tal limit of anonymity protection provided by the anonymity sets, similar
to Shannon’s unicity-distance. That identification requires solving NP-
complete problems and was believed to be computationally infeasible.
This thesis shows by a new and optimised algorithm that the unique identi-
fication of a user’s recipients is for many realistic Mix configurations com-
putational feasible, in the average case. It contributes mathematical esti-
mates of the mean least number of rounds and the mean time-complexity
for that unique identification. These measure the fundamental, as well
as the practical protection limit provided by the anonymity sets of a Mix.
They can be applied to systematically identify Mix configurations that lead
to a weak anonymity of a user’s recipients. To the best of our knowledge,
this has not been addressed yet, due to the computational infeasibility of
past algorithms. All before-mentioned algorithms and analyses can be
adapted to deduce information about a user’s recipients, even in cases of
incomplete knowledge about the anonymity sets, or a low number of ob-
served anonymity sets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The importance of protecting privacy was originally addressed by Warren and Brandeis
[1890]. They define privacy as “the right to be let alone” to allow human beings to
have intimacy. Westin [1970] outlines in a broader context that privacy is crucial for a
society like a democracy, which is based on the citizens’ freedom to make individual
choices. In order to make such choices, a person needs the opportunity to be let alone
to avoid external influences. Therefore, privacy protection is addressed by the United
States Privacy Act1 of 1974. Similarly, the German Constitution comprises the right
for “informationelle Selbstbestimmung”2 (informational self-determination regarding
personal data).
Anonymity helps to protect privacy, as it hides the link to the attributes associated
to a person. Means to set up anonymity and privacy are well known to humans in the
physical world and people insist on them. If we cover ourselves, or talk behind walls,
we can usually intuitively and reasonably estimate the provided privacy protection.
Nowadays, a great part of our interactions in the physical world is mapped to the
digital world in the Internet. These include, for example, leisure activities, political ac-
tivities, business activities and interactions with public authorities. Therefore, privacy
should also be provided in the digital world. There are several techniques that help
to provide privacy in the Internet, cf. Danezis and Gu¨rses [2010]. However, there is
still a lack of understanding the fundamental limit of protection provided by many of
those techniques. In this thesis, we investigate the anonymity protection provided by
1Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. §552a. 1974.
2BVerfG, Urteil v. 15.12.1983, Az. 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83. 1983.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
the concept of anonymity sets for anonymous communication.
Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010, p. 10] formulates that “Anonymity of a subject from
an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify the sub-
ject within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.” Anonymity systems seek to establish
anonymity sets. This thesis analyses anonymity sets provided by a concrete anonymity
system, the Chaum Mix, cf. Chaum [1981], to evaluate the protection they provide.
Many anonymity systems are based on the Chaum Mix, cf. Danezis and Diaz [2008];
Edman and Yener [2009]. Some of them, like JAP, Tor and Mixminion, cf. Berthold
et al. [2001a]; Danezis et al. [2003]; Dingledine et al. [2004], are currently used by
many users. Thus the Chaum Mix is the theoretical basis for many conceptional and
practical anonymity systems.
The Chaum Mix hides the association between the senders and recipients of mes-
sages (i.e., the attributes) in a network. In every round of communication, it embeds
the senders in sender-anonymity sets. According to Pfitzmann [1990], the Mix can
be realised in its strongest form in a closed environment1, that we call the perfect Mix.
The perfect-Mix provides information theoretical protection2 against a strong attacker,
as in the Dolev-Yao model by Dolev and Yao [1983]. That is an attacker who can ob-
serve any link in the network and can delay, inject, or modify messages on that link.
However, when adapting the perfect Mix to an open environment3 like the Internet, the
provided protection against a strong attacker is not information theoretically perfect.
The goal of this thesis is to analyse the fundamental limit of anonymity provided
by the Chaum Mix in open environments against a strong attacker. Therefore, we
analyse the Chaum Mix that would result from applying the perfect Mix to open en-
vironments. This can be abstractly modelled by a so-called threshold Mix without
dummy traffic and broadcast4. The model considers the cryptography as secure and
assumes that active attacks (i.e., those that delay, inject, mark messages) are avoided
by the perfect Mix protocol. Therefore the only information immanently leaked by
the Mix to a strong attacker is the sender-anonymity set and the recipient set of the
1In a closed environment, the set of communicating users is static.
2That is a strong attacker cannot gain any new information, despite unlimited computing resources.
3That is the set of communicating users is dynamic. Users only join the set if they need to send, or
receive a message and leave it otherwise.
4Since dummy traffic and broadcast are hard to realise in large open environments.
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messages relayed in each round. Our analyses refer to the open environment, as it
describes the predominant way of communication in the Internet and consequently the
most common user communication in practice. Anonymity should be provided with
respect to arbitrary communication patterns. Motivated by the observation that users
tend to have a persistent set of friends, we analyse the anonymity for the special case
where a user recurrently contacts her friends from a static set of friends, over several
rounds of communication. We consider the least number of rounds, such that the set of
friends is uniquely identifiable, as the fundamental limit of anonymity protection. This
is in accordance to Shannon’s unicity-distance, cf. Shannon [1949], that measures the
confidentiality provided by a cipher by the number of intercepted cipher text bits to
uniquely identify a plain text.
Combinatorial analyses of anonymity sets and recipient sets of messages relayed
by the Mix in each round have shown that it is possible to uniquely identify a user’s set
of friends. These analyses represent a fundamental threat to the Mix in open environ-
ments, as they passively exploit information that is inevitably leaked by the Mix with-
out a malicious behaviour. The Hitting-Set attack (HS-attack) introduced by Kesdogan
and Pimenidis [2004] is based on such combinatorial analyses. It is until now the only
known attack1 that identifies a user’s set of friends with the provably least number of
rounds, as shown by Kesdogan et al. [2006]. The thesis therefore analyses this attack
to measure the fundamental limit of anonymity protection. However, the unique iden-
tification of a user’s set of friends requires solving NP-complete problems, as outlined
by Agrawal et al. [2003a]; Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004]. In case of the HS-attack,
the underlying problem is the unique minimum-hitting-set (UMHS) problem. The al-
gorithm deployed by the HS-attack requires exponential time- and space-complexity
to solve the UMHS problem.2 It is computational infeasible for realistic parameters of
the Chaum Mix. These parameters refer to the user’s traffic distributions, the number
of friends, the number of users and the size of the anonymity sets and determine the
achievable anonymity protection.
In this thesis, we contribute a new algorithm to solve the UMHS problem that pro-
vides a significantly lower time-complexity than the old one and only a linear space-
1This excludes attacks contributed by this thesis.
2This refers to the worst and average case complexities.
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complexity. Its mean time-complexity is in particular computational feasible for many
realistic parameters of the Chaum Mix. The HS-attack using this new algorithm
uniquely identifies a user’s set of friends with the least number of rounds. There-
fore, this redesign of the HS-attack, instead of the original version, is analysed in this
thesis.
The thesis contributes analytical analyses to estimate the least number of rounds
and the mean time-complexity for the unique identification of a user’s set of friends. As
opposed to existing works, our analyses apply to non-uniform traffic distributions and
thus cover more realistic cases. We show for reasonable parameters of the Chaum Mix
that the mean time-complexity for the unique identification of a user’s set of friends is
maximal (e.g., exponential) if that user’s communication is uniformly distributed. This
complexity approaches a polynomial function for various non-uniform distributions of
the user’s traffic. This relation is particularly proved for the Zipf distribution that is
known to closely model a user’s Internet and email traffic, as confirmed by Adamic
and Huberman [2002]; Almeida et al. [1996]; Breslau et al. [1999]. Therefore, our an-
alytical analyses show that the least number of rounds to uniquely identify a user’s set
of friends is in many cases even a practical limit of anonymity protection, as opposed to
Shannon’s unicity-distance Shannon [1949]. We prove that this limit is asymptotically
lower than the number of rounds required by the well known statistical disclosure at-
tack (SDA) of Danezis [2003] to guess a user’s friends with any probability1. This limit
is bounded by O(1
p
), while the number of rounds required by SDA is O( 1
p2
), where p is
the least probability in the traffic distribution that the attacked user applies to contact
her friends.
These relations have not been revealed by past works yet, due to two reasons: The
first is the computational infeasibility of the original HS-attack of Kesdogan and Pi-
menidis [2004]. The second is the restriction of related analytical analyses, cf. Agrawal
et al. [2003a]; Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006]; Kesdogan et al. [2006]; O’Connor
[2008] to solely uniform traffic distributions.
Finally, the thesis proposes extensions of analyses of the HS-attack to two novel
cases. In the first case, it is assumed that the attacker does not aggregate information
from sufficiently many rounds to uniquely identify a user’s set of friends. It provides
1We consider SDA, as its analytical analyses are applicable to non artificial cases, as opposed to
heuristic approaches not based on it, as outlined in Section 6.2.
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analytical analyses of the number of rounds to identify subsets of a user’s friends with
some probability. The second case assumes that the attacker aggregates in some rounds
erroneous information about a user’s friends. It suggests a modified application of
the HS-attack to identify a user’s set of friends despite erroneous information. The
analyses derive the maximal probability for erroneous information in a round that is
tolerable for a unique identification with a high certainty by that attack.
Erroneous information could be caused by two cases: First, a user randomly con-
tacts recipients who are not her friends, e.g., due to dummy traffic. Second, a user
appears to contact a recipient who is not her friend, due to incomplete knowledge
about sender anonymity sets and recipient sets processed by the Mix in a round. The
suggested extension thus aids studying the HS-attack for conditions that are closer to
the real world user behaviour, as well as for Mix variants with indeterministic relay of
messages, like the pool-Mix.
The remaining of this Introduction is structured as follows. Section 1.1 introduces
the general attacker model and protection model for anonymous communication and
the common terminologies. It discusses basic anonymity techniques with respect to
these models and concludes that the Chaum Mix technique is the most practical one
among them. Section 1.2 details the Chaum Mix technique. It outlines that for open
environments, the Chaum Mix provides anonymity against a strong attacker as in the
model of Dolev and Yao [1983], as opposed to its more practice oriented variants. This
justifies the focus on the Chaum Mix, to study the limit of anonymity protection pro-
vided by the Mix technique in open environments in this thesis. Section 1.3 finally
depicts the structure of this thesis.
1.1 Anonymous Communication Protection Model
Anonymous communication systems aim at hiding the senders, or recipients of mes-
sages, or the communication relations between users in a communication network to
provide confidentiality of traffic data with respect to a considered attacker. Anonymity
protection is thus considered with respect to an attacker’s capability.
Section 1.1.1 introduces descriptions of the attacker model. This is followed by the
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definition of anonymity and its variants in Section 1.1.2. Section 1.1.3 provides a brief
discussion of basic anonymity techniques and their applicability in practice.
1.1.1 Attacker Model
In the following, some terms are introduced that help modelling the attacker. This is
necessary, as there is no protection against an almighty attacker, who is not restricted
by any model assumptions and can thus control all users, network links and nodes.
A first attribute refers to the role of the attacker with respect to the considered com-
munication event. The attacker is called involved, if he participates the communication
as a member, either sender, or recipient. Otherwise he is called uninvolved. Such an
attack is, for example, the operator of the network. The remaining three attributes
describe the general capability of an attacker and are adopted from Pfitzmann [1990]:
Resource: The attacker can either be computationally restricted with limited time and
memory resources, or computationally unrestricted with unlimited resources.
Action: If an attacker can modify, inject, or delay messages, he is called active. Oth-
erwise, if he only observes the communication, he is called passive.
Location: If the attacker can apply his attack on arbitrary network links and nodes, he
is called a global attacker, otherwise he is called a local attacker.
We define a global active attacker, who might be involved, or not involved in a commu-
nication as a strong attacker. This definition is consistent to the fundamental Dolev-
Yao attacker model for cryptography, as described by Dolev and Yao [1983]. In order
to study the fundamental limit of anonymity protection, we assume a strong attacker.
However, this thesis aims at analysing confidentiality of traffic data, which is re-
gardless of the content of the messages. Therefore, we exclude for simplicity crypto-
graphic considerations and thus assume that the attacker cannot break cryptographic
protocols.
1.1.2 Anonymity Terminology
The anonymity terminology that is commonly used in the privacy research area was
introduced by Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp [2001]. In this thesis, we use the terminol-
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ogy in its most recent version, as provided by Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]. Since
anonymity depends on the attacker’s capability and knowledge, all definitions refer to
a considered attacker.
Anonymity: “Anonymity of a subject from an attacker’s perspective means that the
attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set.” (Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010, p. 10])
Undetectability: “Undetectability1 of an item of interest from an attacker’s perspec-
tive means that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or
not.” (Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010, p. 16])
Unlikability: “Unlinkability of two or more items of interest ... from an attackers
perspective means that ... the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether
these [items] are related or not.” (Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010, p. 12])
An item of interest might be an entity, an action, an identifier, or combinations thereof,
c.f. Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]. According to Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010],
anonymity can be described in terms of unlinkability, which supports a more fine
grained description of properties than anonymity. Undetectability implies anonymity,
but additionally requires the protection of the item of interest as such.
These definitions are coarse and generic. In order to consider anonymity and un-
detectability in the special context of network communications, we will use the more
concrete definitions of these terms as proposed by Pfitzmann [1990]. A network com-
munication system contains a set of all subjects that can use that system. If there is a
communication event E , e.g., a sending, or receiving of a message, then some of these
subjects are involved in the event in the roleR of, e.g., a sender, or a recipient.
Undetectability: An event E (e.g., sending/receiving/exchanging of message) is un-
detectable for an attackerA (who is not involved2 in E ), if the a-posteriori prob-
ability that E exists, after any possible observationO ofA , is 0 < P (E |O) < 1.
1Undetectability was formerly called unobservability by Pfitzmann [1990]; Pfitzmann and Ko¨hn-
topp [2001].
2The event of sending/receiving a message is detectable by the subjects (sender/recipient) involved
in that event, therefore undetectability of events does not hold for subjects involved in that events.
7
1. INTRODUCTION
If for every possible observationO ofA , the a-priori and a-posteriori probability
that E exists are additionally equal, that is ∀OP (E ) = P (E |O), then we call
this perfect preservation of undetectability1 according to Pfitzmann and Hansen
[2010].
Anonymity: A subject is anonymous in the roleR (e.g., sender/recipient) with respect
to an event E (e.g., sending/receiving of a message) and a attacker A (who can
even be involved in E ), if the a-posteriori probability that it takes the role R in
E , after any possible observation of A is greater than 0 and lower than 1.
If for every possible observation O of A , the a-priori and a-posteriori probabil-
ity that that subject takes the role R in E are additionally equal, then we call
this perfect preservation of a subject’s anonymity2 according to Pfitzmann and
Hansen [2010].
The set of all subjects who are anonymous in the roleR with respect to an event
E and an attacker A is the corresponding anonymity set. Perfect preservation
of a subject’s anonymity implies that the anonymity set remains the same for all
possible observations O .
Anonymity can be further specified by sender-anonymity, recipient-anonymity and
relationship-anonymity, c.f Pfitzmann [1990]; Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]; Pfitz-
mann and Ko¨hntopp [2001]. These terms refer to following events: sending a message,
receiving a message, exchanging any message and corresponding roles. Relationship-
anonymity extends the anonymity definition for subjects to that for pairs of subjects.
It refers to the anonymity of a pair of (sender, recipient) with respect to the role R
of communication partners and the event E of message exchange. Note that sender-
anonymity, or recipient-anonymity is sufficient to imply relationship-anonymity, as
stated by Pfitzmann [1990]; Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]; Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp
[2001].
According to Shannon [1949], “perfect” protection always means that it is not pos-
sible to gain any additional information by observing a system, even if the attacker is
computationally unrestricted. The anonymity protection model of Pfitzmann [1990]
allows specifying the perfect confidentiality of traffic data. That is perfect preservation
1This was formerly called perfect unobservability by Pfitzmann [1990].
2This was formerly called perfect anonymity by Pfitzmann [1990].
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of undetectability against an uninvolved attacker and perfect preservation of anonymity
against an involved attacker, which is called perfect preservation of unobservability by
Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]. That protection refers to a computationally unrestricted
attacker.
Note that in our context, the term “perfect” solely characterises the protection of
the traffic data. This is regardless of the underlying cryptographic protocols that are
used to implement an anonymity concept. Cryptographic considerations are excluded,
as we aim to study the protection of traffic data, but not of message content.
Example 1.1.1 (Anonymity Set). Figure 1.1 draws the state of an anonymity system
with respect to a strong attacker, who can observe all subjects’ actions, but is un-
involved1 in the communication. It illustrates messages with hidden content in the
anonymity system that are unlinkable to any active senders and recipients framed by
the ellipses S ′ and R′, with respect to the attacker. The attacker’s knowledge allows
excluding the remaining subjects for being senders, or recipients of these messages.
Let us consider the events of sending and receiving the message with the grey con-
tent, as an example to illustrate anonymity sets. Every subject s ∈ S ′ has a probability
of 0 < ps < 1 of being in the role R =sender with respect to the event E =(send,
grey content) and this attacker, so that S ′ is a sender-anonymity set. Similarly, R′ is
the recipient-anonymity set, as every subject r ∈ R′ has a probability of 0 < pr < 1
of being in the role R =recipient with respect to the event E =(receive, grey content)
and this attacker. Every pair of sender s ∈ S ′ and recipient r ∈ R′ has a probability
of 0 < ps,r < 1 of being the sender and recipient in the event E =(exchange, any
message) and this attacker. The relationship-anonymity set is thus the cross product of
subjects in S ′ and R′, that is:
{(s8, r3), (s8, r7), (s8, r2), (s4, r3), (s4, r7), (s4, r2), (s1, r3), (s1, r7), (s1, r2)} .
Assume that the attacker was involved, like the recipients of all messages in this ex-
ample. The relationship-anonymity set would remain the same, as sender-anonymity,
respectively recipient-anonymity implies relationship-anonymity, according to Pfitz-
mann [1990]; Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010]; Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp [2001].
1The attacker is neither the sender nor the recipient of the observed messages.
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Figure 1.1: Anonymity sets. Sender and recipients are denoted by s and r. Illustrated
messages are unlinkable to any subjects framed by ellipses.
1.1.3 Basic Anonymity Techniques
The following basic anonymous communication techniques against a strong attacker
are known:1
• Broadcast with invisible implicit address for recipient-anonymity and relationship-
anonymity, as presented by Pfitzmann and Waidner [1986].
• The Chaum Mix for sender-anonymity and relationship-anonymity introduced
by Chaum [1981].
• The DC-Net for sender-anonymity and relationship-anonymity proposed by Chaum
[1988].
As stated by Pfitzmann [1990], broadcast with invisible implicit address only provides
anonymity against a strong attacker, if the broadcast medium is secure. This means
that the medium must ensure the integrity and the timely delivery of all messages
to all recipients, in spite of attacks that might try to delay, drop, or manipulate the
network traffic. The attacker might perturb the physical medium itself, or the messages
transmitted through it in these attacks. As there is a lack of quality of service guarantee
in the Internet, broadcast is impractical in this prevalent communication network.
The DC-Net is based on one-time-pad and requires synchronised computations
between the users to transmit a message, as specified by Chaum [1988]. Therefore,
this technique is less suitable for spontaneous communication in the Internet.
1Anonymity systems like Crowds are omitted, as they do not provide protection against a strong
attacker, c.f. Reiter and Rubin [1998].
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In contrast to these techniques, the Chaum Mix is applicable to various network
structures and also enables spontaneous communication, making it the most widely
deployed technique in practice. A detailed evaluation of these basic anonymity tech-
niques is provided by Kesdogan and Palmer [2006].
The Mix technique also provides an intuitive and transparent construction of
anonymity sets as illustrated in Section 1.2. It allows studying the anonymity pro-
tection provided by the abstract and general concept of anonymity sets by analysing
the protection provided by the Mix technique, as outlined by Kesdogan [2006]. Due
to this theoretical and practical property of the Mix, this thesis exclusively focuses on
analyses of the Mix technique.
1.2 The Mix for Anonymous Communication
The Chaum Mix (also known as threshold Mix) introduced by Chaum [1981] repre-
sents the base of many popular services offering anonymity in open environments like
the Internet. It is a concrete concept that serves to establish anonymity sets in order
to provide sender- and relationship-anonymity against a strong attacker. For closed
environments, the Chaum Mix concept combined with dummy traffic and broadcast
of messages, even provides perfect preservation of unobservability against a compu-
tationally unrestricted strong attacker, as shown by Pfitzmann [1990]. We call that
concept the perfect Mix concept.
The general task of an anonymity system as formulated by Kesdogan and Palmer
[2006], is to provide a group function and an embedding function to build anonymity
sets from the users’ communication traffic.
Embedding function: The embedding function embeds the communication traffic of
distinct users in an anonymity set by unifying and hiding their message charac-
teristics (appearance and time), such that they are indistinguishable from each
other.
Group function: As there is no anonymity against a strong attacker, if there is only
a single communication event, the group function serves to enforce that there is
additional communication traffic from distinct users, that we call cover-traffic. It
aims at avoiding that an attacker can control the cover-traffic.
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Section 1.2.1 describes the embedding function for the perfect Mix in a closed en-
vironments and for the Chaum Mix in an open environment with respect to a strong
attacker. The common group function with respect to a strong attacker is described in
Section 1.2.2. Combining these two functions provides the corresponding Mix con-
cepts against a strong attacker for the closed, as well as for the open environment.
Section 1.2.3 summarises main variants of Mix concepts for open environments
that assume an attacker who is weaker than the strong attacker.
1.2.1 Embedding Function
Chaum [1981] introduced a concept for sender and relationship-anonymity, in that
messages are prepared by their initiating senders to be grouped and relayed by a Mix
to the final recipients, instead of being directly delivered to the final recipients. The
purpose of the Mix is to hide the correlation between its incoming and outgoing mes-
sages and thus the linking of the sender and recipient of a message.
Section 1.2.1.1 describes the embedding function of the perfect Mix concept for
closed environments that aids perfect preservation of unobservability against a strong
attacker. The embedding function of the Chaum Mix is a relaxation of that embedding
function, such that it is applicable to open environments and aids sender and relation-
ship anonymity against a strong attacker. It is described in Section 1.2.1.2. These
sections describe the basic embedding function for the relay of messages through one
Mix. Section 1.2.1.3 discusses the straight forward extension of this basis to relay
messages through chains of Mixes to reduce the probability that all Mixes are compro-
mised.
1.2.1.1 Perfect Mix Concept for Closed Environment
We use the term round to refer to the process of collecting messages and forwarding
messages in an anonymity system1, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. The perfect Mix con-
cept requires every sender to contribute real or dummy messages in every round. In
each round, every sender prepares the same number of messages fixed by the system to
be relayed by the Mix, following a sender protocol. The Mix processes these messages
1If messages are processed continuously, a round could refer to a process within a given time win-
dow.
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Figure 1.2: Processing of messages by embedding function in a round: Each shape
around a message x represents a layer of encryption. The outermost encryption layer
is removed, when passing a Mix.
according to the Mix protocol in the same round, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. These
protocols conceal the appearance and time characteristic of messages that might link
their senders and recipients. The appearance refers to information about the sender
and recipient address, the bit pattern, the size, as well as the number of the message
transmitted between a sender and a recipient. The time characteristic addresses the
information about the transmission time and the order of transmitted messages.
Sender Protocol: The sender prepares his messages to be of constant length either by
splitting long messages, or by padding short messages to a length that is fixed by
the anonymity system for all messages. If there is no message, then he generates
dummy messages, in case of the perfect Mix concept. A message mess is first
encrypted with a nonce (number used once) for the final recipient and addressed
to that recipient (represented by a circular shape in Figure 1.2). Let us refer to
the nonce, address and message for that recipient by the subscript 2, then
mess2 = Enc2(mess , nonce2), addr 2 .
In case of the perfect Mix concept, addr 2 is an invisible implicit address that is
used to broadcast the message as proposed by Pfitzmann and Waidner [1986].
Otherwise it is the address of the final recipient of mess .
This resulting message is then encrypted with a nonce for the Mix and addressed
to that Mix (represented by a pentagon shape in Figure 1.2). Let us refer to the
13
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nonce, address and message for that Mix by the subscript 1, then
mess1 = Enc1(mess2, nonce1), addr 1 .
Mix protocol: A Mix collects the same number of messages from every sender in a
batch of a fixed size b, decrypts the message part encrypted only for him and
removes the nonce. Given a message mess1, by decrypting the part encrypted
for him, the Mix thus obtains
mess2, nonce1 = Dec1(Enc1(mess2, nonce1))
and removes nonce1.
The bit representations of the resulting messages are lexicographically sorted
in the output batch to shuffle the input and output order of the messages (as
illustrated by the Mix in Figure 1.2). If the Mix is the last Mix, then it broadcasts
in case of the perfect Mix each output message to all recipients in the anonymity
system, otherwise the message is simply forwarded to the recipient.
Perfect preservation of unobservatibility requires applying these protocols to a closed
environment, where the set of senders and recipients are static. In that case, the set of
all senders and all recipients are in every round the same, so that an attacker cannot
gain any new information from observing the anonymity system.
1.2.1.2 Chaum Mix Concept for Open Environment
Communication networks in practice like the Internet are open environments, where
users can join and leave the network at any time and exchange messages, whenever
they need to. Consequently, the set of potential users are not known a-priori and not
static, as in the closed environment. Therefore, although the Chaum Mix concept
provides unlinkability between the input and output messages, the anonymity sets are
not static in an open environment, so that perfect preservation of unobservability or
perfect preservation of anonymity cannot be provided against a strong attacker.
Networks like the Internet are also very large, so that broadcasting of messages
would be impracticable. It is thus reasonable to assume that at the utmost we can ap-
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ply the perfect Mix embedding function without broadcast to open environments. Yet
no theoretic basis for the effective deployment of dummy traffic to increase anonymity
in open environments exists, as outlined by Ko¨psell [2010, pp. 302 – 305]; Berthold
and Langos [2003]; Diaz and Preneel [2004]. On the contrary, dummy traffic can cause
a significant traffic overhead, as evaluated by Kesdogan [1999, p. 68]; Kesdogan and
Palmer [2006], without a clear gain of protection, so that it is mainly omitted. It is
further reasonable to assume that the Mix collects exactly one message from each par-
ticipating sender in every round to minimise the delay of relaying messages, according
to analyses of Kesdogan and Palmer [2006]. Otherwise, if the Mix collected, for ex-
ample, two messages instead of one from each sender1, then more time would pass to
complete a batch to forward it. While this would decrease the network performance,
it might not increase the anonymity protection, as the size of the sender-anonymity-set
in a round would remain the same
From the theoretical point of view, we need to understand the anonymity protection
provided by the Mix concept without dummy traffic in open environments, before we
can understand how dummy traffic can be effectively used to increase that protection.
We will follow this line of analysis in this thesis. Therefore, we consider the embed-
ding function of the perfect Mix “without dummy traffic and broadcast” as the basic
embedding function of the Chaum Mix in open environments2. With the group func-
tion in Section 1.2.2, this Mix concept provides sender and relationship-anonymity
against a strong attacker in open environments, as shown by Chaum [1981]; Pfitzmann
[1990].
In Figure 1.2, the sender-anonymity set corresponds to the set of all active senders
in a Mix round, i.e., {s1, s2, s3}. The relationship-anonymity set is represented by all
pairs of active senders and recipients in a round, that is:
{(s1, r1), (s1, r2), (s1, r3), (s2, r1), (s2, r2), (s2, r3), (s3, r1), (s3, r2), (s3, r3)} .
The set of active recipients {r1, r2, r3} is no recipient-anonymity set with respect to
a strong attacker, as a sender of a message could follow his message to the recipient.
However, it is a recipient-anonymity set with respect to a global passive attacker who
1Note that the Mix must collect the same number of messages from each sender to provide unlink-
ability between messages in the input and output batch.
2This consideration is also in accordance with Chaum [1981].
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is not involved in any message transmission.
1.2.1.3 Sequence of Mixes
The anonymity protection of the embedding function relies on trusting that the Mix
is not compromised by the attacker. However, in the strong attacker model, the Mix
itself might be colluded. In order to not be dependent on trusting a single Mix, Chaum
[1981] suggests using a sequence of Mixes1 as illustrated in Figure 1.3, so that the
anonymity protection is not affected, as long as at least one of the Mixes is honest. If
messages have to pass a fixed sequence of Mixes determined by the anonymity system,
then we call it a Mix-cascade, while we call it a Mix-net, if senders can choose their
sequence of Mixes themselves.
In case of using Mixes in open environments, the sender-anonymity set and recipient-
set of a particular Mix-cascade consists of all subjects sending and receiving message
through that cascade in a round. The sender-anonymity set and recipient-set are known
to the Mix-cascade, so that verification of the anonymity protection mechanism by the
Mixes and the users is possible. This is necessary to counter attacks by a strong at-
tacker as outlined in Section 1.2.2. If for every sequence of Mixes, the subjects using
that sequence are known, then the sender-anonymity set and recipient-set size provided
by the Mix-net does not improve over that provided by the Mix-cascade, as outlined by
Berthold et al. [2001b]. But if the subjects using a particular Mix sequence were un-
known, a Mix-net could extend the sender-anonymity set and recipient-set of that Mix
sequence to the set of all senders and recipients who are active in the entire Mix-net,
in the same round. However, this would lack verification of anonymity mechanisms
to provide protection against a strong attacker, as in Section 1.2.2. Therefore, we
only consider Mix-cascades in this thesis. A comprehensive discussion about advan-
tages and disadvantages of Mix-cascades and Mix-nets is provided by Berthold et al.
[2001b].
1The sender and Mix protocol straight forwardly apply to a sequence of Mixes, according to Chaum
[1981]; Pfitzmann [1990].
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Figure 1.3: Embedding function in a 2 Mix cascade. Shapes around a message x draw
layers of encryptions. Each Mix removes the outermost layer encrypted for it.
1.2.2 Group Function
Anonymity and unobservability require several users to cooperate to provide cover-
traffic to each other, as there is no anonymity against a strong attacker if there is only
one message transmission between a sender and a recipient. Consequently, a strong
attacker might try to manipulate the cover-traffic, such that he can isolate the message
transmission of a single honest sender from the cover-traffic.
To avoid these kinds of attacks by a strong attacker, Kesdogan and Palmer [2006]
require the group function to fulfil the so-called CUVE requirement that also comprises
all requirements mentioned by Chaum [1981]. CUVE requires all Mixes to know
all senders participating in a round, i.e., the sender-anonymity set. This information,
however, is anyway available to a strong attacker. CUVE is an acronym for following
requirements:
Completeness: All users can verify that their messages have been sent, received, or
transmitted.
Un-reusability: No user can participate more than an allowed number of times in a
round.
Verifiability: Messages of non colluded users cannot be changed by attackers without
being detected.
Eligibility: Only authorised users can participate in a round.
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Figure 1.4 illustrates the embedding function of the Mix with the group function that
complies to the CUVE requirement. We next describe this group function in detail.
Completeness avoids an attacker from, e.g., blocking messages of (b − 1) senders
of a batch and replacing them by his own messages, cf. Serjantov et al. [2003], such
that only the transmission of one honest sender, that is distinguishable to the attacker,
remains. Completeness can be technically realised by requiring the Mix to sign the
hash of every message relayed in a round and broadcast them to all senders in that
round, cf. Chaum [1981]. This is also called the loop-back function, cf. Kesdogan and
Palmer [2006], and enables senders to verify the correct transmission of their messages
to detect blocking of messages1. A Mix only relays a batch, if all senders in a round
anonymously acknowledge that their messages are correctly included in that batch, as
described by Chaum [1981].
Un-reusability avoids an attacker from duplicating and retransmitting a user’s mes-
sage, cf. Chaum [1981], such that a message that is transmitted x times is linkable
to the recipient who receives a message x times. Un-reusability can be technically
realised by time stamping the messages and requiring the Mix to keep a database of
relayed messages, so that duplicated messages are omitted, cf. Chaum [1981].
Verifiability avoids an attacker from marking messages by, e.g., manipulating some
bits, cf. Berthold et al. [2001b]. Verifiability is technically provided by the loop-back
function.
Eligibility avoids masquerading attacks, cf. Dorothy [1982], where an attacker
takes several identities and participates as (b− 1) senders in a batch, such that only the
transmission of one honest sender remains, cf. Serjantov et al. [2003]. Eligibility can
be technically realised by authenticating every sender in a round and accepting only
authenticated messages. Attacks that enable the attacker to know the traces of all mes-
sages, apart from that of the message he wants to deanonymise, are generally called
(b− 1)-attacks2, cf. Berthold et al. [2001b]; Serjantov et al. [2003].
Note that the Chaum Mix and perfect Mix concept cannot provide anonymity pro-
tection, if the attacker controls all Mixes, or if all senders and recipients apart from
1We focus on protecting anonymity of communication but not on protecting availability, i.e., against
denial-of-service attacks.
2They are also called (n− 1)-attack in the literature.
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one honest user cooperate with the attacker.
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Figure 1.4: Mix concept complying to CUVE requirement. All Mixes in the cascade
have a common list of authenticated senders in a round. Every batch relayed by a Mix
must be verified and acknowledged by the senders, using the loop-back function.
1.2.3 Mix Variants for Practice-oriented Attacker Models
Since the introduction of the Chaum Mix concept by Chaum [1981], several variants
of that concept have been suggested for open environments, e.g., Danezis et al. [2003];
Dingledine et al. [2004]; Fasbender et al. [1996]; Kesdogan et al. [1998]; Syverson
et al. [1997], assuming that attackers in practice are weaker than those specified by the
strong attacker model. These variants commonly avoid the overhead of sender authen-
tication and verification of correct message transmission for the CUVE requirement
and of some more protection functions of the Mix. They aim at increasing the flexi-
bility of using anonymity systems in open environments and the performance of those
systems. As trade-off, a weakened and restricted attacker model against which they
can provide anonymity is accepted, cf. Berthold et al. [2001b]; Serjantov et al. [2003].
A classification of these Mix variants with respect to the perfect Mix and the Chaum
Mix is illustrated in Figure 1.5. Readers interested in a more comprehensive descrip-
tion of Mix variants are referred to Danezis [2004]; Danezis and Diaz [2008]; Edman
and Yener [2009]; Serjantov [2004].
The strong attacker model is based on the Dolev-Yao model, cf. Dolev and Yao
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Figure 1.5: Classification of Mix techniques with respect to their attacker and protec-
tion model.
[1983] that assumes that the network is basically insecure. Considering such an at-
tacker seems to be overcautious, but it is reasonable, as we do not know a-priori all
application scenarios and attacker capabilities a system will have to face. That is by de-
signing a system based on assumptions for weaker attackers, that system might provide
protection in one situation, but it might fail in another situation, where the assumptions
turns out to be invalid. Therefore, it is probably hard to find a meaningful quantifica-
tion of anonymity protection with respect to practice oriented attacker models. Attacks
on Tor, as summarised by Westermann [2012, pp. 20 – 40] particularly show that it
is risky to base the protection of a system on assumptions for practice-oriented at-
tacker models, as it might not be possible to assure the validity of such assumptions.
We shortly describe the main variants of Mix concepts for practice oriented attacker
models in the next sections.
1.2.3.1 Stop-and-Go Mix
In the Stop-and-Go Mix (SG-Mix) concept proposed by Kesdogan et al. [1998], the
function of collecting and shuffling messages is shifted from the Mix to the senders.
A sender prepares his message for relaying by attaching to it a random route through
a Mix-net of SG-Mixes and the delay of the message at each of the SG-Mixes on
that route. Every sender draws the delay at a SG-Mix randomly from an exponential
distribution that is dependent on the service rate µ of that SG-Mix. That way, it is likely
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that there will be sufficiently many messages in a SG-Mix. Due to the memoryless
property of the exponential distribution, every message in a SG-Mix is equally likely
to leave it next, regardless of its arrival time at that SG-Mix. This provides a shuffling
of messages, as long as there is more than one message in the SG-Mix.
The random collection of messages in a SG-Mix and thus the provided anonymity
depends on the service rate µ that relies on estimates of the network traffic. As there is
no authentication of senders and no loop-back function in the SG-Mix concept, a strong
attacker could control the network traffic, thus undermining the protection provided by
SG-Mixes, as mentioned by Kesdogan [1999].
1.2.3.2 Pool-Mix
The pool-Mix concept tries to increase the anonymity set size by indeterministic relay
of messages. This is realised by extending the embedding function of the Chaum Mix
to keep a pool of η random messages that are not forwarded in a round. In every round,
a pool-Mix chooses to output a batch of b messages from the set of (b + η) messages
from the pool and the input batch at that round. This leads to a non-zero probability
that a message is not relayed in the same round. As the sender of a message received
in one round might have already sent it in a previous round, the sender-anonymity set
theoretically covers all senders in the current and past rounds. However, it is more
likely that a message is sent in the perimeter close to the same round, than in a round
further back in the past. Therefore, Serjantov and Danezis [2003] suggest the so-called
“effective” anonymity set size that accounts this likelihood. This supports compar-
isons of anonymity sets between distinct Mix techniques and variants. Mixmaster and
Mixminion, cf. Danezis et al. [2003], are implementations of the pool-Mix concept.
The advantage of the pool-Mix, which is its drawback at the same time is its inde-
terministic relay of messages. To preserve indeterminism of message relay, authenti-
cation of the messages’ senders by the Mix would be an issue, as it would reveal whose
messages remain in the pool, thus undermining indeterminism. Verifying the correct
message transmission would also be an issue, as a delay of a message could be due to
the indeterministic relay, or due to a (b − 1) attack as well. A (b − 1) attack is possi-
ble, as there is no authentication of the senders, as outlined by Berthold et al. [2001b];
Serjantov et al. [2003]. Therefore the pool-Mix concept does not provide protection
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against a strong attacker.
1.2.3.3 Onion Routing and Non-Disclosing-Method
The onion routing and non-disclosing-method (NDM) proposed by Syverson et al.
[1997] and by Fasbender et al. [1996] assume a local attacker, who is not able to
observe sufficiently many network links to link the messages sent and received by the
senders and recipients. In these approaches, messages are relayed through Mix-nets
with rudimentary Mix functions that apply the embedding function in Section 1.2.1
without shuffling the input and output order of relayed messages. They assume that
a large number of relay nodes and the resulting huge number of Mix-net routes that
can be chosen by the senders to transmit their messages provides sufficient anonymity
with respect to their local attacker. It is particularly assumed that the attacker does
not observe the first and the last relay node on the route of the messages exchanged
between the sender and the recipient.
A popular implementation based on these concepts is Tor, which is proposed by
Dingledine et al. [2004] and is widely used in practice. Bauer et al. [2007] shows that
Tor’s attacker model is questionable by undermining its assumptions. They demon-
strate an attack that increases the likelihood of observing the first and last Tor relay
node of the message route between a sender and a recipient. This attack can be com-
bined with, traffic confirmation attacks to identify the sender of a message, c.f. Wang
et al. [2007]. However, the anonymity provided by Tor can be even threatened by
attacks within its assumed local attacker model, c.f. Evans et al. [2009]; Mittal et al.
[2011]; Murdoch and Danezis [2005]. These attacks show that designing the protection
of a system for a practice-oriented attacker model, i.e., the local attacker, is risky.
1.3 Structure
Chapter 2 deals with a formal description of the Chaum Mix model and attacker model,
as well as the scheme of the combinatorial attack based on these models. It introduces
a redesign of the HS-attack that is for many realistic Mix parameters computation-
ally feasible. This is confirmed by empirical results that apply the new HS-attack on
simulated random observations of Mix rounds. The observed relations between the
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parameters of the Chaum Mix, the traffic distributions, the number of observations and
the complexity to identify a user’s set of friends motivates analytical analysis to explain
those relations, in this thesis.
Chapter 3 investigates the mean least number of observations required to uniquely
identify a user’s set of friends. It provides a closed formula for the estimate of that
number, even for non-uniform traffic distributions in the Chaum Mix.
Chapter 4 considers the case, where sufficiently many observations have been ag-
gregated to uniquely identify a user’s set of friends. It provides analytical analyses
of the mean time-complexity for that identification that also applies to non-uniformly
distributed traffic.
Chapter 5 studies the disclosure of information about a user’s friends for two cases.
In the first case, the situation is considered, where the number of observations aggre-
gated by the attacker is not sufficient for a unique identification of Alice’s set of friends.
It analyses the number of observations, such that a subset of Alice’s set of friends can
be uniquely identified, or guessed with a certain probability. In the second case, it is
assumed that some unknown observations aggregated by the attack are erroneous. It
determines the maximal rate of erroneous observations, such that Alice’s set of friends
can be uniquely identified by an adapted HS-attack with a high certainty. Analyses
in the first case only apply to uniformly distributed traffic, while the analyses in the
second case also refer to non-uniformly distributed traffic.
Chapter 6 provides an overview over traffic analysis attacks and analyses that refer
to the attacker and Chaum Mix model considered in this thesis. That is a strong attacker
who aggregates information leaked by the Chaum Mix.
Chapter 7 summarises the results in this theses and outlines open problems for
future works.
Appendix A describes the hardware and software deployed by the simulations pre-
sented in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Combinatorial Attack
The combinatorial attack considered in this thesis is a traffic analysis attack that ap-
plies to any anonymity system that provides sender- and recipient-anonymity sets that
are observable to an attacker1, cf. Kesdogan [2006]. That is, we consider an ideal
anonymity system, such that all information that is available to even a strong attacker
are solely the anonymity sets.
Based on the observation that users tend to have a persistent set of friends, the at-
tack aims at disclosing a user’s possible set of friends (i.e., her relationship-anonymity).
It applies combinatorial analyses on that user’s sender- and recipient-anonymity sets,
accumulated over several rounds of the anonymity system. For anonymity systems in
open environments, this even allows exact identification of a user’s set of friends2. This
identification can be achieved, if the attack accumulates sufficiently many anonymity
sets and the user’s set of friends remains persistent during that accumulation. As
this attack evaluates all information available within the anonymity system (i.e., the
anonymity sets), the least number of anonymity sets accumulated to identify a user’s set
of friends provides a hard limit for the anonymity protection provided by the anonymity
system. That user’s set of friends cannot be uniquely identified, if fewer anonymity sets
are observed than determined by the limit. Therefore this limit represents a pendant to
Shannon’s unicity-distance for cryptography that is an information theoretic measure
1Note that this is a sufficient condition for the attack, thus it also applies if, e.g., the recipient-set
would not be anonymous, as this would not decrease the information available to the attacker.
2According to Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010], sender- and recipient-anonymity implies relationship-
anonymity, thus disclosing relationship-anonymity implies the disclosure of the former.
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of protection, introduced by Shannon [1949]. In contrast to this, given that there are
sufficiently many anonymity sets for the disclosure of a user’s set of friends, the com-
putational complexity of the combinatorial attack to disclose those friends represents
a practical limit of anonymity protection.
The combinatorial attack allows classifying users according to the persistence of
their set of friends, in those users, whose relationship-anonymity can be exactly dis-
closed and those for that this is not possible. We study the combinatorial attack to
understand how the sender- and recipient-anonymity sets constructed by an anonymity
system affect this classification. This should aid understanding how to narrow the class
of users susceptible to the combinatorial attack, as well as to increase the computation
complexity of that attack to rise the practical protection of the users. In other words,
our study aids increasing the limit of theoretical and practical anonymity protection for
distinct communication patterns of users.
We study in this thesis the application and analysis of this combinatorial attack on a
concrete anonymity technique, the Chaum Mix in open environments. To solely focus
on the anonymity protection provided by that concept, we assume an ideal implemen-
tation of the Chaum Mix protocols and of the CUVE requirements. As described in
Section 1.2.1.2, the information that is leaked by such a Chaum Mix to a strong at-
tacker is the set of active senders and recipients, i.e., the sender-anonymity set and the
recipient set in a Mix round.
Section 2.1 provides a simple formal description of the Chaum Mix and attacker model
that is the underlying model for all analyses in this thesis. Using this simple Mix and
attacker model, we describe the combinatorial analysis based on computing minimal-
hitting-sets by the HS-attack introduced by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004]. This anal-
ysis is considered, because it allows the unambiguous disclosure of a user’s friends by
accumulating the provably least number of observations of sender-anonymity sets and
recipient sets, as proved by Kesdogan et al. [2006]. This is in contrast to other related
attacks, as outlined in Section 6.
However, the HS-attack requires solving an NP-complete problem and its complex-
ity is originally exponential in time and space, cf. Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004].
We propose in Section 2.2 a new variant of the HS-attack that contributes a minimised
worst case complexity and tractable mean time complexities for practical Mix con-
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figurations, while providing exactly the same results as the HS-attack. Therefore, all
remaining analyses of the HS-attack in this thesis will refer to this more efficient vari-
ant.
Although Section 4 will show that there are realistic cases for which our HS-attack
variant is tractable, the core of the HS-attack and its variants, is the solving of an
NP-complete problem, so that there are always intractable cases. For those cases, Sec-
tion 2.3 contributes an efficient algorithm that empirically estimates the least number
of observations required to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends more closely than
the previous algorithm of Kesdogan et al. [2006]. Although this algorithm is no attack,
users can use it to estimate by themselves, when their set of friends can be disclosed
by the HS-attack, as suggested by Kesdogan [2006, pp. 31 – 37].
2.1 Formal Mix and Attacker Model
The way how anonymity sets are established by the Chaum Mix is similar to the prin-
ciple of ballot boxes for elections, cf. Chaum [1981]. The ballot box hides the caster
of a specific vote within the set of all casters (anonymity set) by shuffling the votes
collected in the ballot box (similar to mixing messages within the Mix). This model
is sufficiently general to derive more complicated models and simple enough to ob-
tain analytical results. We can clearly measure the effect of distinct parameters, like
the size of the anonymity set, or the underlying traffic distribution to the provided
anonymity protection by combinatorial approaches.1 These Mix parameters that spec-
ify the properties of the sender-anonymity sets and recipient sets provided by an ideal
implementation of the Chaum Mix is defined in this section.
Section 1.2.1.2 has outlined that the Chaum Mix does not prevent passive attackers
from observing the sender-anonymity sets and recipient sets for traffic analyses. As
a passive strong attacker does not provide any malicious behaviour that is detectable
by the Mix2 and is sufficient for these attacks, we consider without loss of generality
solely the global passive attacker in this thesis. That is an attacker who wire-taps
every connection in the Mix system and thus observes the sender-anonymity sets and
1The same analysis is difficult if heuristic approaches are applied, as stated by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and
Troncoso [2012].
2Because the sender-anonymity set and recipient set are immanently leaked by the system.
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recipient sets. We formally describe the information accumulated by this attacker, as
well as the evaluation of that information.
2.1.1 Formal Model of Chaum Mix
The Chaum Mix was already introduced in Section 1.2.1.2 with technical details. Now
we want to focus on formal aspects and abstract from technical details. The Mix system
is considered as a black box that outputs information that is visible to the attacker (i.e.,
the sender-anonymity sets and recipient sets), as illustrated in Figure 2.1. It represents
a generalised and simplified model of real-world threshold Mixes that can be adapted
to model more complex Mixes, cf. Serjantov and Danezis [2003].
Senderset
S
S ′ R′
R
ecipientset
R
s6
s3 s1
s8s5
s4
r2
r5r9
r1
r3
Mix
Figure 2.1: Mix model.
The Mix is abstractly described as follow:
• A communication system consists of a set of all senders, S, a set of all recipients,
R, and a Mix node or Mix cascade as shown in Figure 2.1. S and R represent
all users with the ability to send or receive messages in the system1. If a sender
s ∈ S communicates with a recipient r ∈ R, then we say that r is a recipient of
s.
• In each communication round a subset S ′ ⊆ S of all senders each send precisely
one message to their recipients. Let R′ ⊆ R be the set of intended recipients.
The act of sending or receiving a message is not hidden to the attacker, there-
fore (S ′, R′) represents the information leakage available to an attacker in each
round.2
1This definition allows for cases of S 6= R, as well as S = R, i.e., the sender and recipient set might
be distinct or identical.
2Note that a sender can send to multiple recipients in distinct rounds, but cannot send multiple
messages in a single round.
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• We call S ′ the sender-anonymity set, which is the set of all senders who may
have sent a given message in a round. The recipient set1 R′ is the set of all
recipients who have received a message in a round.
• We label the size of the sender-anonymity set, |S ′|, as b which is also called the
batch size.
• The size of the recipient set, |R′|, is less than or equal to b, as each sender sends
exactly one message per round, but several senders may communicate with the
same recipient. The size of the set of all recipients is |R| = u.
2.1.2 Formal Attacker Model
We consider a global passive attacker who observes the traffic on all links between
the users and the Mixes in the network. Such an attacker can observe all sending and
receiving events in the Mix system, that is he has full knowledge about the pair (S ′, R′)
in every Mix round. We assume that the Mix system is not entirely compromised. This
means that at least one of the Mixes in the Mix cascade is honest, so that the Mix
system still provides unlinkability of the message entering and leaving the Mix system
in a round, complying with the formal Mix model described in Section 2.1.1.
The anonymity protection provided by the Mix system is bypassed, if the contacts
of any user can be unambiguously disclosed from the observations, that is from the
accumulation of pairs (S ′, R′). It is thus sufficient to analyse the disclosure of a single
user’s contacts to provide measurements for the protection provided by the Mix system.
The attacker is assumed to apply the best possible attack, such that it is not possible
to gain unambiguous information about a user’s contacts with fewer observations than
required by that attack.
2.1.2.1 Attacker’s Goal
The goal of the attacker is to compute, from a set of traffic observations, all possible
sets of friends of a target sender Alice ∈ S. These possibilities form hypotheses for
the true set of the sender’s friends, HA . For a start we assume that Alice contacts a
1We called it the recipient-anonymity in the past, which is true for passive attackers not involved in
the sending or receiving of any messages. However, the term recipient set is in general more precise.
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static set ofm = | HA | friends during the attack1. As a convention, we always address a
possible set ofmAlice’s friends by the term hypothesis, if not otherwise specified. The
consideration of non-static communication is discussed as an extension of the attacker
model in Section 5.2.
We call a recipient r ∈ HA an Alice’s friend, or just a friend, where HA ⊆ R.
A recipient who does not communicate with Alice, that is r ∈ R \ HA , is called a
non-friend. If no distinction is required, then r is simply called a recipient.
The attacker focuses on revealing Alice’s friends by observing only those pairs
(S ′, R′), where Alice participates as a sender. Under this condition we refer to the
corresponding recipient set R′ as an observation, O. The set of all observations col-
lected during t communication rounds is referred to as the observation set OS =
{O1, . . . ,Ot}.
2.1.2.2 Attack Scheme
The attacks considered in this thesis aid investigating the effort to break the anonymity
protection provided by the Mix concept and thus by the concept of anonymity sets. In
our Mix and attacker model, this effort is dependent on the Mix parameters (u, b,m)
and the distribution of the traffic in the considered Mix. To be more precise, the distri-
bution of the traffic refers to the distribution of the recipients addressed by that traffic
and we further distinguish between the distribution of Alice’s traffic and of the cover-
traffic induced by all senders of the cover-traffic in the Mix system. We use the term
Mix configuration to refer to such a combination of Mix parameters and traffic dis-
tributions. The basic scheme underlying all analyses of these attacks in this thesis is
illustrated in Figure 2.2.
We aim at understanding and proving the relation between the effort to reveal infor-
mation about Alice’s friends (represented by the hypotheses) and the considered Mix
configurations, based on the attacks. The knowledge of this relation will be applied
to derive mathematical measurements of the anonymity protection with respect to the
Mix configurations.
1That is Alice is assumed to contact only friends in HA during the attack.
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Figure 2.2: Basic scheme in analyses of attacks: Variables a, r stand for arbitrary
Alice’s friend a ∈ HA and recipient r ∈ R.
2.1.2.3 Hitting-Set Attack
Given that Alice communicates with a static set of m friends during the attack, the
hypotheses for Alice’s possible set of friends in Figure 2.2 can be specified by com-
puting all hitting-sets of size m with respect to the observation set OS collected by the
attacker. We refer to these hypotheses by the term specified hypotheses, if a distinction
to the general term “hypothesis” is necessary that refers to every set of m recipients,
regardless whether it is a hitting-set or not. A hitting-set is a set that intersects with all
observations1 in OS. A hitting-set is a minimal-hitting-set if no proper subset of it is
a hitting-set. We call a hitting-set H a unique minimum-hitting-set2, if all hitting-sets
H′ 6= H in OS fulfil the condition |H| < |H′|.
By collecting sufficiently many observations, untilOS contains a unique minimum-
hitting-set, the attacker can unambiguously identify Alice’s set of friends HA . This
attack is known as the Hitting-Set attack (HS-attack), which is introduced by Kesdogan
and Pimenidis [2004]. The intuition behind this attack is that at least one Alice’s
friends in HA appears in each observation
3, while this does not hold for any set H 6=
HA , where |H| ≤ | HA |. This applies to non-pathological network traffic, where there
are no recipients that are contacted all the time in the anonymity system and thus appear
in every observation. Therefore, if there are sufficiently many observations, then HA
becomes a unique minimum-hitting-set. We call the problem of identifying the unique
1Due to the definition of observations, HA is a hitting-set inOS, that is for allO ∈ OS, HA ∩O 6= ∅.
2Every unique minimum-hitting-set is a minimal-hitting-set, but the reverse conclusion is invalid.
3Due to the definition of observations.
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minimum-hitting-set, respectively its absent in a given observation set OS, the unique
minimum-hitting-set problem (UMHS problem) . The computation of all minimal-
hitting-sets of a size that do not exceed m is dual to solving the UMHS problem,
which is known to be NP-complete, cf. Garey and Johnson [1990]. By solving the
UMHS problem, we either obtain a unique minimum-hitting-set, or a proof that there
are several minimal-hitting-sets of a minimal size in OS.
The HS-attack consists of collecting and adding new observations to OS and solv-
ing the UMHS problem for that observation set, until OS contains a unique minimum-
hitting-set. We call the corresponding algorithm that solves the UMHS problem the
HS-algorithm. If the HS-algorithm finds a unique minimum-hitting-set, then this
equals Alice’s set of friends HA and thus uniquely identifies that set
1. In that case we
say that the attack succeeds. It was proven by Kesdogan et al. [2006] that the HS-attack
requires the least number of observations to unambiguously identify HA with respect
to the given Mix and attacker model. Therefore, the mean number of observations re-
quired to succeed the HS-attack2 measures the maximal achievable protection provided
by the Mix system against a strong attacker, similar to Shannon’s unicity-distance in
cryptography, cf. Shannon [1949]. Other combinatorial attacks are either a special
case of the HS-attack, or require more observations for the identification of Alice’s
friends as outlined in Section 6.1.1. We therefore refer to the HS-attack as the basis for
combinatorial analyses in this thesis.
In applying the HS-attack, we assume that the size of Alice’s set of friends, m, is
known, since m can be easily learned, as discussed in Section 2.1.2.4.
Example 2.1.1 (Unique Identification by HS-attack). We illustrate the unique identi-
fication of Alice’s set of friends HA by the HS-attack. In this example, the set of all
recipients is R = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and Alice’s set of friends is HA = {1, 2, 3}, thus
u = |R| = 6 and m = | HA | = 3. The set of observations collected by the attacker is
initially OS0 = {}. When collecting the i-th observation Oi the attacker extends this
set of observations to OSi = OSi−1 ∪Oi and computes all specified hypotheses in OSi
as shown in Table 2.1.
The fourth column in Table 2.1 shows the specified hypotheses in OSi, determined
by the original HS-algorithm of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004]. If no observations
1The equality might not hold in pathological cases that are unlikely as discussed in Section 2.1.2.4.
2That is the average size of the observation setOS collected by the attacker to succeed the HS-attack.
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(i.e., i = 0) have been collected, then every set of size m is a hitting-set. In that
case, all hypotheses are specified hypotheses and the number of hypotheses is
(
u
m
)
,
which is 20 in our example. The HS-attack excludes previously specified hypotheses by
each collected observation, until a single specified hypothesis remains. That specified
hypothesis equals Alice’s set of friends.
The third column in Table 2.1 represents all minimal-hitting-sets (MHS) in OSi.
We can see that if a single specified hypothesis remains, then this hypothesis is also
a unique minimum-hitting-set. Thus computing all specified hypotheses by the HS-
algorithm also provides a solution to the UMHS problem for hitting-sets of size m.
This example also illustrates that the number of specified hypotheses is never lower
than the number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m in every sequence of obser-
vations collected by the attacker. There are particularly more specified hypotheses
than minimal-hitting-sets prior to a certain number of observations, while they become
equal after that number of observations.
2.1.2.4 Learning Number of Alice’s Friends
The intuition behind our attack is that at least one of Alice’s friends must appear in each
observation1, while this does not hold for any other setH, whereH 6⊇ HA . Therefore,
after a sufficient number of t observations, Alice’s set of friends HA remains the unique
minimum-hitting-set.
Assume the existence of a set in which H 6= HA , where |H| < m happens to be a
unique minimum-hitting-set2. Let q be the probability that any recipient in H appears
in a random observation. The probability that H remains a hitting-set after x obser-
vations decreases according to an exponential function qx and is thus negligible. As
defined in cryptography, a function f(x) : N 7→ R is negligible, if for every positive
polynomial pol(x), there is a c > 0 such that |f(x)| < 1
pol(x)
for all x > c. Conse-
quently, collecting sufficiently many observations when applying the HS-attack leads
to a probability of learning the wrong set of Alice’s friends and the wrong value of m
that is very small to matter. This is even the case for moderate number of observations
x.
1Recall that an “observation” refers to a round in which Alice participates.
2This case is pathological, as it requires an uncommon combination of two coincidences, a hitting-
set H of a size less than m and the absence of any other hitting-sets of the same size as |H|.
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i Oi MHS Hypotheses
0 − − {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 3, 6}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 6},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{2, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6}, {3, 5, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
1 {1, 4} {1}, {4} {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 3, 6}, {2, 3, 4},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{2, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
2 {2, 5} {1, 2}, {1, 5},
{4, 2}, {4, 5}
{1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 3, 6}, {2, 3, 4},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{2, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
3 {1, 6} {1, 2}, {1, 5},
{4, 2, 6}, {4, 5, 6}
{1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
4 {3, 4} {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4},
{1, 5, 3}, {1, 5, 4},
{4, 2, 6}, {4, 5, 6}
{1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
5 {2, 6} {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4},
{4, 2, 6}, {4, 5, 6}
{1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4},
{1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
6 {1, 3} {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4} {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4}
7 {3, 5} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
Table 2.1: HS-attack applied to collected observations, given knowledge of m. 3rd and
4th column show minimal-hitting-sets (MHS) and hypotheses computed by HS-attack.
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We can easily learn m by applying the HS-attack for the possible set of Alice’s
friends of size m′ = 1, . . . ,m.1 If the HS-attack is applied for m′ < m, then there will
be no hitting-set of size m′ after collecting some set of observations OS′, where t′ =
|OS′| is the number of observations. Let t = |OS| be the least number of observations
to succeed the HS-attack for m, then t′ ≤ t, 2where OS = OS′ ∪ {Ot′+1, . . . ,Ot}. If
m′ < m, then t′ is usually low3, such that the correct value m can be learned fast and
reliably. The MHS column in Table 2.1 of Example 2.1.1 illustrates, when values of
m′ that underestimate m are detected.
m′ = 1: After collecting the second observation (i = 2), all MHS in OS2 are of at
least size 2. This proves that there is no hitting-set of a size lower 2 in OS2. The
HS-attack applied for m′ = 1 will fail to find any hitting-sets of size 1 and thus
detects that the size of Alice’s set of friends cannot be 1.
m′ = 2: After collecting the fourth observation (i = 4), all MHS in OS4 are of at least
size 3. This proves that there is no hitting-set of size smaller than 3 in OS2. The
HS-attack applied for m′ = 2 will fail to find any hitting-sets of size 2 and thus
detects that the size of Alice’s set of friends cannot be 2. The attacker learns the
correct value of m after 4 observations in this example.
2.2 Hitting-Set Attack Based on ExactHS
ExactHS is an algorithm that allows solving the UMHS problem by computing all
minimal-hitting-sets in a given observation set OS that does not exceed the size m. Its
worst case time-complexity is proportional to bm, while its space-complexity is lin-
ear, in contrast to the original HS-algorithm of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] that
requires O(
(
u
m
)
) time and space-complexity. By using ExactHS to solve the UMHS
problem in the HS-attack, instead of using the original HS-algorithm, we obtain our
variant of the HS-attack. We refer to that variant by the term HS-attack using Ex-
actHS. The practical advantage of the HS-attack using ExactHS is its low mean time-
1By applying the HS-attack for m′, the size of all computed hitting-sets do not exceed m′.
2This inequality is obvious. As long as there is a hitting-set H′ of size m′ < m, there must be
several hitting-sets H = H′ ∪ {rm′+1, . . . , rm} of size m for arbitrary {rm′+1, . . . , rm} ⊆ R \H′.
3In general, the smaller the size m′ of a set H′ 6= HA , the smaller is its probability to remain a
hitting-set when new observations are collected and thus the smaller is t′.
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complexity that is with respect to many realistic Mix configurations, computationally
feasible. This feasibility is despite the NP-completeness of the UMHS problem, as we
will demonstrate in Section 2.2.4 and prove in Chapter 4.
The computational advantage of ExactHS over HS-algorithm is due to two reasons:
Firstly, ExactHS computes all minimal-hitting-sets instead of all specified hypotheses
with respect to the attacker’s observation set OS and m.1 It makes use of the obser-
vation that the number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m (i.e., at most bm) is
lower than the number of specified hypotheses of size m (i.e.,
(
u
m
)
) in every observa-
tion set OS, as demonstrated in Table 2.1 of Example 2.1.1. Secondly, the mean time-
complexity of ExactHS approaches a lower bound2, if applied to sufficiently many
collected observations. This is due to the decrease of the number of minimal-hitting-
sets of size m with respect to the number of observations. Therefore, ExactHS can
be applied, when the UMHS problem becomes computationally less hard. This is the
case, when the number of observations collected by the attacker is close to that to
uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends.
This is not possible with HS-algorithm, as it requires the computation of all pos-
sible
(
u
m
)
hypotheses prior to determining which hypotheses can be excluded by the
collected observations.
Section 2.2.1 introduces the ExactHS algorithm. The correctness and completeness
of that algorithm in computing all minimal-hitting-sets in any given observation set is
proved in Section 2.2.2. Section 2.2.3 then determines a tight bound for the worst case
time and space-complexity of ExactHS.
2.2.1 ExactHS Algorithm
ExactHS recursively computes all minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m in a given
observation set OS. Applying ExactHS thus allows proving, whether there is a unique
minimum-hitting-set of size m in a given observation set OS. We use the following
notation:
1The MHS column in Table 2.1.1 equals the result of ExactHS with respect to OSi and m. If there
is only a single MHS, then it is a UMHS, otherwise there is more than one MHS of at most size m.
2This bound is dependent on the Mix configuration and is analytically determined in Chapter 4.
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• C: Set of at most m suspected1 recipients representing a subset of a possible
hitting-set. We initially set C = {}.
• HS: Set that stores all hitting-sets identified by ExactHS, which is initiallyHS =
{}. It represents a global variable that is a non integral part of ExactHS, like an
output stream on the display2.
• OS[r]: Set of observations containing recipient r, that is OS[r] = {O ∈ OS |
r ∈ O}. We call |OS[r]| the frequency of r, where |OS[r]| is 0, if r is not in any
observations of OS.
• OS[{r1, . . . , rk}]: Set of observations containing any recipient r1, . . . , rk, that is
the observation set resulting from
⋃k
i=1OS[ri].
The basic scheme of ExactHS was first proposed by Pham and Kesdogan [2009];
Pham [2008]. It is presented in Algorithm 1, solely to illustrate the difference to its en-
hanced version as implemented in Algorithm 2, that is the focus of this thesis. While
Algorithm 1 Basic Scheme of ExactHS.
1: procedure EXACTHS(OS′, m′, C)
2: if OS′ = {} then
3: HS = HS ∪ C . C is a hitting-set
4: else if m′ ≥ 1 then . C can be extended, if |C| < m
5: fix O′ ∈ OS′
6: while ({} 6∈ OS′) ∧ (|O′| ≥ 1) do
7: choose r ∈ O′ . r will be added to C
8: EXACTHS(OS′ \ OS′[r],m′ − 1,C ∪ {r}) . select remaining (m′ − 1)
recipients
9: OS′ ← ⋃O′l∈OS′{O′l \ {r}} . remove r from all observ. in OS′
10: O′ ← O′ \ {r} . do not choose r in this recursion level again
both ExactHS versions provide the same worst case complexities, Algorithm 2 con-
tains tiny, but effective changes in Lines 5 – 7 to reduce the mean time-complexity.
These changes are based on analytical results that will be introduced in Chapter 4. We
anticipate the effect of the lower mean time-complexity due to applying those results
to ExactHS, by evaluating Algorithm 2 in this chapter.
1During execution, C either becomes a minimal-hitting-set, or it will be proved not to be a subset of
any minimal-hitting-sets that has not been evaluated.
2The space-complexity of ExactHS is therefore independent of HS.
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All evaluations, descriptions and analyses in this remaining chapter refer by default
to the enhanced version of ExactHS, whenever the term ExactHS is referred, if not
otherwise stated. However, analyses of the worst cases complexities apply to both
versions of ExactHS. We now describe in detail the steps taken by ExactHS, when
jumping from one level of recursion to the succeeding level of recursion and back.
Algorithm 2 ExactHS.
1: procedure EXACTHS(OS′, m′, C)
2: if OS′ = {} then
3: HS = HS ∪ C . C is a hitting-set
4: else if m′ ≥ 1 then . C can be extended, if |C| < m
5: fix O′ ∈ OS′ that contains the most frequent recipient
6: while ({} 6∈ OS′) ∧ ( max
{r1,...,rm′}⊆
⋃
O∈OS′ O
{∑m′l=1 |OS′[rl]|} ≥ |OS′|) do
7: choose r ∈ O′ that is most frequent . r will be added to C
8: EXACTHS(OS′ \ OS′[r],m′ − 1,C ∪ {r}) . select remaining (m′ − 1)
recipients
9: OS′ ← ⋃O′l∈OS′{O′l \ {r}} . remove r from all observ. in OS′
10: O′ ← O′ \ {r} . do not choose r in this recursion level again
The computation of the minimal-hitting-sets is initially invoked by calling the al-
gorithm ExactHS (OS,m,C) and setting C = {} and HS = {}.
For ease of reference we address by the subscript i the state of a set, when entering
the i-th level of recursion. Thus Ci,OS′i are the sets prior to any modifications that
could appear within level i, where C0 = {} and OS′0 = OS are the sets in the initial
call of ExactHS.
At each level i of recursion in the algorithm, jumping to the next level i+1 extends
the current set of recipients Ci by exactly one recipient, r, chosen at Line 7 in Algo-
rithm 2. This recipient is element of a fixed observation O′ ∈ OS′i, determined by the
algorithm in Line 5 in level i. The set of chosen recipients when entering the (i+ 1)-th
level of recursion is thus Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {r}.
OS′i+1, determined at Line 8, results from removing all observations intersecting
with r in OS′i and removing all recipients who have been previously evaluated in level
i (within the while loop). That way, we focus in the (i + 1)-th recursion level only on
those observations that are not hit by recipients in Ci+1.
If, at Line 2, the algorithm detects that all remaining observations in OS′i+1 in-
tersect with Ci+1, Ci+1 is proven to be a hitting-set. This hitting-set is added to HS
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and ExactHS immediately return back to level i, so that no set containing Ci+1 will be
computed in the future1. Otherwise, Line 6 enables detecting the case that every set
consisting of Ci+1 and any m− (i+ 1) remaining recipients cannot hit all observations
in OS. This disproves all hypotheses containing Ci+1 that have not yet been evaluated
by ExactHS, therefore ExactHS immediately returns back to level i, so that any set
containing Ci+1 will be ignored in the future2. We refer to sets excluded by the algo-
rithm, because they are proven to be minimal-hitting-sets, or to be no subset of any
hitting-set by the term finalised sets.
After choosing and evaluating recipient r in recursion level i, ExactHS removes, at
Line 9, r from all observations of OS′i and, at Line 10, from the designated observation
O′. Thus Ci will not be extended by r in any succeeding recursion level again.
ExactHS stops choosing new recipients in level i, if Line 6 detects that all recipients
in the designated observation O′ have been chosen (first condition), or if Ci and any
m− i remaining recipients cannot hit all observations in OS (second condition).
2.2.1.1 Identification of Hitting-Sets – Examples
In order to support understanding Algorithm 2, we demonstrate the identification of all
minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m in an observation set by the ExactHS algorithm
in two examples. Example 2.2.1 shows ExactHS applied to an observation set that does
not contain a unique minimum-hitting-set. Example 2.2.2 shows ExactHS applied to
an observation set that contains a unique minimum-hitting-set.
In these examples, Alice’s set of friends is HA = {1, 2, 3}, and the batch size of
the Mix is b = 2. We demonstrate the application of Algorithm 2 on sequences of
observations O1, . . . ,Ot′ collected by the attacker at distinct time points 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t,
that are enlisted in Figure 2.3.
4
1
O1
6
1
O2
4
3
O3
5
2
O4
7
3
O5
8
2
O6
· · · 63
Ot
Figure 2.3: Sequence of collected observations from time point 1 to t.
1Although these sets would be hitting-sets in OS, they would not be minimal.
2This avoids evaluating sets for that we know that they cannot be hitting-sets in OS. The lower |C|
is, the more computation can be avoided.
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As a convention, we attach a numerical subscripts i to a set in Algorithm 2 to denote
the state of that set when entering the i-th level of recursion in Algorithm 2, where
OS′0 = OS,C0 = {} are the initial states. In each level i of recursion in Algorithm 2,
an observation O′i ∈ OS′i is fixed and ExactHS chooses one of the two recipients in O′i.
We number the choices alphabetically by a, b. The state of O′i when conducting the
first choice in level i is labelled O′i.a.
We assume without loss of generality that Algorithm 2 evaluates observations in
OS′ from left to right in Line 5. Similarly recipients in a set O′ are assumed to be
evaluated from left to right in Line 7.
Example 2.2.1 (Observation Set without Unique Minimum-Hitting-Set). In this exam-
ple, ExactHS is applied to identify all minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m = 3 in the
observation set OS = {O1, . . . ,O5}, that does not contain a unique minimum-hitting-
set.
i.j O′i.j OS
′
i.j Ci+1 OS
′
i+1 HS
0.a {4, 1} {{4, 1}, {6, 1}, {4, 3},
{5, 2}, {7, 3}}
{4} {{6, 1}, {5, 2}
{7, 3}, }
{}
1.a {6, 1} {{6, 1}, {5, 2}, {7, 3}} {4,−} − {}
0.b {1} {{1}, {6, 1}, {3},
{5, 2}, {7, 3}}
{1} {{3}, {5, 2},
{7, 3}}
{}
1.a {3} {{3}, {5, 2},
{7, 3}}
{1, 3} {{5, 2}} {}
2.a {5, 2} {{5, 2}} {1, 3, 5} {{}} {}
3.a − {{}} − − {{1, 3, 5}}
2.b {2} {{2}} {1, 3, 2} {{}} {{1, 3, 5}}
3.a − {{}} − − {{1, 3, 5},
{1, 3, 2}}
Table 2.2: ExactHS applied on OS = {O1, . . . ,O5} that contains no unique minimum-
hitting-set. The same line colour highlights the same level of recursion.
Each line in Table 2.2 shows the state of sets in a level of recursion that result from
ExactHS constructing a particular set C that is suspected to be subset of a hitting-set
in OS. We explain Table 2.2 on a line by line basis with respect to steps in Algorithm 2,
next.
0.a: This is the state, when Algorithm 2 is initially invoked by ExactHS (OS,m,C),
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thus OS′0.a = OS
′
0 = OS and C0 = C = {} is the first state in level 0. Line 5 in
Algorithm 2 fixes O′0 = {4, 1}, as it is the first observation in OS′0 that contains
a recipient with maximal frequency1. Line 6 in Algorithm 2 is fulfilled, as {} 6∈
OS′0.a and |OS′0.a[4]|+|OS′0.a[1]|+|OS′0.a[3]| ≥ |OS′0.a|. Algorithm 2 thus chooses
the first recipient 4 in O′0.a to extend C, such that C1 = {} ∪ {4} and OS′1 =
OS′0.a \ OS′0.a[4], when Algorithm 2 enters the next level of recursion.
1.a: O′1 = {6, 1} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′1 that contains a recip-
ient with maximal frequency. There are no recipients r1, r2 in OS′1.a, such that
|OS′1.a[r1]|+ |OS′1.a[r2]| ≥ |OS′1.a|. This proves that C1 = {4} is no subset of any
hitting-set of size m = 3 that has not been evaluated and prevents Algorithm 2
from choosing the next recipient. Instead, Algorithm 2 terminates this level and
returns to level 0. ({4} is a finalised set.)
0.b: Due to Lines 9, 10 in Algorithm 2, recipient 4 that was previously chosen in level
0, is removed from all observations inOS′0.a and fromO
′
0.a, resulting inOS
′
0.b and
O′0.b. Only recipient 1 in O
′
0.b remains to be evaluated
2 in the current level. As
{} 6∈ OS′0.b and |OS′0.b[1]|+|OS′0.b[3]|+|OS′0.b[6]| ≥ |OS′0.b|, Algorithm 2 chooses
recipient 1 to extend C, such that C1 = {} ∪ {1} and OS′1 = OS′0.b \ OS′0.b[1],
when Algorithm 2 enters the next level of recursion.
1.a: O′1 = {3} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′1 that contains a recipient
with maximal frequency. Only recipient 3 in O′1.a remains to be evaluated in the
current level. As {} 6∈ OS′1.a and |OS′1.a[3]| + |OS′1.a[5]| ≥ |OS′1.a|, Algorithm 2
chooses recipient 3 to extend C, such that C2 = {1} ∪ {3} and OS′2 = OS′1.a \
OS′1.a[3], when Algorithm 2 enters the next level of recursion.
2.a: O′2 = {5, 2} is fixed and the only observation in OS′2. As {} 6∈ OS′2.a and
|OS′2.a[5]| ≥ |OS′2.a|, Algorithm 2 chooses recipient 5 to extend C, such that
C3 = {1, 3}∪{5} and OS′3 = OS′2.a \OS′2.a[5], when Algorithm 2 enters the next
level of recursion.
1We always refer to the frequencies of recipients in the observation set in the considered level of
recursion.
2Note that O′0 is fixed in Line 5 in Algorithm 2, therefore only recipients in O
′
0 are evaluated in the
0-th level of recursion.
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3.a: O′3 = {}, thus C3 = {1, 3, 5} is a hitting-set and is added to HS. After that
Algorithm 2 terminates this level and returns to level 2. ({1, 3, 5} is a finalised
set.)
2.b: Recipient 5, that was previously chosen in level 2, is removed from all obser-
vations in OS′2.a and from O
′
2.a, resulting in OS
′
2.b and O
′
2.b. As {} 6∈ OS′2.b
and |OS′2.b[2]| ≥ |OS′2.b|, Algorithm 2 chooses recipient 2 to extend C, such that
C3 = {1, 3}∪ {2} and OS′3 = OS′2.b \OS′2.b[2], when Algorithm 2 enters the next
level of recursion.
3.a: O′3 = {}, thus C3 = {1, 3, 2} is a hitting-set and is added to HS. After that
Algorithm 2 terminates this level and returns to level 2. ({1, 3, 2} is a finalised
set.)
Algorithm 2 terminates, when returning from the last level 3 above, as no recipients
remain to be chosen in all levels below 3. The attacker can conclude from the hitting-
sets {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 2} in HS that there is no unique minimum-hitting-set in OS. Thus
more observations have to be collected to succeed the HS-attack.
Example 2.2.2 (Observation Set with Unique Minimum-Hitting-Set). In this example,
ExactHS is applied to identify all minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m = 3 in the
observation set OS = {O1, . . . ,O6}, that contains a unique minimum-hitting-set. In
comparison to Example 2.2.1, the attacker collects one more observation, which is O6.
We explain Table 2.3 on a line by line basis with respect to steps in Algorithm 2,
next.
0.a: This is the first state in level 0, thus OS′0.a = OS
′
0 = OS and C0 = {}. O′0 =
{4, 1} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′0 that contains a recipient with
maximal frequency. As {} 6∈ OS′0.a and |OS′0.a[4]| + |OS′0.a[1]| + |OS′0.a[3]| ≥
|OS′0.a|, Algorithm 2 chooses the first recipient 4 in O′0.a to extend C, such that
C1 = {} ∪ {4} and OS′1 = OS′0.a \ OS′0.a[4], when Algorithm 2 enters the next
level of recursion.
1.a: O′1 = {5, 2} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′1 that contains a recipi-
ent with maximal frequency1. There are no recipients r1, r2 in OS′1.a, such that
1O′1 is not the first observation in OS
′
1, but the first containing a recipient with maximal frequency.
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|OS′1.a[r1]|+ |OS′1.a[r2]| ≥ |OS′1.a|. This proves that C1 = {4} is no subset of any
hitting-set of size m = 3 that has not been evaluated and prevents Algorithm 2
from choosing the next recipient. Instead, Algorithm 2 terminates this level and
returns to level 0. ({4} is a finalised set.)
0.b: Recipient 4, that was previously chosen in level 0, is removed from all observa-
tions in OS′0.a and from O
′
0.a, resulting in OS
′
0.b and O
′
0.b. Only recipient 1 in O
′
0.b
remains to be evaluated in Algorithm 2 in the current level. As {} 6∈ OS′0.b and
|OS′0.b[1]|+ |OS′0.b[3]|+ |OS′0.b[2]| ≥ |OS′0.b|, Algorithm 2 chooses recipient 1 to
extend C, such that C1 = {}∪{1} and OS′1 = OS′0.b \OS′0.b[1], when Algorithm 2
enters the next level of recursion.
1.a: O′1 = {3} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′1 that contains a recipient
with maximal frequency. Only recipient 3 in O′1.a remains to be evaluated in the
current level. As {} 6∈ OS′1.a and |OS′1.a[3]| + |OS′1.a[2]| ≥ |OS′1.a|, Algorithm 2
chooses recipient 3 to extend C, such that C2 = {1} ∪ {3} and OS′2 = OS′1.a \
OS′1.a[3], when Algorithm 2 enters the next level of recursion.
2.a: O′2 = {5, 2} is fixed, as it is the first observation in OS′2 that contains a recipient
with maximal frequency. As {} 6∈ OS′2.a and |OS′2.a[2]| ≥ |OS′2.a|, Algorithm 2
chooses recipient1 2 to extend C, such that C3 = {1, 3}∪{2} and OS′3 = OS′2.a \
OS′2.a[2], when Algorithm 2 enters the next level of recursion.
3.a: O′3 = {}, thus C3 = {1, 3, 2} is a hitting-set and is added to HS. After that
Algorithm 2 terminates this level and returns to level 2. ({1, 3, 2} is a finalised
set.)
2.b: Recipient 2, that was previously chosen in level 2, is removed from all observa-
tions in OS′2.a and from O
′
2.a, resulting in OS
′
2.b and O
′
2.b. There is no recipient r
in O′2.b, such that |OS′2.b[r]| ≥ |OS′2.b|. This proves that C2 = {1, 3} is no subset
of any hitting-set of size m = 3 that has not bee evaluated and prevents Algo-
rithm 2 from choosing the next recipient. Instead, Algorithm 2 terminates this
level and returns to level 1. ({1, 3} is a finalised set.)
1The frequency of recipient 2 is maximal, therefore it is the first recipient chosen from O′2.
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Algorithm 2 terminates, when returning from the last level 2 above, as no recipients
remain to be chosen in all levels below 2. The attacker thus identifies the unique
minimum-hitting-set {1, 3, 2} in HS.
This example illustrates that the number of observations required by ExactHS to
uniquely identify HA is the least possible. There is no unique minimum-hitting-set, if
the attacker collects just one fewer observation, as shown in Example 2.2.1. Clearly,
HA remains a unique minimum-hitting-set, even if more than the least number of ob-
servations are collected, if Alice does not change her set of friends.
i.j O′i.j OS
′
i.j Ci+1 OS
′
i+1 HS
0.a {4, 1} {{4, 1}, {6, 1}, {4, 3},
{5, 2}, {7, 3}, {8, 2}}
{4} {{6, 1}, {5, 2}
{7, 3}, {8, 2}}
{}
1.a {5, 2} {{6, 1}, {5, 2}, {7, 3},
{8, 2}}
{4,−} − {}
0.b {1} {{1}, {6, 1}, {3},
{5, 2}, {7, 3}, {8, 2}}
{1} {{3}, {5, 2},
{7, 3}, {8, 2}}
{}
1.a {3} {{3}, {5, 2},
{7, 3}, {8, 2}}
{1, 3} {{5, 2}, {8, 2}} {}
2.a {5, 2} {{5, 2}, {8, 2}} {1, 3, 2} {{}} {}
3.a − {{}} − − {{1, 3, 2}}
2.b {5} {{5}, {8}} {1, 3,−} − {{1, 3, 2}}
Table 2.3: ExactHS applied to OS = {O1, . . . ,O6}, the least observation set contain-
ing a unique minimum-hitting-set. The same line colour highlights the same level of
recursion.
2.2.2 Soundness and Completeness
We prove that ExactHS is sound and complete with respect to the computation of min-
imal hitting-sets in the given observation set OS and the maximal-hitting-set size m.
Soundness means that ExactHS only computes hitting-sets of at most size m in OS.
Completeness means that ExactHS identifies all minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m
in OS.
Section 2.2.2.1 proofs properties of hitting-sets that are crucial for the proofs of sound-
ness and completeness in Section 2.2.2.2 and Section 2.2.2.3.
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2.2.2.1 Properties of Hitting-Sets
In this section, we show that the hitting- respectively non hitting-set property of a setH
in an observation set OS is inherited by particular subsets of H and subsets of OS and
constraints thereof. These inheritance relations are formulated in Claim 1 and Claim 2
and will be required in the proof of soundness and completeness of ExactHS.
Claim 1. Let H ⊆ R be any set of recipients and OS a given set of observations. For
every set {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆ R \H and k ∈ N, H is a hitting-set in the observation set
OS, if and only if H is a hitting-set in OS′ = {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS}. If H is a
minimal-hitting-set, then this equivalence relation preserves that property. 1
Claim 2. Let H ⊆ R be any set of recipients and OS be a given set of observations.
For every set C ⊆ H, H is a hitting-set in OS if and only if H \ C is a hitting-set in
OS \OS[C]. If H is a minimal-hitting-set in OS, then H \ C is a minimal-hitting-set in
OS \ OS[C].2
By combining these two claims, we can deduce for every C ⊆ H and {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆
R \ H, that H is a hitting-set in OS, if and only if H \ C is a hitting-set in {O \
{r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS \ OS[C]}. And, if H is a minimal-hitting-set in OS, then H \ C
is a minimal-hitting-set in {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS \ OS[C]}.
Proof of Claim 1 The proof of Claim 1 is decomposed into two proofs. The first
proof shows the “equivalence relation for the hitting-set property” in Claim 1, that is:
∀H⊆R∀{r1,...,rk}⊆R\H : H is hitting-set in OS⇔
H is hitting-set in {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS} (2.1)
The second proof shows that the equivalence relation in (2.1) also applies to the
minimal-hitting-set property, that is:
∀H⊆R∀{r1,...,rk}⊆R\H : H is minimal-hitting-set in OS⇔
H is minimal-hitting-set in {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS} (2.2)
1If H is no hitting-set in OS, then it does not mean that there is no hitting-set in OS. However, if
{} ∈ OS, then there are no hitting-sets in OS.
2We define that every set H ⊆ R is a hitting-set in OS = {}, including H = {}.
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Proof (first). We prove the equivalence relation “⇔” in (2.1) for each direction of
the relation “⇐” and “⇒” separately. The proof of (2.1) is done by contradiction.
Therefore, it is assumed that there are sets H, {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆ R \ H and OS, such
that the relation that H is a hitting-set in OS, if and only if H is a hitting-set in
OS′ = {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS} is invalid.
⇒: Assume that there is a set {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆ R \ H, such that H is a hitting-set
in OS and no hitting-set in OS′ = {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS}. Then there
is an observation O′ ∈ OS′, such that H ∩ O′ = ∅. By definition of OS′, the
observation O = O′ ∪ {r1, . . . , rk} must be in OS and thus H ∩ O = ∅. This
is a contradiction to the initial assumption that H is a hitting-set in OS and thus
proves that: If H is a hitting-set in OS, then it is a hitting-set in OS′.
⇐: Assume that there is a set {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆ R \ H, such that H is a hitting-set in
OS′ = {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈ OS} and no hitting-set in OS. Then for all
O′ ∈ OS′, H ∩ O′ 6= ∅. Since for every O ∈ OS, O ⊇ O′, we conclude that
H∩O 6= ∅. This is a contradiction to the initial assumption that H is no hitting-
set in OS and thus proves that: If H is a hitting-set in OS′, then it is a hitting-set
in OS.
These two proofs, “⇒” and “⇐” complete the proof of (2.1).
Proof (second). We prove the equivalence relation “⇔” in (2.2) for each direction of
the relation “⇐” and “⇒” separately. Let H ⊆ R, {r1, . . . , rk} ⊆ R \H be any set of
recipients and OS be any given observation set, where OS′ = {O \ {r1, . . . , rk} | O ∈
OS}.
Recall from Section 2.1.2.3 that a minimal-hitting-set is a hitting-set in a given
observation set, such that no proper subset of it is a hitting-set in that observation set.
⇒: Let H be a minimal-hitting-set in OS, then it is due to (2.1) a hitting-set in OS′.
Since no subset H′ ⊂ H is a hitting-set in OS, expression (2.1) implies that no
H′ ⊂ H is a hitting-set in OS′. Therefore H is a minimal-hitting-set in OS′.
⇐: Let H be a minimal-hitting-set in OS′, then it is a hitting-set in OS. Since no
subset H′ ⊂ H is a hitting-set in OS′, expression (2.1) implies that no H′ ⊂ H
is a hitting-set in OS. Therefore H is a minimal-hitting-set in OS.
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These two proofs, “⇒” and “⇐” complete the proof of (2.2).
Proof of Claim 2 The proof of Claim 2 is decomposed into two proofs. The first
proof shows the equivalence relation for the hitting-set property in Claim 2, that is:
∀H∈R∀C⊆H : H is hitting-set in OS⇔ H \ C is hitting-set in OS \ OS[C] (2.3)
The second proof shows that:
∀H∈R∀C⊆H : H is minimal hitting-set in OS⇒
H \ C is minimal hitting-set in OS \ OS[C] (2.4)
Proof (first). We prove the equivalence relation “⇔” in (2.3) for each direction of the
relation “⇐” and “⇒” separately. The proof of (2.3) is done by contradiction. There-
fore, it is assumed that there are sets H, C ⊂ H and OS, such that the relation that H
is a hitting-set in OS, if and only if H \ C is a hitting-set in OS \ OS[C] is invalid.
⇒: Assume that there is a set H and a non-empty set C ⊆ H, such that H is a
hitting-set in OS andH \C is no hitting-set in OS\OS[C]. Therefore, there must
be an observation O ∈ OS \OS[C], such that (H \ C) ∩O = ∅. However C does
not intersect any observation in OS \ OS[C] either, that is ∀O′ ∈ OS \ OS[C] :
C ∩ O′ = ∅. This implies that H ∩ O = ∅, which is a contradiction to the initial
assumption that H is a hitting-set in OS. This proves that: If H is a hitting-set
in OS, then H \ C is a hitting-set in OS \ OS[C].
⇐: Assume that there is a set H and C ⊆ H, such that H \ C is a hitting-set in
OS \ OS[C] and H is no hitting-set in OS. Note that C is a hitting-set in OS[C]
due to the definition of OS[C], while H \ C is a hitting-set in OS \ OS[C] due
to the initial assumption. These two facts imply that H is a hitting-set in OS,
which is a contradiction to the initial assumption that H is no hitting-set in OS
and proves that: If H \ C is a hitting-set in OS \OS[C], then H is a hitting-set in
OS.
These two proofs “⇒” and “⇐” complete the proof of (2.3).
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Proof (second). We now prove (2.4). Let H be a minimal-hitting-set in OS, we show
that for every C ⊆ H, H \ C is a minimal-hitting-set in OS \ OS[C]. This requires
proving the following two conditions:
• For every C ⊆ H, H \ C is a hitting-set in OS \ OS[C].
• For every C ⊆ H, every proper subsetH⊂ ⊂ H\C is no hitting-set inOS\OS[C].
The first condition is already proven by (2.3), therefore we only prove the second
condition. Let us define for convenience the term H′ = H⊂ ∪ C. Since H′ ⊂ H,
we conclude that H′ is no hitting-set1 in OS. The equivalence relation in (2.3) implies
that for every C′ ⊆ H′, H′ \ C′ is no hitting-set in OS \ OS[C′]. Using the substitution
C′ = C, this particularly proves thatH′\C is no hitting-set inOS\OS[C] and completes
the proof of (2.4). 2
2.2.2.2 Soundness
Proof. We prove the soundness of Algorithm 2 by contradiction and therefore assume
that ExactHS adds a set H to HS that is no hitting-set in OS, where |H| = i ≤ m.
This means that there is an observation O ∈ OS, such that H ∩ O = ∅.
The proof is based on the analysis of the trace of computing H = {r1, . . . , ri} by
ExactHS. To aid this, we define without loss of generality that Cj = {r1, . . . , rj} ⊆ R
is the set of distinct recipients when ExactHS enters the j-th level of recursion, where
rj is the recipient who was added when entering the j-th level of recursion on the trace
of computing H, for j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, C0 = {} and Ci = H.
Observe that after choosing rj in the (j − 1)-th level of recursion, Line 8 invokes
the j-th level of recursion by submitting OS′j = {O′ \ {rj1 , . . . , rjk} | O′ ∈ OS′j \
OS′j[rj], {rj1 , . . . , rjk} ⊆ R \H}, where rj1 , . . . , rjk are any recipients evaluated and
removed3 in the while loop in the (j − 1)-th level of recursion4 prior to choosing rj .
According to Claim 2, H is no hitting-set in OS, if and only if H \ {r1, . . . , rj} is no
1Because H is a minimal-hitting-set in OS, no proper subset of H must be a hitting-set in OS.
2It is possible that H \ C is minimal-hitting-set in OS \ OS[C], whereas H is a hitting-set, but no
minimal-hitting-set in OS. Therefore (2.4) contains no equivalence relation for the minimal-hitting-set
property.
3The index k refers to distinct values in different levels of recursion and is reused for convenience.
4Since we only trace the case, when ExactHS computes H, no r ∈ H must be removed on that
trace, therefore {rj1 , . . . , rjk} ∩H = ∅ in all level j ∈ {0, . . . , i} of recursion.
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hitting-set in OS \ {r1, . . . , rj} for j ∈ {1, . . . , i}. By combining this with Claim 1,
we deduce from the transitivity of the equivalence relation, that H \ {r1, . . . , rj} is no
hitting-set in OS \ {r1, . . . , rj} , if and only if H \ {r1, . . . , rj} is no hitting-set in OS′j
for j ∈ {1, . . . , i}.
From this and our initial assumption thatH is no hitting-set, we conclude that when
ExactHS enters the i-th level of recursion that is also the last level, Ci \ {r1, . . . , ri} is
no hitting-set in OS′i. Therefore OS
′
i 6= {} in Line 2 in Algorithm 2, so that Ci and thus
H cannot be added to HS. This contradicts the initial assumption that ExactHS would
accept H and thus proves that ExactHS is sound and only adds hitting-sets to HS.
2.2.2.3 Completeness
Proof. We prove the completeness of Algorithm 2 by induction on the size of minimal-
hitting-sets. It will be shown that ExactHS identifies all minimal-hitting-sets of any
given size in any given observation set OS.
Superscripts and subscripts attached to sets will have following meanings: The
superscript in OSi and Hi annotate that there is a minimal-hitting-set of size i in OSi
and that Hi is one of that set. We address by the subscript j the state of a set, when
entering the j-th level of recursion.
Ind. basis: Let i = |H1| = 1 and H1 be a minimal-hitting-set in the observation
set OS1. We prove that the invocation of ExactHS (OS, 1,C), where OS = OS1,
C = {} will identify1 H1 as a hitting-set in OS1.
SinceH1 is a minimal-hitting-set inOS1, every observation determined in Line 5
of Algorithm 2 must contain r ∈ H1 in the 0-th level of recursion. Let O0
be the observation fixed in Line 5 in the 0-th level of recursion. Without loss
of generality, r11 , . . . , r1k ∈ R \ H1 are any k ≥ 0 recipients2 evaluated and
removed within the while-loop in Algorithm 2 before ExactHS chooses r ∈
O0 ∩H1 in Line 7. In that case, Line 8 invokes the next level of recursion, such
thatOS′1 = {O′\{r11 , . . . , r1k} | O′ ∈ OS′0\OS′0[r]} is the observation set, when
entering the 1-st level of recursion. Since every observation O ∈ OS1 contains
1If hitting-set is identified by ExactHS, then that set is added to the set of identified hitting-setsHS.
2The index k refers to distinct values in different levels of recursion and is reused for convenience.
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r, we conclude that OS′1 = {}. This will be detected in Line 2 in level 1 and
C1 = {r} = H1 will be added as a hitting set to HS. 1
Ind. step: Assume for i = |Hi| ≥ 1, where Hi is a minimal-hitting-set in the
observation set OSi, that the invocation of ExactHS (OS, i,C), where OS = OSi,
C = {}, will identify Hi as a hitting-set. We prove that this assumption also
applies to the case of i+ 1 = |Hi+1|, where Hi+1 is a minimal-hitting-set in the
observation set OSi+1.
Since Hi+1 is a minimal-hitting-set in OSi+1, every observation determined in
Line 5 of Algorithm 2 must contain any r ∈ Hi+1 in the 0-th level of recursion.
LetO0 be the observation fixed in Line 5 in level 0 and r11 , . . . , r1k ∈ R\Hi+1 be
any recipients evaluated and removed prior to choosing r ∈ O0∩Hi+1 in Line 7.
In that case, Line 8 invokes the next level of recursion, such that OS′1 = {O′ \
{r11 , . . . , r1k} | O′ ∈ OS′0 \OS′0[r]} is the observation set, when entering the 1-st
level of recursion. Due to Claim 1 and Claim 2,Hi+1 \ {r} is a minimal-hitting-
set of size i in OS′1. According to the induction assumption, any minimal-hitting
set of size |Hi+1 \ {r}| = i in OS′1 will be identified by ExactHS. Therefore, the
recursive invocation of ExactHS (OS′1, i, {r}) in Line 8 in level 0 will identify
the minimal-hitting-set Hi+1 in OSi+1.
We conclude from the induction steps that for every observation set OS and minimal-
hitting-set Hi of size i in OS, the invocation of ExactHS (OS, i,C), where C = {},
will identify Hi. If invoking ExactHS (OS, i,C) identifies Hi, then invoking
ExactHS (OS, i,C) also identifies Hi. This and the induction steps proves that the
invocation of ExactHS (OS,m,C) identifies all minimal-hitting-sets H in OS, where
|H| ≤ m and thus proves the completeness of ExactHS.
Note that given m and OS, the above proof does not exclude, that ExactHS might
also add hitting-sets of at most sizem toHS that are not minimal inOS. However, even
in special cases, where all hitting-sets of at most sizem in OS are minimal-hitting-sets,
such that all hitting-sets added toHS by ExactHS are inevitably minimal, the maximal
1ExactHS identifies H1 already in the 1-st level of recursion, thus invoking ExactHS (OS,m, {})
for m ≥ 1 would provide a different result.
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value of |HS| 1would be identical to that in the general case2. Section 2.2.3.1 proves
this equality and shows that the maximal value of |HS| primarily determines the worst
case complexity of ExactHS. Therefore, we do not care about excluding non minimal-
hitting-sets in HS.
2.2.3 Worst Case Complexity
This section derives the worst case time and worst case space-complexity of ExactHS
with respect to the parameters u, b,m in the Mix system and the number t of obser-
vations collected by the attacker. We prove that the worst case time-complexity of
ExactHS is O(bmtbm), while its time-complexity is O((m+ 1)tb).3 As will be proven
in Section 2.2.3.1, the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m is
bm, so that the worst case time-complexity of ExactHS is minimal except for the minor
factor (tbm) that is the size of the input (i.e., the observation set) to ExactHS.
2.2.3.1 Time-Complexity
Finalised sets are those sets C in Algorithm 2 in Section 2.2.1 that ExactHS has proved
to be a hitting-set, or to be no subset of any hitting-set that it has not yet computed,
during its computation of hitting-sets of at most size m in OS. The time-complexity of
ExactHS is primarily determined by the computation of these finalised sets.
Claim 3. For given parameters u, b,m in the Mix system, where u ≥ bm, the maximal
number of finalised sets computed by ExactHS is bm and is a tight maximum of the
number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m.
Claim 4. For given parameters u, b,m in the Mix system, where u ≥ bm, the worst
case time-complexity of ExactHS is O(bmtbm).
Proof (Claim 3). ExactHS is initially invoked by calling ExactHS (OS,m,C), where
C = {}. Since C is extended by exactly one recipient in each level of recursion4. In
1That is the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m.
2That is the maximal number of hitting-sets of at most size m added to HS by ExactHS, regardless
whether they are minimal, or not.
3Note that the worst case complexity of ExactHS is invariant to u.
4The level of executing ExactHS (OS,m,C) is counted as level 0. ExactHS extends C by the i-th
recipient, when entering the i-th level of recursion, where C = {} for i = 0.
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every level i of recursion, ExactHS chooses in Line 7 one of the b recipients ri+1 in an
observation Oi, that was fixed at Line 5, to extend C at the (i+ 1)-th level of recursion.
The bound m for the number of successive recursive invocations to choose a recip-
ient to extend C, and the bound b for the number of choices of recipients in each level
of recursion, proves that ExactHS computes at most bm finalised sets.
To prove that bm is the tight maximum of the number minimal-hitting-set of at
most size m, it is sufficient to show that a set of observations OS exists, such that
ExactHS applied to OS computes exactly bm distinct minimal-hitting-sets1. Consider
the set of m pairwise disjoint observations OS = {O0, . . . ,Om−1}, 2where |Oi| = b
for 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. We assume without loss of generality, that Oi ∈ OS is fixed in
the i-th level of recursion of ExactHS. The finalised sets computed by ExactHS thus
have the structure C = {r1, . . . , rm}, where rj ∈ Oj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m is a recipient
who ExactHS chooses in the (j − 1)-th level of recursion. In this case, all bm finalised
sets C are minimal-hitting-sets, proving that the maximum of the number of minimal-
hitting-sets is exactly bm.
Proof (Claim 4). As a first step, the proof shows that computing a single finalised set
H requires at most O(tbm) operations in ExactHS, as represented by Algorithm 2.
We assume for simplicity and without loss of generality for the proof, that H =
{r1, . . . , rm} = Cm, where ri is the first recipient who ExactHS chooses in Line 7
in the (i− 1)-th level of recursion, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
When ExactHS chooses ri in the (i − 1)-th level of recursion, invoking the next
level of recursion by calling ExactHS (OSi,m− i,Ci−1∪{ri}) in Line 8, where OSi =
OSi−1 \ OSi−1[ri] requires removing all observations containing ri from OSi−1. Since
|OSi−1| ≤ |OS| = t, we have to evaluate at most t observations for containment of
ri. Evaluating containment of ri in a single observation requires comparison of ri to
at most b recipients in that observation. Thus extending Ci−1 by a single recipient ri
requires O(tb) operations. Consequently, computing a single set H requires O(tbm)
operations.
1Remember that ExactHS is complete (see Section 2.2.2.3) and thus identifies all minimal-hitting-
sets.
2In context of the observations collected by the attacker, Oi denotes the i-th collected observation,
for i > 0. To ease references, we use in this proof a deviant notation, where Oi−1 is the i-th collected
observation.
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Combining this result with the maximal number of finalised sets in Claim 3 proves
that the worst case time-complexity of ExactHS is O(bmtbm). A similar proof was
provided by Pham and Kesdogan [2009]; Pham [2008].
Example 2.2.3 (Maximal Number of Minimal-Hitting-Sets). This example illustrates
a case, where ExactHS computes the maximal number of bm minimal-hitting-sets and
thus requires the worst case time-complexity of O(bmtbm). In that case, the attacker
collects a set of observations {O0, . . . ,Om−1}, where all observations are pairwise
disjoint.
Let the set of all recipients in this example be R = {1, . . . , 12}, where b = 2 is the
batch size of the Mix. Let Alice’s set of friends be HA = {1, 2, 3}.
The information available to the attacker are the following collected observations:
{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}
By applying ExactHS on this set of observations form = 3, we obtain bm = 8 minimal-
hitting-sets, which is the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size 3 in
any observation set. These minimal-hitting-sets have the structure H = {r1, . . . , rm},
where rj ∈ Oj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. They are in this example the following minimal-
hitting-sets:
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 5, 3}, {1, 5, 6}, {4, 2, 3}, {4, 2, 6}, {4, 5, 3}, {4, 5, 6}
Note that the number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m never exceeds bm, even
if there are more observations, and that this number does not depend on the number of
recipients u.
Non Triviality of ExactHS We illustrate that providing an algorithm that computes
at most bm hitting-sets, while solving the UMHS problem is not trivial by an example.
In essence, a hitting-set is a set of recipients, each is picked from a distinct obser-
vation, and every observation must have one recipient in the hitting-set. Let us solve
the unique minimum-hitting-set problem from this simple point of view. That is we
compute the combination of the recipients in distinct observations.
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Example 2.2.4 (Naive Computation of Hitting-Sets). Let Alice’s set of friends be
HA = {1, 2, 3}, b = 2 and R = {1, . . . , 12} as in Example 2.2.3. Assume that
the observations collected by the attacker in OS are
4
1
O1
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2
O2
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1
O4
7
2
O3
8
1
O5
9
2
O6
10
1
O7
11
2
O8
3
1
O9
Figure 2.4: Sequence of observations collected by attacker.
The computation of the hitting-sets by combination of recipients from each ob-
servation is represented in Table 2.4. It shows the computed hitting-sets for distinct
sequences of observations in Figure 2.4.
i Oi Hypotheses
1 {1, 4} {1}, {4}
2 {2, 5} {1, 2}, {1, 5}, {4, 2}, {4, 5}
3 {1, 6} {1, 2}, {1, 2, 6} {1, 5}, {1, 5, 6},
{4, 2, 6}, {4, 5, 6}
4 {2, 7} {1, 2}, {1, 2, 7}, {1, 2, 6} {1, 2, 5}, {1, 5, 7} {4, 2, 6}
· · · · · · · · ·
9 {1, 3} {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6},
{1, 2, 7}, {1, 2, 8}, {1, 2, 9}, {1, 2, 10}, {1, 2, 11},
Table 2.4: Naive Computation of hitting-sets of at most size m by combination of
recipients from distinct observations.
The maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most sizem is due to Claim 3 bm,
which is in this example 23 = 8. However considering all hitting-sets of at most size 3
resulting from any combination of the 9 observations will lead to at least 9 hitting-sets.
These are at least the sets H = {1, 2, x} for x ∈ {3, . . . , 11}.
The structure of observations depicted in Example 2.2.4 straight forwardly applies
to any larger number of hitting-sets, form = 3, b = 2. We can also extend the structure
for arbitrary values of b and m. This thus demonstrates that finding an algorithm like
the ExactHS that only evaluates bm finalised sets to solve the UMHS problem is not
trivial.
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2.2.3.2 Space-Complexity
We observe that in each level i of recursion, Algorithm 2 keeps a copy of the actual
observation set OSi in the memory, for 0 ≤ im. Therefore, there are at most m + 1
observation sets that simultaneously allocate memory. This implies, cf. Pham [2008],
that the worst case space-complexity of Algorithm 2 is bounded by:
O((m+ 1)tb), (2.5)
where t = |OS| is the number of observations collected by the attacker and tb is the
maximal number of recipients in OS. Hence ExactHS is a linear space algorithm.
Note that we do not account the size of the setHS in Algorithm 2, since the hitting-
sets in HS are not an integral part of Algorithm 2. We can consider HS as a system
output. Even deletingHS would have no effect on the continuative execution of Algo-
rithm 2.
Also note that the worst case space-complexity of the original HS-algorithm as pre-
sented by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] is at least O(
(
u
m
)
). That is because the algo-
rithm requires computing the initial set of all
(
u
m
)
hypotheses and then excludes those
hypotheses that are no hitting-sets in the sequence of observations collected by the at-
tacker. In general, as illustrated in Example 2.1.1, the number of specified hypotheses
can significantly exceed the number of minimal-hitting-sets, so that algorithms based
on computing all specified hypotheses lead to a higher complexity than computing all
minimal-hitting-sets.
2.2.4 Evaluation
We apply the (enhanced) ExactHS, as implemented in Algorithm 2 to randomly gen-
erated observations. To illustrate the efficiency of the HS-attack using ExactHS for
practical cases, we consider the empirical least number of observations to succeed the
HS-attack and the time-complexity of ExactHS for a range of Mix parameters u, b,m.
These include Mix parameters that are infeasible for the original HS-algorithm, as well
as those that are also infeasible with respect to the worst case time-complexity of Ex-
actHS. The worst case complexity is determined by the number of finalised sets, as
enlisted in Table 2.5 for some Mix parameters u, b,m considered in the simulations.
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The delay of the traffic relayed by the Mix increases with the number of message it
has to collect for a batch, as analysed by Kesdogan and Palmer [2006]. Therefore, we
only consider batch sizes b ≤ 85 that provide reasonable practical delays specified by
Kesdogan and Palmer [2006].
u b m
(
u
m
)
bm
100 10 10 1.7× 1013 1.0× 1010
400 10 10 2.6× 1019 1.0× 1010
400 40 10 2.6× 1019 1.0× 1016
400 10 23 1.4× 1037 1.0× 1023
10000 50 20 4.0× 1061 9.5× 1033
20000 50 20 4.3× 1067 9.5× 1033
20000 85 20 4.3× 1067 3.9× 1038
20000 50 40 1.3× 10124 9.1× 1067
Table 2.5: Worst case number of finalised sets: HS-algorithm
(
u
m
)
versus ExactHS bm.
Alice’s communication traffic is modelled by a Zipf distribution that is known to
closely model e-mail and internet traffic, cf. Adamic and Huberman [2002]; Almeida
et al. [1996]; Breslau et al. [1999]; Glassman [1994]. This reveals the impact of Al-
ice’s communication on the feasibility of ExactHS in practical cases. Each observation
contains an Alice’s friend that is drawn from a Zipf(m,α) distribution and (b− 1) re-
cipients of cover-traffic that are drawn uniformly from the set of |R| = u possible
recipients. We model for the sake of simplicity the cover-traffic by a uniform distribu-
tion that bound various cover-traffic distributions of interest, instead of analysing those
distributions separately.
The HS-attack is successful (or succeeds) if ExactHS can uniquely identify Al-
ice’s set of friends HA . The simulation generates new random observations until the
HS-attack is successful and we call this an experiment. The average number of obser-
vations required by an attack is therefore the mean of the number of observations of
all successful attacks (i.e., of all experiments). To ensure that our results are statisti-
cally significant, experiments are repeated until 95% of the results fall within 5% of
the empirically observed mean. Every experiment is repeated at least 300 times.
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2.2.4.1 Communication Traffic
The distribution of Alice’s communication traffic and that of the cover-traffic result
from the probability distribution of the recipients of each sender. We model the dis-
tribution of a sender by the Zipf distribution as it allows an easy formulation of non-
uniform distributions and closely models e-mail and Internet traffic distributions, cf.
Adamic and Huberman [2002]; Almeida et al. [1996]; Breslau et al. [1999]; Glassman
[1994].
Zipf Distribution Let Y be a random variable with values in the discrete state space
Ω = {1, . . . , v}, |Ω| = v. Y is Zipf(v, α) distributed, if its probability mass function
P v,αz and cumulative distribution function F
v,α
z are
P v,αz (Y = i) =
i−α∑v
l=1 l
−α ,
F v,αz (Y = i) =
∑i
k=1 k
−α∑v
l=1 l
−α ,
for all i ∈ Ω.
Let U = {r1, . . . , rv} be the ordered set of all recipients of a sender and |Ω| = |U |,
where for all i ∈ Ω, ri ∈ U is the recipient who is i-th most frequently contacted
by that sender. If for all i ∈ Ω, the probability that this sender contacts his i-th most
frequently contacted recipient ri ∈ U is P v,αz (i), then we say that his recipients are
Zipf(v, α) distributed, or that he contacts his recipients according to the Zipf(v, α)
distribution. In case that α = 0 in that probability distribution, we say that the sender’s
recipients are uniformly distributed, or that the sender contacts his recipients according
to a uniform distribution. That is P v,0z (i) =
1
v
for i ∈ Ω and ri ∈ U . We generally call
all distributions that are not uniform, non-uniform distributions.
For example, let HA = {a1, . . . , am} be Alice’s set of friends ordered by the fre-
quency of being contacted by Alice and Ω = {1, . . . ,m} and |Ω| = | HA |. Alice’s
friends are Zipf(m,α)-distributed, if the probability that she contacts her i-th most
frequently contacted friend is Pm,αz (i), for i ∈ Ω and ai ∈ HA . This distribution is
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Zipf(m,α) distribution of Alice’s friends, for m = 23.
Cover-traffic We consider in this thesis that the cumulative communication traffic of
all senders other than Alice leads to a distribution of the cover-traffic that is bounded
from above by a uniform distribution. This thesis mainly focuses on the effect of Al-
ice’s communication on its relationship anonymity. To ease those analyses, we choose
to simplify the cover-traffic by a uniform distribution of the recipients in R, such that
without Alice’s traffic, each recipient r ∈ R appears with the same probability PN in an
observation. Each sender can select its recipient according to an arbitrary distribution
provided that ∀r ∈ R : P (r ∈ OS′) = PN , where P (r ∈ OS′) denotes the probability
that r appears in the observations in OS without considering Alice’s communication.
That is OS′ result from removing all of Alice’s communications in the observations in
OS, collected by the attacker.
As the overall distribution of the cover-traffic, but not the individual senders’ traffic
distributions in the cover-traffic are relevant for the HS-attack, we further assume for
simplicity and without loss of generality that each of the (b − 1) non-Alice senders
of a batch chooses its recipient from the set R of u recipients according to a uniform
distribution in every round. The corresponding probability mass function is 1
u
for every
r ∈ R, thus PN = 1 − (u−1u )b−1 is the probability that a recipient r ∈ R is contacted
by any sender other than Alice in an observation.
As a start, we only simulate and analyse uniformly distributed cover-traffic in this
thesis for a better comparability of the simulative and analytical results. However, as-
sume, for example, that the Mix parameters (u˜, b,m) are given, where |R˜| = u˜ and
R˜ is the set of all recipients in the Mix system and we want to bound a specific (non-
uniformly) distributed cover-traffic with given probability P (r ∈ OS′) for all r ∈ R˜ by
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PN . We can set PN = 1− (u−1u )b−1 for a u, such that ∀r ∈ R˜ : P (r ∈ OS′) ≤ PN . 1
2.2.4.2 Simulation
Uniformly Distributed Alice’s Traffic Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 draw the mean
number of observations and of finalised sets evaluated by ExactHS when uniquely
identifying Alice’s set of friends. They refer to the case that Alice’s communica-
tion and the cover-traffic is uniformly distributed. This allows the exclusive analy-
sis of the influence of each the Mix parameters u, b,m on these quantities, that is
independent of the underlying traffic distribution. We observe that changing a pa-
rameter, such that the mean number of observations to succeed the HS-attack is in-
creased, also increases the corresponding number of finalised sets and thus the time-
complexity of ExactHS. However, Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 also show that the rela-
tion between the Mix parameters u, b,m and the mean number of observations and
mean time-complexity when succeeding the HS-attack is non-trivial. Low Mix pa-
rameters (e.g., (u = 400, b = 10,m = 20) in Figure 2.6) can lead to a higher
mean number of observations and of finalised sets than large Mix parameters (e.g.,
(u = 20000, b = 50,m = 20) in Figure 2.7). This is even more surprising, as the
corresponding worst case number of finalised sets for the former Mix parameters (i.e,
1020) is lower than for the latter Mix parameters (i.e., 5020). The estimate (4.16) of
the mean number of finalised sets in Section 4.1.4.1 will mathematically show this
non-trivial relation to the worst case number of finalised sets determined by Claim 3 in
Section 2.2.3.1.
1Analyses of ExactHS would be applied to the corresponding Mix parameters (u, b,m) and a uni-
formly distributed cover-traffic resulting from every sender other than Alice contacting its recipients in
R with the probability mass function 1u , where |R| = u, HA ⊆ R andR ⊆ R˜ if |R| ≤ |R˜|, elseR ⊇ R˜.
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Figure 2.6: Uniformly distributed communication. Left: Mean number of observa-
tions to succeed HS-attack. Right: Mean number of finalised sets when succeeding
HS-attack.
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Figure 2.7: Uniformly distributed communication. Left: Mean number of observa-
tions to succeed HS-attack. Right: Mean number of finalised sets when succeeding
HS-attack.
Zipf-Distributed Alice’s Traffic Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 study the mean number
of observations and of the finalised sets exclusively with respect to the Zipf distribution
of Alice’s friends for the Mix parameters (u = 400, b = 10,m = 23) respectively
(u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40). It leaves the Mix parameters u, b,m unchanged, while
varying the weight α of the Zipf distribution Alice use to contact her m friends. We
observe that increasing the non-uniformity of Alice’s communication (i.e., the weight
α) increases the mean number of observations, while decreasing the mean number of
finalised sets when succeeding the HS-attack. For the Mix parameters (u = 400, b =
10,m = 23) in Figure 2.8, the number of observations is for (α = 1) by a factor
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of 3 higher than that for (α = 0), while the number of finalised sets is for (α = 1)
58000, which is by a factor of 1
143
lower than that for (α = 0). For the Mix parameters
(u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40) in Figure 2.9, the number of observations is for (α = 1)
by a factor of 3 higher than that for (α = 0), while the number of finalised sets is for
(α = 1) 20000, which is by a factor of 1
85
lower than that for (α = 0).
Figure 2.8: Zipf-distributed communication. Left: Mean number of observations to
succeed HS-attack. Right: Mean number of finalised sets when succeeding HS-attack.
Figure 2.9: Zipf-distributed communication. Left: Mean number of observations to
succeed HS-attack. Right: Mean number of finalised sets when succeeding HS-attack.
Summary In summary, Table 2.5 illustrates that the worst case number of finalised
sets computed by HS-algorithm is significantly higher than that computed by ExactHS.
The simulation results in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 reveal that the mean number of fi-
nalised sets computed by ExactHS when succeeding the HS-attack is even significantly
lower than the corresponding worst case number of finalised sets with respect to the
Mix parameters. We further observe that regardless of the Mix parameters and of the
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worst case time-complexity of ExactHS, the mean number of finalised sets and thus
the mean time-complexity of ExactHS decreases, the more non-uniform Alice con-
tacts her friends, as illustrated by the Zipf distribution of Alice’s friends in Figure 2.8
and Figure 2.9. While these simulations illustrate complex relations between the Mix
parameters and the mean number of observations and of the finalised sets computed
by ExactHS when succeeding the HS-attack, we will derive these relations mathemat-
ically in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
2.3 Approximation of Hitting-Set-Attack
The theoretical limit of anonymity protection is reasonably represented by the least
number of observations for unique identification of a user’s contacts, as this limit is
also valid for attackers with unlimited computing resources1.
This section provides an approximation that allows an efficient empirical esti-
mate of the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s friends by the
HS-attack from below. It applies to arbitrary concrete Mix parameters and commu-
nication traffics. The approximation requires the a-priori knowledge of Alice’s set of
friends HA . Therefore, it is solely an estimate of the number of observations to suc-
ceed the HS-attack, but no replacement of that attack. This approximation allows Alice
to estimate in real time her current anonymity protection by herself to immediately ad-
just that protection, by, e.g., decent usage of dummy traffic as suggested by Kesdogan
[2006, pp. 31 – 37].
2.3.1 Classification of Hitting-Sets and Hypotheses
The lower bound for the least number of observations is based on analysing the number
of observations, until a particular class of hitting-sets disappears. Therefore we define
a classification of hitting-sets that are computed by ExactHS in this section.
Let H be the set of all hypotheses2. We classify each hypothesis H ∈ H according
to the number of non-friends in it, such that H is assigned one of the m + 1 disjoint
1The theoretic limit of protection always refers to an attacker with unlimited computing resources.
2That are all hitting-sets of size m
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classes H0, . . .Hm, where
H0 = { HA }
Hi ⊆ (R \ HA )i × HA m−i , for 0 < i < m.
Hm ⊆ (R \ HA )m
A hypothesis H belongs to the class Hi that is stated by H ∈ Hi, if it contains exactly
(m − i) distinct Alice’s friends. The class H0 contains exactly one set, Alice’s set
of friends HA . The class Hm represents hypotheses consisting of only Alice’s non-
friends.
This classification thus applies to every hitting-set of size m. To apply this clas-
sification to hitting-set H, where |H| < m, we assign H to the class Hi, if it con-
tains exactly i friends, so that H ∪ {n|H|+1, . . . , nm} ∈ Hi is a hypothesis for every
{n|H|+1, . . . , nm} ∈ R \ HA . Thus for everyH that belongs1 to Hi, there is a hypothe-
ses H′ ⊃ H, where H′ ∈ Hi.
2.3.2 Approximation Based on No-Trivial-Disproof
The UMHS problem remains NP-complete, even though Alice’s set of friends is a-
priory known, thus motivating the need for efficient approximations. It is clear that
Alice’s set of friends HA is a unique minimum-hitting-set in OS if and only if there is
no specified hypothesis in any of the classes H1, . . . ,Hm in OS. We call the existence
of a specified hypothesis in the class H1 in a given observation set, a trivial-disproof
that HA is not unique. Our approximation consists of determining the least number of
observations ta = |OS|, such there is no specified hypothesis in the class H1, that is
there is no trivial-disproof.
The trivial-disproofs can be efficiently identified by Algorithm 3 that we explain in
a line by line basis, next. Each specified hypothesis H ∈ H1 contains a subset C ⊂ H,
consisting of exactly (m− 1) friends, that is C ⊂ HA , where |C| = m− 1 and a non-
friend n ∈ R \ HA . Line 2 in Algorithm 3 thus loops over all possible sets C specified
in the former sentence. For each C, Line 4 determines by I all possible non-friends for
1The term “belongs to” is not strictly defined, but it provides a consistent classification of hitting-
sets.
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Algorithm 3 Trivial-Disproof.
1: procedure TRIVDISPROOF( HA ,m,OS)
2: for C ∈ {{a1, . . . , am−1} ⊆ HA } do . Choose distinct sets of m− 1 friends
3: OS′ ← {O \ HA | O ∈ OS \ OS[C]}
4: I← ⋂O′∈OS′ O′
5: if (|OS′| = 0) ∨ (I 6= {}) then
6: Print {C ∪ {n} | n ∈ I} . All identified trivial-disproofs
n that hit those observations OS′ = OS \OS[C] that are not hit by C. If C is a subset of
a hitting-set of size m in OS, then Line 6 provides the following two possible outputs.
If C is a hitting-set in OS, then C ∪ {n} ∈ H1 for every n ∈ R \ HA , therefore it is
sufficient to output C, otherwise C ∪ {n}, for every n ∈ I is provided as the output.
Algorithm 3 terminates without any output, if there is no trivial-disproof.
Since no-trivial-disproof is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for HA to be
a unique minimum-hitting-set, ta is thus a provable lower bound for the least number
of observations to succeed the HS-attack. Indeed, we can observe in Figure 2.10 that
specified hypotheses in the class H1 remain hitting-sets for a large number of observa-
tions |OS| that is close to the least number of observations t to succeed the HS-attack.
2.3.2.1 Complexity
In Line 2 of Algorithm 3, the number of subsets C ⊂ HA , where |C| = m − 1 is(
m
m−1
)
= m. Computing OS′ in Line 3 requires comparing the m friends in a given C
and HA \ C with the b recipients in the observations O ∈ OS, which leads to O(mtb)
operations, where t = |OS|. Computing I in Lines 4 requires O(btb) operations. The
overall time-complexity of Algorithm 3 is thus m(O(mtb) +O(btb)), that is
O(m2tb2) .
The space-complexity of Algorithm 3 is obviously linear.
2.3.2.2 Relation to 2×-Exclusivity
According to Kesdogan et al. [2006] a friend appears exclusively in an observation,
if there is no other friend in that observation. A friend is 2×-exclusive, if it appears
at least two times exclusively in observations, or at least one time alone (i.e., without
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any other recipient) in an observation. The 2×-exclusivity property is fulfilled, if all
Alice’s friends are 2×-exclusive. It was shown by Kesdogan et al. [2006] that this
property is a good approximation for the lower bound of the number of observations to
fully disclose Alice’s set of friends. We prove that no-trivial-disproof is an even better
approximation than 2×-exclusivity by showing the following two cases. Firstly, there
are observations, where the 2×-exclusivity property is fulfilled, although there is still a
hitting-set that belongs to H1. Secondly, if the 2×-exclusivity property is not fulfilled,
then there is always a hitting-set that belongs to H1.
Proof (Case 1). Since this is an existence proof, we only have to construct an example,
where 2×-exclusivity is given, although a hitting-set that belongs to H1 exists. Let
Alice’s set of friends be HA = {1, 3}. Assume that the following four observations
are given:
{3, 5, 6}, {3, 1}, {1}, {6, 3}.
All friends in HA are obviously 2×-exclusive, but there is a hitting-set {1, 6} that
belongs to H1.
Proof (Case 2). Let HA = {a1, . . . , am} be the Alice’s set of friends. Assume wlog.
that the friend a1 appears only one time exclusively in a given observation set OS.
Let O ∈ OS be the observation, in that a1 appears exclusively. Then the set H =
{n, a2, . . . , am}, where n ∈ O \ HA is a hitting-set belonging to H1.
2.3.3 Evaluation
The plots from Figure 2.10 represent results of applying the HS-attack on simulated
Mix traffic. In this simulation we assume that in each round, Alice chooses her recip-
ient uniformly distributed from one of her m friends, i.e., with probability 1
m
. All the
other b − 1 senders are assumed to choose their recipients uniformly distributed from
the set of all |R| = u recipients, i.e., with probability 1
u
.
Each of the figures varies one of the parameter u,m, b, while all the other parame-
ters remain fixed. The standard parameter of this simulation is u = 400, m = 10, b =
10. The line labelled (HS) shows the mean number of observations of the HS-attack
to reveal the Alice’s set of friends. Accordingly the line labelled (2x-excl) is the mean
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number of observation to fulfil the 2×-exclusivity criterion, while the line labelled (h1)
visualizes the mean number of observations until there is no specified hypothesis in the
class H1, that is there is no trivial-disproof.
The simulation results confirm our proof in Section 2.3.2.2. The no-trivial-disproof
criterion provides a better estimate of the number of observations required to succeed
the HS-attack than the 2×-exclusivity criterion. The top right plot in Figure 2.10 re-
veals that the superiority of the estimate by no-trivial-disproof becomes more signif-
icant, compared to the estimate by 2×-exclusivity, if the batch size is large. This is
because a larger batch size increases the probability that observations that contain an
Alice’s friend, e.g., ai ∈ HA exclusively, also contain some common non-friend r.
Consequently it becomes more likely that {a1, . . . , ai−1, r, ai+1, . . . , am} ∈ H1 is a
hitting-set, although all Alice’s friends are 2×-exclusive, for larger batch sizes.
Figure 2.10: Mean number of observations until: succeeding HS-attack (HS), fulfilling
2×-exclusivity property (2x-excl) and disappearing of no-trivial-disproofs (h1).
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2.4 Summary
This chapter drew the basic scheme underlying the analyses of our combinatorial attack
on the Chaum Mix in this thesis. As illustrated in Figure 2.2 in Section 2.1.2.2, the
Mix configuration models the input of the attack (the random observations), while
the output of the attack is determined by the hypotheses. We consider the effort of an
attack to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends as a measure for the limit of anonymity
protection provided by the Mix system. Therefore we studied the least number of
observations and the computational complexity required for that unique identification
by an attack with respect to distinct Mix configurations. The analyses in this chapter
were empirical and based on simulations.
We chose to consider the HS-attack introduced by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004],
as it provably requires the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set
of friends, as proved by Kesdogan et al. [2006]. This least number of observations
to disclose Alice’s relationship anonymity is a pendant to Shannon’s unicity-distance
that measures the information theoretic least number of intercepted cipher text bits
to disclose an encrypted message, cf. Shannon [1949]. The original HS-attack of
Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] uniquely identifies Alice’s set of friends by solving the
UMHS problem with the HS-algorithm that is exponential in (mean) time and space.
However, the UMHS can be solved by orders of magnitudes more efficiently by our
ExactHS algorithm in Section 2.2.1. This was illustrated by Table 2.5 in Section 2.2.4.
Section 2.2.3 proved that ExactHS provides a linear worst case space-complexity and
minimises the worst case time-complexity. We demonstrated in Section 2.2.4 that it can
even provide feasible mean time complexities. The HS-attack using ExactHS to solve
the UMHS problem, instead of using the original HS-algorithm identifies Alice’s set
of friends with the least number of observations. This thus contributes a more efficient
variant of the HS-attack and we use and analyse this efficient variant by default in this
thesis.
We further observed that the mean time-complexity itself can be decreased with-
out changing the Mix parameters, as in case of changing the distribution of Alice’s
friends from a uniform distribution to a non-uniform distribution. In that case, we
modelled the distribution of Alice’s friends by a Zipf(m,α) distribution, that is known
to closely model e-mail and Internet traffic Adamic and Huberman [2002]; Almeida
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et al. [1996]; Breslau et al. [1999]; Glassman [1994]. It could be observed that in-
creasing the weight α and thus increasing the non-uniformity of the distribution of
Alice’s friends significantly decreases the mean time-complexity of ExactHS, while
increasing the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends
by the HS-attack. The increase of the number of observations is due to recipients who
are rarely contacted by Alice.
The thesis additionally contributed in Section 2.3 an efficient empirical approxi-
mation of the number of observations required to succeed the HS-attack. This approx-
imation is based on a necessary condition for the unique identification of Alice’s set
of friends that subsumes the 2×-exclusivity condition of Kesdogan et al. [2006]. We
call this the no-trivial-disproof condition and proved that it provides a lower bound
for the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends that is
closer than the bound provided by the 2×-exclusivity. This approximation aids effi-
cient empirical analyses of the HS-attack, but it is no attack, as it requires the a-priori
knowledge of Alice’s set of friends.
The empirical evaluations in Section 2.2.4 indicated complex relations between the
Mix parameters, the traffic distributions, the mean time-complexity of ExactHS and the
least number of observations to succeed the HS-attack. However, analytical analyses
are crucial to understand the systematic behind those relations, in order to explain the
limit of anonymity protection provided by the Chaum Mix. Therefore, Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 will analyse that relations analytically.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Limit of Anonymity
Protection
The theoretical limit refers to the anonymity protection provided by a system against
an attacker with unlimited computing resources1. In accordance to Shannon’s unicity-
distance, cf. Shannon [1949], we consider the least number of observations to uniquely
identify Alice’s friends as the theoretical limit of anonymity protection.
The HS-attack and its approximations in Chapter 2 allow empirical analyses of the
least number of observations for the unique identification of Alice’s friends for single
Mix configurations2. However, this cannot replace analytical analyses, which allow
proving systematic relationships between Mix configurations and the least number of
observations for the unique identifications.
Due to the complexity of analytical analyses, past works, as Kesdogan and Pimeni-
dis [2006]; Kesdogan et al. [2006]; O’Connor [2008] solely focused on analysing the
Chaum Mix for the simple case of uniformly distributed traffic. In contrast to past
works, we contribute a closed formula that estimates the mean of the least number of
observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends with respect to arbitrary distri-
bution of Alice’s traffic and Mix parameters. It can also be applied to non-uniformly
distributed cover traffic. Our estimate thus allows studying more realistic traffic dis-
tributions and comparing the number of observations required by the HS-attack with
1The theoretical limit means that the protection against a computationally unlimited attacker cannot
exceed this limit.
2The HS-attack using ExactHS is computationally tractable in some cases.
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those of other attacks.
The estimate shows that the mean number of observations to uniquely identify Al-
ice’s set of friends is inverse proportional to the least probability p in the distribution
of Alice’s traffic. Firstly, this implies that the uniformly distributed Alice’s traffic min-
imises the number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends, that was
as yet unproven, but believed, cf. Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006]; Kesdogan et al.
[2006, 2009]. Secondly, this shows that the HS-attack requires only O(1
p
) observa-
tions to exactly identify all Alice’s friends, whereas O( 1
p2
) observations are required
by the Statistical Disclosure attack (SDA) of Danezis [2003] to inexactly classify Al-
ice’s friends.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show the mentioned relationships
analytically.
Section 3.1 mathematically estimates the mean of the least number of observations
to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends. This results in a closed formula that deter-
mines that mean with respect to the parameters in the Mix configuration.
Section 3.2 compares the mathematically estimated mean of the least number of
observations with that obtained by applying the HS-attack on random observations in
simulations. This reveals that our mathematically estimated mean is reasonable close
to the empirical mean. Additionally, we graphically compare the estimated mean least
number of observations required to succeed the HS-attack with that required by the
SDA to guess Alice’s friends with a true-positive rate of 95%.
3.1 Mean Number of Observations
The work of Kesdogan et al. [2006] has shown that the least number of observations,
such that the 2×-exclusivity property is fulfilled, provides a close lower bound for
the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends, cf. Sec-
tion 2.3.2.2. We propose an approximation of the mean of the least number of ob-
servations to fulfil the 2×-exclusivity property. This provides a closed formula that
estimates the mean of the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set
of friends with respect to arbitrary distribution of Alice’s traffic and Mix parameters. It
is more general than the mean number of observations for 2×-exclusivity of Kesdogan
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et al. [2006], since the mean of Kesdogan et al. [2006] is a non-closed formula that is
only valid for uniform traffic distributions. The advantages of Kesdogan et al. [2006]
is the exact computation of the mean number of observations for 2×-exclusivity, but
we can see in Section 3.2 that our estimate is reasonable close to that exact mean.
Section 3.1.1 estimates the mean least number of observations to fulfil
2×-exclusivity from the top and from the bottom. This is followed by the estimate
of the mean least number of observations for k×-exclusivity, for arbitrary k ∈ N in
Section 3.1.2. The bounds in Section 3.1.1 show that Section 3.1.2 provides a closer es-
timate of the mean least number of observations for 2×-exclusivity, for k = 2. There-
fore we prefer in this thesis estimates based on Section 3.1.2. All our estimates show
that the mean number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends is
minimised, if Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed.
Section 3.1.3 compares the estimated mean least number of observations for 2×-
exclusivity with the number of observations required by the SDA of Danezis [2004] to
guess Alice’s friend with some true-positive rates1. It shows that the former mean is in
O(1
p
), while the latter mean is in O( 1
p2
), where p denotes the least probability p < 1 in
the distribution of Alice’s friends.
3.1.1 Bounds of Mean Number of Observations for 2×-Exclusivity
As a first estimate of the mean of the number of observations for 2×-exclusivity for
arbitrary distribution of Alice’s traffic we propose estimates of the lower an upper
bound of that mean in this section. The idea is to estimate the mean of the least number
of observations, such that all Alice’s friends are 1×-exclusive, that we called 1×-
exclusivity. This mean can be straight forwardly estimated and provides a lower bound
of the corresponding mean for 2×-exclusivity.
Section 3.1.1.1 shows the relation between 1×-exclusivity and 2×-exclusivity. This
allows estimating the lower and upper bound of the mean of the least number of obser-
vations for 2×-exclusivity, based on the corresponding mean for 1×-exclusivity. The
closed formula for the estimate of that means is derived in Section 3.1.1.2.
1The SDA was introduced by Danezis [2003]. But the estimate of the number of observations
required by the SDA was corrected by Danezis [2004] and is thus more recent.
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3.1.1.1 Relating 1×-Exclusivity and 2×-Exclusivity
Remember that an Alice’s friend a is exclusive in an observation, if the other senders
do not contact any of the other (m − 1) friends in HA , in that observation. It is 1×-
exclusive, respectively 2×-exclusive, if it is exclusive in at least one, respectively two
observations.
Let T1×e, T2×e be the random variables for the least number of observations, until
all friends are 1×-exclusive, respectively 2×-exclusive with means E(T1×e), E(T2×e).
All senders are assumed to choose their recipients statistically independently, so that
the probability that a particular friend is exclusive in a given observation is not depen-
dent on any past observations. This therefore implies the following relations:
E(T1×e) ≤ E(T2×e) ≤ 2E(T1×e).
3.1.1.2 Estimation of 2×-Exclusivity Based on 1×-Exclusivity
We estimateE(T2×e) for arbitrary distributions of Alice’s friends by providing a closed
formula for E(T1×e). Most importantly, we prove that E(T1×e) ∝ 1/p and thus
E(T2×e) ∝ 1/p, where p = min{PA(a) | a ∈ HA } is the least probability in the con-
sidered distribution. Changing Alice’s traffic distribution and p, while leaving u, b,m
and the cover-traffic distribution unchanged, only changes the number of observations
to identify HA by ExactHS linearly with 1/p. The proof derives the following estimate
of the expectation of the least number of observations for unique identification of all
Alice’s friends:
E(T2×e) ≤ 1
p
2(ln(m) + γ)
(u−(m−1)
u
)b−1
and E(T2×e) ∝ 1
p
.
Proof. Let T1×,i be the random variable for the least number of observations passed
between Alice contacting the (i− 1)-th friend and the i-th friend, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
This is regardless whether the observations are exclusive, or not and thus independent
of the behaviour of senders other than Alice.
Let Te,aj be the random variable for the least number of times Alice has to con-
tact aj , 1until aj is exclusive. Obviously, Te,aj is only dependent on the behaviour
1This only counts observations in OSA[aj ].
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of the senders other than Alice and independent of Alice’s behaviour. Let us set
a = argmaxaj∈ HA E(Te,aj) and Te = Te,a, then T1×,i and Te are statistically inde-
pendent and we obtain
E(T1×e) ≤
m∑
i=1
E(T1×,i)E(Te) .
E(Te): Assume that every r ∈ R, |R| = u is contacted uniformly distributed by
any (b− 1) non-Alice senders in every observation, then the probability that r is
contacted by any non-Alice sender is PN(r) = PN = 1− (u−1u )b−1. Given Alice
contacts aj ∈ HA and the remaining (b − 1) non-Alice senders do not, then aj
is exclusive. That probability is Pe(aj) = (
u−(m−1)
u
)b−1. Te,aj is geometrically
distributed; E(Te,aj) =
1
Pe(aj)
= (u−(m−1)
u
)1−b for j = 1, . . . ,m, thus E(Te) =
E(Te,aj). This E(Te) serves as an upper bound for E(T
′
e,aj
) of all cases, where
r′ ∈ R′ is non-uniformly contacted with P ′N(r′) and maxr′∈ HA {P ′N(r′)} ≤ PN ,
for any recipient sets R′ ⊃ HA .
∑m
i=1E(T1×,i): Alice contacts (arbitrarily distributed) friends aj ∈ HA with PA(aj)
in each observation. Let T1× =
∑m
i=1 T1×,i, then E(T1×) =
∑m
i=1 E(T1×,i)
is the mean number of observations until Alice contacts each of her friends at
least once. This equals the Coupon Collector Problem (CCP) Boneh and Hofri
[1997], where a1, . . . , am are m coupon types and PA(aj) is the probability of
getting a type aj coupon. According to Boneh and Hofri [1997, Eq. (30)]:
E(T1×) =
∫ ∞
t=0
(1−
m∏
j=1
(1− e−PA(aj)t))dt
is the mean number of coupons collected to obtain all types.
Let p = minaj∈ HA {PA(aj)} and m′ = 1/p, then m′ ≥ m. Let us further define
U = {a1, . . . , am, nm+1, . . . , nm′} as the type set of a CCP, where every type
has the probability p for integral m′. Collecting all types in HA ⊆ U requires
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according to Boneh and Hofri [1997, Eq. (39)]
E(T1× HA ) =
∫ ∞
t=0
(1−
m∏
j=1
(1− e−pt))dt (3.1)
=
1
p
m∑
i=1
1
i
(using Flajolet et al. [1992]) (3.2)
≈ 1
p
(ln(m) + γ) (3.3)
coupons, where γ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler-Mascheroni number. Note thatE(T1×) ≤
E(T1× HA ), as PA(aj) ≥ p for j = 1, . . . ,m. Collecting all types in HA requires
for arbitrary distributions fewer coupons than collecting all types in HA ⊆ U ,
where every type in U is of probability p and |U | = 1
p
.
Let p = minaj∈ HA {PA(aj)}, we conclude from this proof that:
E(T1×e) ≤ 1
p
(ln(m) + γ)(
u− (m− 1)
u
)1−b and E(T1×e) ∝ 1
p
E(T2×e) ≤ 1
p
2(ln(m) + γ)
(u−(m−1)
u
)b−1
and E(T2×e) ∝ 1
p
. (3.4)
Inequality (3.4) thus estimates the expectation of the least number of observations
to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends for arbitrary distribution of Alice’s friends.
It can be observed, that the number of observations to succeed the HS-attack is propor-
tional to 1
p
. Thus the least probability in the distribution of Alice’s friends determines
how long Alice can contact her set of friends, without them being uniquely identifiable.
3.1.2 Mean Number of Observations for k×-Exclusivity
We propose a closed formula for the estimated mean of the least number of observa-
tions, such that all Alice’s friends are k×-exclusive, for arbitrary k ∈ N and distri-
butions of Alice’s traffic. In accordance to the definition of Kesdogan et al. [2006], a
friend a ∈ HA is k×-exclusive, if it appears at least k times exclusively, or at least
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one time alone1 in the considered observations. The k×-exclusivity is fulfilled, if all
Alice’s friends are k×-exclusive. While this chapter mainly discusses k×-exclusivity
for k = 2, the general case of k ∈ N will be applied in Section 5.2.2.1 in Chapter 5.
Section 3.1.2.1 derives the estimate of the mean of the least number of observa-
tions E(T2×e) for k×-exclusivity, based on a close estimate of the general CCP by
Brayton [1963]. The general CCP can be used to estimate the mean number of coupon
collections E(Tk×), such that every coupon type appears at least k times, for k ∈ N.
The resulting estimate of E(T2×e) by (3.5) (for k = 2) might over, or under estimate
E(T2×e), whereas (3.4) estimates the upper bound of E(T2×e).
Section 3.1.2.2 shows that the estimate of E(T2×e) in (3.4) exceeds that in (3.5)
(for k = 2) by a factor that is lower than 2, while the estimate of E(T1×e) in (3.4) is
lower than (3.5) (for k = 2). This allows concluding that (3.5) provides reasonable
estimate of E(T2×e) for all Mix configurations and a closer estimate of E(T2×e) than
(3.4). The estimate (3.5) is therefore preferred in the remaining thesis.
Section 3.1.2.3 analyses the effect of Alice’s traffic distribution on the mean num-
ber of observations for 2×-exclusivity. This concludes that the uniform distribution of
Alice’s traffic minimises that mean in the average case.
3.1.2.1 Estimation of k×-Exclusivity
Claim 5. LetE(Te,a) be the mean number of observations Alice has to contact a friend
a ∈ HA , 2until a is exclusive and E(Te) = maxa∈ HA E(Te,a), as defined in Sec-
tion 3.1.1.2. Let E(Tk×) be the mean number of coupon collections to obtain every
coupon type at least k times in the general CCP, cf. Brayton [1963]. The set of m
coupon types is represented by HA , where PA(a) is the probability that a coupon is of
type a ∈ HA . The distribution specified by PA(a) can be arbitrary.
We denote the mean number of observations until all Alice’s friends are k×-exclusive
for arbitrary integer k ≥ 1, by E(Tk×e). Its estimate is
E(Tk×e) ≤ E(Tk×)E(Te)
≈
(
1
p
(lnm+ γ) + (k − 1)1
p
ln lnm
)(
u− (m− 1)
u
)1−b
, (3.5)
1This is an observation O′ = {a}.
2This only refers to observations, in that Alice contacts a, that is OSA[a].
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where p = mina∈ HA PA(a) and γ ≈ 0, 57721 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
The 1×-exclusivity of all Alice’s friends requires on average 1
p
(lnm+γ)E(Te) ob-
servations, while every additional exclusivity of all Alice’s friends requires on average
(1
p
ln lnm)E(Te) additional observations.
Claim 3.5 generalises the mathematical estimate of 2×-exclusivity in Section 3.1.1.2
to the estimate of k×-exclusivity, for arbitrary integer k ≥ 1. We therefore reuse the
notations and definitions provided in Section 3.1.1.2.
Proof of Claim 5. Recall from Section 3.1.1.2 that Te is the random variable for the
number of times Alice has to contact a particular friend a ∈ HA , 2until a is exclu-
sive, where a = argmaxa′∈ HA E(Te,a′). The random variable Tk× denotes the number
of observations1 until Alice contacts each of her friends at least k times. These ran-
dom variables are according to Section 3.1.1.2 statistically independent, so that the
mean number of observations E(Tk×e) until all Alice’s friends are k×-exclusive can
be estimated by the product of the expectations E(Te), E(Tk×) of these two random
variables, that is:
E(Tk×e) ≤ E(Tk×)E(Te) . (3.6)
The equation E(Te) =
(
u−(m−1)
u
)1−b
was derived in Section 3.1.1.2, therefore it re-
mains to show the estimate of E(Tk×) for integer k ≥ 1.
The expression for E(Tk×) was derived by Brayton [1963], which is the following
equality for large value of m, that is for m→∞:
E(Tk×) =
m
δ
(lnκm+ γ) + (k − 1)m
δ
(ln lnκm+ ln
1
δ
) + o(1) .
The variables in this equation have the following meaning in our context:
• m = | HA | is the number of coupon types, where w.l.o.g. HA = {1, . . . ,m}.
• δ = minx∈(0,1] f(x) ≤ 1, where PA(a) =
∫ a/m
(a−1)/m f(x)dx and
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx = 1.
δ is the continuous counterpart of the discrete probability mina∈ HA PA(a). We
therefore set f(x) = mPA(dxme). Therefore δ = mmina∈ HA PA(a).
1For clarity, this refers to all observations.
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• κ = γ1 δk−1(k−1)! ≤ 1, where 0 < γ1 ≤ 1 is the size of the interval, where f(x) = δ.
• o(1) is a negligible value.
Let p = mina∈ HA PA(a), then δ = mp. We simplify and approximate the above
equation by
E(Tk×) =
1
p
(ln
γ1
(k − 1)!m+ γ) + (k − 1)
1
p
ln lnκm+ o(1)
≈ 1
p
(lnm+ γ) + (k − 1)1
p
ln lnm . (3.7)
The last estimate result from approximating γ1
(k−1)! and κ by its upper bound 1. Apply-
ing (3.7) to inequality (3.6) result in (3.5) and completes the proof.
3.1.2.2 Comparison of Estimates for 2×-Exclusivity
Note thatE(T1×) ≤ E(T2×) ≤ 2E(T1×). This is similar for the case of 2×-exclusivity
in Section 3.1.1.1, below:
E(T1×e) ≤ E(T2×e) ≤ 2E(T1×e) .
The middle expression in this inequality is estimated by (3.5) for k = 2, while the
left and right expression is estimated by (3.4) in Section 3.1.1.2. We can observe a
corresponding inequality for these estimates, as illustrated below:
1
p
(lnm+ γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈E(T1×)
E(Te) ≤
(
1
p
(lnm+ γ) +
1
p
ln lnm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈E(T2×)
E(Te) ≤ 21
p
(lnm+ γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈2E(T1×)
E(Te) ,
where p = mina∈ HA PA(a) and E(Te) =
(
u−(m−1)
u
)1−b
, as in Section 3.1.1.2.
Note that the closeness of the estimates of E(T2×e) is dependent on the closeness
of the estimate of E(T2×). According to Brayton [1963], the estimate (3.7) approaches
E(T2×) for large value of m. This is therefore more precise than estimating E(T2×)
by 2E(T1×) and thus leads to a closer estimate of E(T2×e) by (3.5) than by (3.4), for
large value of m.
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However, we need to show that (3.7) also leads to reasonable estimates for even
small value of m. The inequality above shows that the estimate of E(T2×e) by (3.4)
exceeds that by (3.5) (for k = 2) by a factor that is lower than 2, while the estimate
of E(T1×e) is lower than (3.5) (for k = 2).1 The estimate (3.5) for k = 1 is even
equal to the estimate of E(T1×e) in (3.4). This shows that (3.5) (for k = 2) reasonably
estimates E(T2×e) for all Mix configurations.
3.1.2.3 Effect of Alice’s Traffic Distribution on 2×-Exclusivity
The estimates show that E(T2×) ∝ 1p , where p = mina∈ HA PA(a), thus implying that
E(T2×) is minimal if Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed. Consequently the mean
number of observations for 2×-exclusivity with respect to a random set of Alice’s
friends HA is in the general case minimal, if Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed.
This is because E(T2×e) ≈ E(T2×)E(Te) ∝ 1p .
The 2×-exclusivity is a necessary condition for the unique identification of Alice’s
set of friends and determines a close lower bound for the number of observations for
that identification, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006]. Therefore, we expect that the uniform
distribution of Alice’s traffic also minimises the mean number of observations for the
unique identification of Alice’s set of friends. This is also confirmed by our simulation
results, as demonstrated in Section 3.2.
3.1.3 Relation to Statistical Disclosure Attack
While combinatorial attacks like the HS-attack aim at exact identification of friends,
heuristic attacks, as introduced by the Statistical Disclosure attack, cf. Danezis [2004],
aim at correct classification of friends with certain probabilities. Although these two
approaches are orthogonal, as we will outline in Section 6, our estimate (3.5) allows
relating the number of observations required by these attacks, analytically. This was
not possible in the past.
1Note that the estimate of E(T1×) in (3.4) was derived for arbitrary integer value of m, with no
particular assumption on the scope of m.
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The Statistical Disclosure attack (SDA), cf. Danezis [2004] requires at least
1
p2
l2
[√u− 1
u2
(b− 1) +
√
u− 1
u2
(b− 1) + p2(1
p
− 1)
]2
(3.8)
observations to classify recipients whom Alice contacts with the least probability p =
mina∈ HA PA(a). Setting l = 2, l = 3 leads to a correct classification in 95%, re-
spectively 99% of the cases1. In case of uniformly distributed Alice’s traffic, p = 1
m
according to Danezis [2004]. For invariant u, b,m, l and non-Alice sender behaviour,
the SDA requiresO( 1
p2
) observations to classify all Alice’s friends while ExactHS only
requires O(1
p
) observations to uniquely identify all Alice’s friends, according to (3.5).
3.2 Evaluation
This section demonstrates the estimate (3.5) for the mean of the least number of ob-
servations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends for concrete Mix configurations.
Section 3.2.1 compares this estimate with the corresponding empirical mean of the
least number of observations to succeed the HS-attack to confirm the closeness of the
estimate. We also apply this estimate to compare the mean number of observations
required to succeed the HS-attack with that to guess Alice’s friends by the SDA in
Section 3.2.2
The evaluations are applied to the same Mix configurations as in the simulations in
Section 2.2.4 to supports the comparability of evaluation results. We therefore assume
that Alice’s traffic to her friends in HA is Zipf(m,α) distributed, while the cover-traffic
to recipients in R is uniformly distributed, as described in Section 2.2.4.1.
3.2.1 Estimated Number of Observations Required by HS-Attack
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 visualise the empirical mean number of observations to suc-
ceed the HS-attack, labelled (HS) and to fulfil 2×-exclusivity labelled (2x-excl), ob-
tained from simulations. These are compared with the estimate (3.5) of the mean of
1This refers to the true-positive rate of the SDA. The false-positive rate might be arbitrary large and
has (to the best of our knowledge) not been mathematically analysed for the general case, yet.
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the least number of observations for 2×-exclusivity, labelled (2x-excl-est), which is:
E(T2×e) ≈ 1
p
((lnm+ γ) + ln lnm)
(
1− (m− 1)
u
)1−b
. (3.9)
Since Alice’s traffic is Zipf(m,α) distributed according to the probability mass func-
tion Pm,αz in Section 2.2.4.1, p = mina∈ HA PA(a) = P
m,α
z (m).
The plots provide these comparisons for distinct Mix configurations that are mod-
elled by the parameters u, b,m, α. The y-axis always shows the mean number of ob-
servations, while the x-axis vary one of the parameters u, b,m, α. Counting from left
to right and from top to bottom, Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed in the first three
plots (i.e., α = 0) and non-uniformly distributed in the fourth plot in Figure 3.1 and
Figure 3.2. We can observe that the estimate (3.5) provides reasonable approximations,
even for the more complex cases, where Alice’s traffic is non-uniformly distributed.
Figure 3.1: Mean number of observations: to succeed HS-attack (HS) and to fulfil
2×-exclusivity (2x-excl) versus estimated mean for 2×-exclusivity (2x-excl-est).
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Figure 3.2: Mean number of observations: to succeed HS-attack (HS) and to fulfil
2×-exclusivity (2x-excl) versus estimated mean for 2×-exclusivity (2x-excl-est).
3.2.2 Number of Observations Required by HS-attack and SDA
We compare the mean number of observations to succeed the HS-attack as estimated by
(3.5) with the number of observations required by the SDA to correctly classify Alice’s
friends with a true-positive rate of 95%, as provide by (3.8), cf. Danezis [2004]. This
serves to concretely illustrate that the SDA requires a number of observations that is
by the factor of O(1
p
) higher than those required by ExactHS, where p is the least
probability in the distribution of Alice’s friends.
α p 2x-excl-est SDA95%
0.0 0.0435 186 343
0.5 0.0253 319 840
1.0 0.0116 693 3282
1.5 0.0041 1960 23036
p = mina∈ HA PA(a) = P
23,α
z (23)
in Zipf(23, α) distribution
Figure 3.3: Estimated number of required observations: HS-attack (2x-excl-est) versus
SDA with 95% true-positive classification (SDA95%), for u = 400, b = 10,m = 23.
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α p 2x-excl-est SDA95%
0.0 0.0250 245 291
0.5 0.0140 437 637
1.0 0.0058 1047 2301
1.5 0.0017 3564 17586
p = mina∈ HA PA(a) = P
40,α
z (40)
in Zipf(40, α) distribution
Figure 3.4: Estimated number of required observations: HS-attack (2x-excl-est) versus
SDA with 95% true-positive classification (SDA95%), for u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40.
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 provide evaluations for the Mix parameters (u = 400, b =
10,m = 23), respectively (u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40) and Zipf(m,α) distributed
Alice’s traffic. These are the same parameters as considered in the bottom right plots
in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. The plots draw the estimated number of observations to
succeed the HS-attack based on (3.5) labelled by (2x-excl-est) and to classify Alice’s
friends with a true-positive rate of 95% by the SDA based on (3.8) (for l = 2) labelled
by (SDA95%).
We observe that the number of observations required by the SDA increasingly ex-
ceeds that required by the HS-attack for increasing value of α, as p decreases with
increasing α.
Note that (3.8) solely considers the true-positive rate of the SDA, that is given an
Alice’s friend, that friend is classified as Alice’s friend with a certain rate (e.g., 95% in
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). However, the false-positive rate can be arbitrary large and
estimating it for general cases is hard, as outlined by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso
[2012] and in Section 6.2.2.4. When the SDA terminates, there is thus an unknown
number of non-friends who are classified as Alice’s friends, whereas there is a unique
identification of Alice’s set of friends, when the HS-attack terminates. We ignore in
this evaluation that the SDA requires a learning phase to estimate the distribution of
the cover-traffic and assume that this information is a-priori known to the attacker.
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3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we analytically revealed the relation between the least number of ob-
servations required by the HS-attack to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends and the
Mix configuration. This relation is mathematically described by (3.5) that provides
an estimate of the least number of observations to succeed the HS-attack with respect
to arbitrary Mix parameters u, b,m, uniformly distributed cover-traffic and arbitrary
distribution of Alice’s friends. As discussed in Section 3.1.1.2 and Section 2.2.4.1, the
uniform distribution of the cover-traffic can model a bound of a real (non-uniformly
distributed) cover-traffic, so that our estimate also applies to non-uniformly distributed
cover-traffic. The loss of precision of the estimate in that case is not focused in this
thesis and is left for future works.
Considering non-uniformly distributed traffic is important, as the real user traffic is
not uniformly distributed. We could see by the evaluation in Section 3.2 and by our an-
alytical estimate (3.5) that non-uniformly distributed communication of Alice leads to
an increase of the number of observations to succeed the HS-attack. As shown in (3.5)
that number of observations is proportional to 1
p
, where p is the least probability in the
distribution of Alice’s friends. This supports Mix designers to adjust, when particular
communication patterns (i.e., static set of friends) can be uniquely identified for traffic
distributions of interest, at the design phase of the Mix system. Alice might also apply
this estimate to adjust her traffic distribution to avoid the unique identifiability of her
set of friends.
The closed formula (3.5) also allows comparing the number of observations to suc-
ceed the HS-attack with that required by the SDA, cf. Danezis [2004]. We chose
to compare with the SDA, as it is the basis of many heuristic attacks, and efficiently
applicable to non-artificial Mix configurations, cf. Section 6.2.2. Additionally, the
SDA also provides a clear mathematical analysis of the true-positive rate for the clas-
sification of Alice’s friends that facilitates the comparison. One of the advantage of
the HS-attack is that it requires the least number of observations to uniquely identify
Alice’s set of friends. Comparing (3.5) with (3.8) shows that this number of observa-
tions is even by a factor of O(1
p
) lower than that required by the SDA to guess Alice’s
friends with any bias. We also observed that other heuristic approaches, cf. Kesdogan
and Pimenidis [2004]; Kesdogan et al. [2009], require significantly more observations
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than the HS-attack. As we will outline in Section 6.2.1, these attacks must collect
sufficiently many observations, such that some statistical properties required by the
heuristics in those attacks become significant. The HS-attack provides a clear and pre-
cise classification of users according to the duration of the persistence of their set of
friends, into those users whose friends can be uniquely identified and those for whom
this is not possible with respect to the considered Mix configurations. As implied by
our analyses, users whose friends can be uniquely identified by the HS-attack might be
too shortly persistence to obtain reasonable guesses by the SDA.
The advantage of heuristic attacks is that they do not focus on providing exact
identification of Alice’s friends, but just on providing good guesses of friends. These
guesses are based on some heuristic and usually allow computationally efficient at-
tacks that do not rely on solving NP-complete problems. However, as illustrated in
the simulations in Section 2.2.4.2, there are Mix configurations that are also compu-
tational feasible for the HS-attack using ExactHS that will be analytically analysed in
Chapter 4.
Our estimate leaves some research issues for future works. One issue is to obtain a
closer estimate of the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of
friends by deploying the non-trivial-disproof, instead of the 2×-exclusivity criteria, as
outlined in Section 2.3. Deriving a closed formula for that estimate seems to be more
complex than deriving (3.5). Another issue is the analytical estimate of the number of
observations to uniquely identify any Alice’s friend, instead of Alice’s set of friends, in
case of non-uniformly distributed traffic. We conjecture that non-uniform distributions
of Alice’s traffic increase the number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of
friends, while decreasing the number of observations to identify any of Alice’s friends
at the same time. Section 5.1 will propose analyses towards this direction.
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Chapter 4
Practical Limit of Anonymity
Protection
Whereas the previous chapter dealt with anonymity protection against an attacker with
unlimited computing resources, the practical limit considers an attacker with limited
resources1. It refers to the computational complexity required by an attacker to break
a system. Therefore, we assume that the attacker has collected sufficiently many ob-
servations, such that Alice’s friends are uniquely identifiable by the HS-attack.
Chapter 2 empirically showed that the practical limit of anonymity protection is
more realistically measured by the “mean time”, than by the “worst case” complex-
ity of an attack. It demonstrated the tractability of the mean time-complexity of the
enhanced ExactHS in Algorithm 2 and thus of the HS-attack using ExactHS for sev-
eral realistic Mix configurations, despite the exponential worse case complexity of
ExactHS. This chapter proposes analytical analyses of the relations between the Mix
parameters, the traffic distributions and the mean time-complexity of the enhanced Ex-
actHS to explain those empirical observations. It allows measuring the practical limit
provided by distinct Mix configurations. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to analyse the practical limit of anonymity protection against the HS-attack that is
more fine-granular than the purely theoretic worst case analyses.
Section 4.1 provides an estimate of the upper bound on the mean time-complexity
1The practical limit means that the protection cannot exceed that limit.
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of the enhanced ExactHS that is invariant to Alice’s traffic distribution. This allows
identifying Mix parameters, where ExactHS is tractable and efficient, regardless of the
distribution of Alice’s friends.
The specific effect of Alice’s traffic distribution on the mean time-complexity of
ExactHS is analytically analysed in Section 4.2. It proves that non-uniform distribution
of Alice’s traffic can lead to an efficient mean time-complexity of ExactHS, despite
Mix parameters that are intractable for the HS-attack in case of uniformly distributed
traffic.
4.1 Upper Bound of Mean Time-Complexity
This section contributes a closed formula to estimate the upper bound of the mean time-
complexity of ExactHS that is independent of the distribution of Alice’s friends, as
proposed by Pham et al. [2011]. We show that the mean time-complexity of ExactHS
is linearly bounded, if for every non-friend, the probability that it appears in a random
observation does not exceed 1
m2
.
Section 4.2 will show that the uniform distribution of Alice’s traffic maximises
the mean time-complexity for ExactHS. Therefore, we analyse the upper bound of the
mean time-complexity of ExactHS for Alice’s uniform traffic distribution to provide
an estimate of the upper bound that is independent of the distribution of Alice’s friends.
Alice’s set of friends HA is a unique minimum-hitting-set in a given observation set
OS, if no other setH 6= HA , where | HA | = m is a hitting-set in OS. The basic scheme
of ExactHS tries to construct a disproof of H by choosing one recipient in H in each
level of recursion, thus obtaining a set of chosen recipients C ⊆ H.
A chosen recipient set C ⊆ H is sufficient to disproveH, if the following inequality
(that corresponds to Line 6 of Algorithm 2) is true:
max
{r′1,...r′m−|C|}⊆
⋃
O∈OS\OS[C] O
m−|C|∑
i=1
|OS[r′i]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# observations potentially hit by H\C
< |OS \ OS[C]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# observations not hit by C
. (4.1)
That is if the cumulative frequency of every m− |C| distinct recipients in OS \ OS[C]
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is lower than the number of observations that are not yet hit by C, so that H \C cannot
be a hitting set in OS \OS[C].1 Provided the inequality is true, it directly follows from
Claim 2 in Section 2.2.2.1 that H is no hitting set in OS.
If we denote by C a set of chosen recipients that is sufficient to disprove H, then
deploying the disproof condition (4.1) would allow ExactHS to disprove H at the |C|-
th level of recursion. We derive an upper bound cum for the mean of |C| with respect to
all H 6= HA , to obtain a bound of O(bcum) for the mean time-complexity of ExactHS.
Section 4.1.1 derives an estimate of the number of observations hit by any single set
H 6= HA in OS, given any chosen set C ⊆ H, that is called the potential Po(H,C).
This potential never underestimates the number of observations hit by H, so that H is
provably no hitting-set in OS, if the difference Po(H,C)− |OS| is negative2.
The mean of this difference is determined with respect to the uniform traffic dis-
tribution in Section 4.1.2. Section 4.1.3 derives the upper bound of the number of
recipient choices cum, such that this mean difference is negative with respect to all
H 6= HA and a C ⊆ H that maximises Po(H,C),3 for |C| ≥ cum.
The closed formula for the upper bound of the mean time-complexity of ExactHS
(as implemented in Algorithm 2) with respect to the Mix parameters and cum is pro-
vided in Section 4.1.4. This mathematical bound is confirmed by simulation results in
Section 4.1.5.
4.1.1 Potential – Estimate of Number of Observations Hit by a Hy-
pothesis
In this section we introduce the definition of the potential our estimate of the number
of distinct observations hit by a set H 6= HA in a given observation set OS. This value
allows us to estimate the number of recipient choices required to disprove a set, and
thus to understand the mean complexity of ExactHS. Note that this “estimate” is part
of our analysis of the complexity, and does not affect the exactness of ExactHS itself.
1A recipient r ∈ R is in an observation set OS, if there is an observation O ∈ OS, where r ∈ O.
2This is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for the disproof of H that is similar to (4.1), but
more fine grained.
3This assumes that ExactHS prefers choosing recipients who maximise the number of recipient
choices to disprove a hypothesis.
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To ease the notation, we assume without loss of generality that all considered sets
are of the structure
H = { r1, . . . , rc︸ ︷︷ ︸
chosen recipients
, rc+1, . . . , rm︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-chosen recipients
} .
Each ri represents a distinct recipient, and the number of recipients is |H| = m. The
first c recipients constitute the set C = {r1, . . . , rc} that we call the chosen recipient
set, where each recipient ri ∈ C, for 1 ≤ i ≤ c is called a chosen recipient and
the variable c = |C| always denotes the number of chosen recipients. The remaining
(m − c) recipients in H are called non-chosen recipients. We define that the set of
all observations hit by the chosen recipients in OS, that is OS[C], is exactly known,
whereas, only the frequency of every non-chosen recipient is known. That is for every
ri ∈ C, 1 ≤ i ≤ c, the frequency |OS[ri]| and |OS[ri] \ OS[C]| is known, where the
latter results from knowing OS[C].
The potential of H with respect to C is denoted Po(H,C).
Po(H,C) = |OS[C]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# observ. hit by all chosen recipients
+
m∑
i=c+1
|OS[ri] \ OS[C]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
# observ. hit by non-chosen recipients in OS\OS[C]
(4.2)
There are two extreme cases. If all recipients are chosen, that is if c = m, then
the observations hit by H are exactly known. The potential is therefore the number of
observations hit by H.
If all recipients are non-chosen, that is c = 0, then it is not known, which obser-
vations contain recipients in H. The potential is therefore the cumulative frequency of
the recipients in H in OS. This case is analysed in Section 4.1.1.1 as a simple starting
point to analyses the general case.
In the general case, Po(H,C) is the sum of the exact number of observations
|OS[C]| containing any of the c chosen recipients and the cumulative frequency of each
non-chosen recipient in H \ C in the remaining observations OS \ OS[C]. We derive
the potential function for this case in Section 4.1.1.2.
The more recipients are chosen in H, the more accurately the potential represents
the number of distinct observations intersecting with H. While never underestimating
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the set of observations intersecting with H the potential might overestimate due to
observations that cover more than one non-chosen recipient, as visualised in Figure 4.1
and explained in the sequel.
OS[r1] OS[r2]
OS[r3]
1 2 1
3
2 2
1
OS[r2]\
OS[r1]
OS[r3] \ OS[r1]
OS[r1]
1 1
2
1
Figure 4.1: Overestimation by potential. Light grey area represents overestimation.
Left: Po({r1, r2, r3}, {}); all recipients are non-chosen. Right: Po({r1, r2, r3}, {r1});
r1 is chosen.
4.1.1.1 Potential in Case of no Chosen Recipient
The set of observations covered by recipient ri is represented by a circle around OS[ri]
for i = 1, 2, 3 in the left-hand picture in Figure 4.1. The grey area represents those
observations that are covered by at least two recipients ri, rj for i 6= j. The number
in the area shows the number of times observations in that area are counted in the
potential. In this example, the considered set is H = {r1, r2, r3}, where C = {} is the
chosen recipient set. We study this marginal case, as a simple starting point to analyse
the general case of the potential function.
The left picture in Figure 4.1 illustrates how Po(H, {}) overestimates |OS[H]|,
which is the number of observations covered by H. The overestimation is caused by
those observations that are covered by more than one of the recipients r1, r2, r3. The
exact number of observations covered by H in the left picture in Figure 4.1 can be
computed by the following inclusion-exclusion formula:
|OS[H]| = |OS[r1]|+ |OS[r2]|+ |OS[r3]| − |OS[r1] ∩ OS[r2]|− (4.3)
|OS[r1] ∩ OS[r3]| − |OS[r2] ∩ OS[r3]|+ |OS[r1] ∩ OS[r2] ∩ OS[r3]| .
In this case, all recipients in H are non-chosen, therefore the potential as formu-
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lated in (4.2) is the frequency of each recipient in OS, which is
Po(H, {}) = |OS[r1]|+ |OS[r2]|+ |OS[r3]| .
Combining (4.3) and the simplification of (4.2) above, we reformulate the potential,
such that the overestimation of OS[H] is mathematically directly visible, next:
Po(H, {}) ≤ |OS[H]|+ |OS[r1] ∩ OS[r2]|+ |OS[r1] ∩ OS[r3]|+ |OS[r2] ∩ OS[r3]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
overestimation
This estimation by combining (4.2) and the inclusion-exclusion formula provides the
basic idea to reveal the overestimation that is applied to the general case in the next
section.
4.1.1.2 Potential in General Case
The case when one recipient is chosen, that is C = {r1}, while the other recipients
in H are non-chosen is illustrated by the right-hand picture of Figure 4.1. Applying
the formulation (4.2) of the potential for Po({r1, r2, r3}, {r1}) specifies that choosing
r1 causes all observations containing it, represented by the dark circle, to be removed
in the frequency consideration of the non-chosen recipients. In this case Po(H,C)
overestimates |OS[H]| by double-counting the grey area that represents observations
that are covered by r2 and r3 but not by r1. Combining (4.3) and (4.2) result in the
following estimation of the potential and its overestimate of OS[H] in this example:
Po(H, {r1}) ≤ |OS[H]|+ |OS[r2] ∩ OS[r3]| .
After illustrating the idea of estimating the potential for the concrete cases in Fig-
ure 4.1, we are now ready to derive the estimation of the potential in the general case. In
general, given a set H and a subset C = {r1, . . . , rc} of 0 ≤ c ≤ m chosen recipients,
the overestimation of the number of covered observations result from the non-chosen
recipients rk, rl for c < k, l ≤ m in H \ C.
The overestimation is bounded by the size of the
(
m−c
2
)
pairwise intersections
OS[rk] ∩ OS[rl]. This results in the following simplified estimation of the potential
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and its overestimation of OS[H] in the general case:
Po(H,C) ≤ |OS[H]|+
∑
c<k,l≤m; k 6=l
|OS[rk] ∩ OS[rl]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
overestimation
. (4.4)
4.1.1.3 Difference Between Potential and Number of Observations
A set H is sufficiently disproved by C with respect to a given observation set OS, if
Po(H,C) < |OS|. That is if the difference between the potential and the number of
observations collected by the attacker is less than 0. This section derives a formula for
the difference between the potential and the number of observations, allowing us to
determine the number of recipient choices c = |C| to disprove H.
In order to distinguish the effect of Alice’s friends and non-friends to Po(H,C),
each recipient r ∈ H is relabelled n for non-friend, and a for Alice’s friend. Without
loss of generality, every H ∈ Hj , where |H| = m from now on has the following
structure:
H = {n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA︸ ︷︷ ︸
c chosen recipients
, ncN+1, . . . , nj, acA+1, . . . , am−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(m−c) non-chosen recipients
} .
The number of chosen recipients is c = cN + cA, where cN ≤ j denotes the number
of chosen non-friends, while cA ≤ m − j denotes the number of chosen friends. The
variable j denotes the number of non-friends in hitting sets of the structure Hj . We still
use the notation ri to address the i-th recipient in H if a distinction is not important.
As before, the first c recipients r1, . . . , rc ∈ H are chosen, while the remaining (m−c)
recipients are non-chosen. We define HA = H ∩ HA as the subset containing only
Alice’s friends and HN = H \ HA as the subset consisting of only non-friends.
The following estimates for |OS[H]| and |OS| will be used next in inequality (4.8):
|OS[H]| ≤ |OS[HA]|+
∑
n∈HN
|OS[n] \ OS[HA]| (4.5)
|OS| ≥ |OS[HA]|+
∑
a∈( HA \HA)
|OS[a] \ OS[ HA \ {a}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
observ. containing a exclusively
| . (4.6)
Remember from Section 2.3.2.2 that an observation contains Alice’s friend a ∈ HA
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exclusively, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006], if it does not contain any other friend of Alice.
We next formulate the difference between the potential and the number of obser-
vations in the inequality (4.7) to derive the number of recipient choices c = |C| to
disprove H. If Po(H,C) < |OS|, so that inequality (4.7) is invalid, we can conclude
that c = |C| is sufficient large to disprove H. This difference is simplified in (4.8) that
result from applying (4.4) and (4.5) to Po(H,C), and applying (4.6) to |OS|.
0 ≤ Po(H,C)− |OS| (4.7)
≤
∑
cA<k,l≤m−j; k 6=l
|OS[ak] ∩ OS[al]|+
∑
cA<k≤m−j; cN<l≤j
|OS[ak] ∩ OS[nl]|
+
∑
cN<k,l≤j; k 6=l
|OS[nk] ∩ OS[nl]|+
∑
n∈HN
|OS[n] \ OS[HA]|
−
∑
a∈( HA \HA)
|OS[a] \ OS[ HA \ {a}]| (4.8)
For simplicity we restrict our analysis to those cases where the probability that
a particular recipient r ∈ H is contacted by a sender other than Alice, within a given
observationO, is significantly lower than the probability that Alice’s friend is contacted
by Alice. This allows us to ignore the possibility that some pair of recipients rk, rl ∈ H
is contacted by senders other than Alice in the same O. This allows us to ignore
counting the observations described below in (4.8):
{O ∈ OS[rk] ∩ OS[rl] | rk, rl ∈ H chosen by non-Alice senders in O} . (4.9)
We call the resulting simplified estimation of (4.8) the difference functionD(c, cN , cA, j),
which is ∑
cA<k,l≤m−j; k 6=l
|OS[ak] ∩ OS[al]|+
∑
cA<k≤m−j; cN<l≤j
|OS[ak] ∩ OS[nl]| +∑
n∈HN
|OS[n] \ OS[HA]| −
∑
a∈( HA \HA)
|OS[a] \ OS[ HA \ {a}]| . (4.10)
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4.1.2 Mean Difference Between Potential and Number of Obser-
vations
In this section, we analyse the expectation of the difference function for a concrete and
simplified communication traffic model of Alice and the other senders, which we call
the uniform communication model. In the uniform communication model, the cover-
traffic and Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed, as defined in Section 2.2.4.1.
The upper bound of the mean time-complexity of ExactHS estimated in
Section 4.1.4 will be inferred from our analyses of the expectation of the difference
function for this uniform communication model.
It is sufficient to derive the mean time-complexity of ExactHS for this uniform
communication model to obtain an upper-bound of that complexity that is also valid
for non-uniformly distributed traffic. Provided that we have the mean time-complexity
analysis of ExactHS for the uniform communication model, this can be used to bound
the mean time-complexity for non-uniformly distributed traffic. We can analyse given
Mix parameters (u˜, b,m) with non-uniformly distributed cover-traffic by analysing the
corresponding Mix parameters (u, b,m) of a uniformly distributed cover-traffic, as
sketched in Section 2.2.4.1. In that analysis, considering a uniform distribution of
Alice’s traffic provides an upper bound of the mean time-complexity of ExactHS. That
is a non-uniform distribution of Alice’s traffic would not lead to a higher mean time-
complexity, as will be shown in Section 4.2.
4.1.2.1 Expectation of the Difference
In the uniformly distributed cover-traffic (which is without Alice’s traffic), each recipi-
ent r ∈ R appears with the same cumulative probability of PN in an observation. That
is the probability that any of the (b − 1) senders of the cover-traffic contacts a given
recipient r ∈ R in an observation is the cumulative probability PN , for every r ∈ R.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4.1 each sender can select its recipient according to an
individual distribution, provided that the cumulative probability is PN . To simplify
our analysis we assume that, in every batch, each of the (b − 1) non-Alice senders
choose their recipients uniformly from the set R of u recipients with probability 1
u
.
The cumulative probability is thus PN = 1− (u−1u )b−1 for every r ∈ R.
The uniform distribution of Alice’s traffic means that in every observation, Alice
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contacts one of her m friends a ∈ HA with the probability mass function PA = 1m .
We apply the above description of the cover-traffic and Alice’s traffic in the uniform
communication model to (4.10). This results in the next four equations that represent
the expectation of the four expressions in (4.10), where the number of observations
collected by the attacker is t = |OS|.
E1(c, cN , cA, j) = t
(
m− j − cA
2
)
2
m
PN
E2(c, cN , cA, j) = t(j − cN)(m− j − cA) 1
m
PN
E3(c, cN , cA, j) = tj
j
m
PN
E4(c, cN , cA, j) = tj
1
m
(
1− m− 1
u
)b−1
The sum of these expectations is the estimate of the mean of Po(H,C)− |OS|.
The expressions following t in E1, E2, E3, E4 are significant and are discussed
next.
E1: For Alice’s friends ak, al ∈ HA, where ak 6= al, the probability that Alice con-
tacts ak and one of the other (b−1) senders contact al in an observation is 1mPN .
Due to symmetry, the probability that ak and al appear in an observation is 2mPN .
This is multiplied by the number of possible pairs of non-chosen Alice’s friends(
m−j−cA
2
)
.
E2: For recipients ak ∈ HA and nl ∈ HN , the probability that Alice contacts ak and
one of the other (b − 1) senders contacts nl is 1mPN . The factor (m − j − cA)
shows the number of non-chosen Alice’s friends ak while the factor (j − cN)
represents the number of non-chosen non-friends nl.
E3: Let a1, . . . , aj ∈ ( HA \ H) be the j Alice’s friends who are not in H. The
probability that a given non-friend nk ∈ HN appears in an observation where
Alice contacts one of a1, . . . , aj is jmPN . The final factor j accounts for the fact
that there are j non-friends nk in HN .
E4: Alice’s friend a ∈ ( HA \H) is exclusive in an observation if Alice contacts a and
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none of the other (b− 1) senders contact any of the recipients a′ ∈ ( HA \ {a}).
The probability that a is exclusive is therefore 1
m
(
1− m−1
u
)b−1. The factor j
accounts for this exclusivity probability for the j Alice’s friends a1, . . . , aj ∈
( HA \H) not appearing in H.
The sum of these these expectations results is the mean of the difference function
D(c, cN , cA, j), which is
ED(c, cN , cA, j) =
t
m
[
((m− c− 1)(m− j − cA) + j2)PN − j
(
1− m− 1
u
)b−1 ]
.
(4.11)
4.1.2.2 Relation of Mean Difference to Number of Chosen Recipients
This section shows for any hypothesis H ∈ Hj , that adding more chosen recipients to
every chosen recipient set C ⊂ H decreases the mean (4.11) of the difference function.
Claim 6. Let H ∈ Hj be any hypothesis and C = Ci be the subset of chosen recipients
in any sequence C1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Cm ⊆ H, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Given H and any sequence
of chosen recipients, the expectation ED(c, cN , cA, j) is a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to the number of chosen recipients c = |C|, where 1 ≤ c ≤ m− 1
2
.
The proof consists of two parts. We will show that ED(c, cN , cA, j) is monotoni-
cally decreasing given that cN is fixed and then for the case that cA is fixed.
Monotonicity of ED(c, cN , cA, j) given fixed cN . This analysis refers to the case that
the number of chosen non-friends cN is fixed in the number of chosen recipients c.
By definition cA = (c − cN), therefore we replace all cA in (4.11) by (c − cN). The
following function determines the gradient of the resulting function by computing its
partial derivative with respect to c: ∂ED(c,cN ,c−cN ,j)
∂c
= tPN
m
(2c− 2m− cN + j + 1) .
This equation is less-than or equal 0, if
c ≤ m+ 1
2
(cN − j)− 1
2
. (4.12)
We consider the inequality (4.12) for different cases of (cN − j). The condition
cN ≤ j is given by definition , therefore only the following cases exist:
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cN = j: In this case ED is a decreasing function if c ≤ m− 12 .
cN < j: In this case ED is always a decreasing function. The proof derives from the
definition c = (cN +cA), where cA ≤ (m−j). Replacing cA in the first equation
by the latter inequality, we obtain:
c ≤ m+ (cN − j) ⇒ c ≤ m+ 1
2
(cN − j)− 1
2
, since cN − j ≤ −1 .
Therefore (4.12) is always fulfilled in this case.
This proves that ED(c, cN , cA, j) is a monotonically decreasing function with respect
to the number of chosen recipients c, where 1 ≤ c ≤ m− 1
2
, given that cN is fixed.
Monotonicity of ED(c, cN , cA, j) given fixed cA. We now consider the case that the num-
ber of Alice’s friends is fixed in the number of chosen recipients c. The gradient of
ED(c, cN , cA, j) with respect to c is now:
∂ED(c,c−cA,cA,j)
∂c
= tPN
m
(−m+ cA + j) .
The relation (cA + j) ≤ m is given by definition, therefore the gradient is always
less-than or equal to 0. This proves that ED(c, cN , cA, j) is a monotonically decreasing
function, given that cA is fixed.
We conclude from these two proofs that given a hypothesisH and any sequence of
chosen recipients C1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Cm ⊆ H, ED(c, cN , cA, j) is a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to c = |C| for C ∈ {C1, . . . ,Cm} in the sequence, where 1 ≤ c ≤
m− 1
2
. This completes the proof of Claim 6. All remaining analyses within Section 4.1
implicitly assume c ∈ [1, . . . ,m− 1].
4.1.2.3 Relation of Mean Difference to Order of Recipient Choice
This section shows that, in general, if one prefers to chose non-friends in H ∈ Hj first
and then the remaining friends in H, then the number of choices required to disprove
H is maximised.
Claim 7. Let c be a fixed number of chosen recipients and cN be the number of chosen
non-friends, where cN ≤ j ≤ c. The expectation ED(c, cN , cA, j) with respect to cN is
a monotonically increasing function.
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Proof. To analyse how ED is related to the number of non-friend choices cN , we com-
pute the partial derivative of ED(c, cN , c− cN , j) with respect to cN ≤ j ≤ c, where c
is fixed. This is: ∂ED(c,cN ,c−cN ,j)
∂cN
= tPN
m
(m− c− 1) .
This equation is clearly greater than 0 (since c ≤ m − 1 is assumed), therefore
ED(c, cN , c − cN , j) is a monotonically increasing function for cN in the complete
interval [0, . . . , j].
Note that ED(c, cN , c − cN , j) for cN > j is, by definition of cN , not defined. Let
H and the number of chosen recipients c ≥ j be fixed, while C ⊆ H is variable for
|C| = c. Claim 7 implies that Po(H,C) is in most of the cases maximal if cN = j of the
chosen recipients in C are non-friends. Disproving H therefore requires the maximal
number of chosen recipients in most of the cases, if the non-friends are chosen first.
To simplify the notation and because of the importance of the number of non-friends,
we will replace the notation ED(c, cN , c − cN , j) by the shorter notation ED(c, cN , j)
in the sequel.
4.1.3 Maximal Mean Number of Recipient Choices for Disproofs
We analyse in this section the maximum of the mean number of recipient choices to
disprove hypotheses. This maximum corresponds to modelling the case that ExactHS
would always choose a recipient in a hypothesis H 6= HA , such that the mean number
of recipient choices required to disprove H is maximal. While this assumption about
the choices of recipients by ExactHS is pessimistic and not general, it is considered to
provide the maximal mean number of recipient choices to disprove a single hypothesis,
as well as that to disprove all hypotheses.
Section 4.1.3.1 derives a formula for the maximal mean number of recipient choices
to disprove single hypotheses. The relation of this mean number is analysed with re-
spect to the class of the hypothesis in Section 4.1.3.2. This allows identifying the
hypothesis class containing hypotheses that require the maximal mean number of re-
cipient choices for disproofs with respect to all hypotheses classes. Section 4.1.3.3
derives a closed formula for the maximal number of recipient choices to disprove all
hypotheses from the results of these analyses.
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4.1.3.1 Local Maximal Mean
In this section, we derive the maximal mean number of recipient choices required to
disprove a single hypothesis H ∈ Hj , where H 6= HA . We obtain this by evaluating
structures of chosen recipient sets C ⊆ H, that immanently lead to a high number of
recipient choices for disproofs in most of the cases. It straight forwardly follows from
Claim 7 in Section 4.1.3 that such a structure is obtained, if C preferably consist of
non-friends.
Claim 8. Let u
b−1 ≥ 2(m − 1). The maximal mean number of recipient choices c to
disprove a hypothesisH ∈ Hj , such that ED(c, cN , j) = 0, is with respect to u, b,m, j:
cm(u, b,m, j) = argmax
0≤c≤m
{ED(c, cN , j) = 0 | 0 ≤ cN ≤ j}
= m− 1
2
−
√
j
u
b− 1 − j
2 + j −mj + 1
4
. (4.13)
We call cm(u, b,m, j) the maximal mean number of recipient choices to disprove a
hypothesis. If (u, b,m, j) is clear from the context, or if their particular values are not
important, we also refer to cm(u, b,m, j) shortly by cm.
Proof. In order to ensure that all non-friends are chosen first, we set cN = j. Given
this, the maximal number of recipient choices is the value c, such that ED(c, cN , j)
in (4.11) is 0.
0 = ED(c, j, j)
≤ t
m
[
((m− c− 1)(m− c) + j2)(1− (1− b− 1
u
))− j(1− (b− 1)m− 1
u
)
]
.
We obtain (4.13) by computing the positive root of the last right hand side function for
the variable c. Equation (4.13) is valid if the expression within the square root is at
least 0. That is, if
0 ≤ ju(b− 1)−1 − j2 + j −mj + 1
4
.
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Since j ≤ m the above equation holds, if
u(b− 1)−1 ≥ 2(m− 1) .
Note that it is sufficient to assume cN = j and c ≥ j for the proof. There is no
need to consider the case c < j for the maximal mean number of recipient choices,
where cN < j, separately. For an intuitive explanation, we assume a set H ∈ Hj for a
maximal value j, such that cN = j = c is the maximal number of non-friend choices
to disprove H. Let H′ ∈ Hj′ be another set, where j′ > j. Since we assume that
each Alice’s friend are more frequently observed by the attacker than any non-friend,
the relation Po(H′, {}) < Po(H, {}) holds in most of the cases. We can particularly
deduce that ED(c, cN , j′) < ED(c, cN , j), which implies that the maximal number of
recipient choices to disprove H, as well as H′, is c. It is thus sufficient to analyse the
case cN = j and c ≥ j.
4.1.3.2 Maximal Mean with respect to Hypothesis Class
We now analyse the relation of the maximal mean number of recipient choices (4.13)
with respect to the hypotheses classes. It allows determining conditions, where (4.13)
is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to Hj . Under these conditions, the
identification of the hypothesis class containing hypotheses that requires the globally
maximal mean number of recipient choices for disproofs is greatly simplified.
The next equation is the partial derivative of (4.13) with respect to j.
∂cm
∂j
= −1
2
(u(b− 1)−1 − 2j + 1−m)(
ju(b− 1)−1 − j2 + j −mj + 1
4
) 1
2
(4.14)
The value of cm is thus monotonically decreasing, if the numerator in the above is at
least 0.
0 ≤ u(b− 1)−1 − 2j + 1−m ⇒ j ≤ 0.5 (u(b− 1)−1 −m+ 1)
Thus, if the maximal number of non-friend choices in a disproof is not larger than
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1
2
( u
b−1 −m+ 1), then (4.13) is a monotonically decreasing function. If ub−1 ≥ 3m− 1,
then this case is necessarily fulfilled and we assume this condition for the remaining
analyses in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.3.3 Global Maximal Mean
This section provides a simple closed formula for the global maximal mean number of
recipient choices to disprove every hypothesis. It is the maximum of (4.13) for given
Mix parameters u, b,m.
We derive the maximum of (4.13) under the condition in Section 4.1.3.2, so that
(4.13) is monotonically decreasing. As shown below, obtaining a closed formula for
the maximum of (4.13) with respect to u, b,m is straight forward under this condition.
Claim 9. Let u
b−1 ≥ 3m− 1 and cm(u, b,m, j) be the maximal mean number of recip-
ient choices for single hypotheses. The maximal value of cm for fixed u, b,m is
cum(u, b,m) = max
j
cm(u, b,m, j)
= m− 1
2
−
√
u
b− 1 −m+
1
4
, where 0 ≤ cum ≤ m . (4.15)
We call cum the upper bound of the mean number of recipient choices for disproofs.
Proof. Let u
b−1 ≥ 3m− 1, then cm is monotonically decreasing with respect to j. It is
therefore maximal if we set j = 1 in (4.13) and thus obtain (4.15).
In case of u
b−1 < 3m− 1, the right hand side of equation (4.15) might not provide
a maximal value for cum . However, we can conclude from that equation that, if ub−1 =
m− 1
4
, then cum ≥ m− 12 and that cum increases if the value of ub−1 decreases.
4.1.4 Maximal Mean Time-Complexity
The last section derives the upper bound of the mean number of recipient choices re-
quired to disprove all hypotheses H 6= HA . This section applies that result to estimate
the upper bound of the mean time-complexity. We outline the implementation of the
potential in Algorithm 2, such that analyses of the potential and of the mean time-
complexity to disprove hypotheses directly apply to ExactHS.
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The basic ExactHS scheme in Algorithm 1 that is proposed by Pham [2008], fo-
cuses solely on minimising the worst case complexity of solving the unique minimum
hitting set problem. Each recipient choice in a level of recursion in Algorithm 1 spec-
ifies a branch that directs to distinct proofs or disproofs of hypotheses for possible
minimal-hitting-sets. That number of possible minimal-hitting-sets is according to
Claim 3 in Section 2.2.3.1 tightly bounded by bm. Therefore, even if Alice’s set of
friends HA is a unique minimum hitting set, there are b
m − 1 hypotheses for possible
minimal-hitting-sets that need to be disproved to prove the uniqueness of HA .
However, estimating the number of observations hit by hypotheses based on the
potential and the difference function in the enhanced version of ExactHS allows cut-
ting branches for the disproof of hypotheses. This avoids computing each of the bm−1
single hypotheses of minimal-hitting-sets in ExactHS for disproofs and thus reduces
the practical mean time-complexity of ExactHS. The application of the potential is
implemented in Line 6 of Algorithm 2, that is marked by the grey colour to highlight
the difference to Algorithm 1. In that line, C is the set of chosen recipients, where
|C| = m −m′, |OS′| = |OS \ OS[C]| = |OS| − |OS[C]| and ∑m′l=1 |OS′[rl]| = Po(C ∪
{r1, . . . , rm′},C) − |OS[C]| for any possible m′ non-chosen recipients r1, . . . , rm′ .
Therefore, the inequality in Line 6 of Algorithm 2 is equivalent to that in (4.7) in the
analysis of the difference function in Section 4.1.1.3. These inequalities are enlisted
below.
m′∑
l=1
|OS′[rl]| ≥ |OS′| (Line 6 of Algorithm 2)
⇔ Po(C ∪ {r1, . . . , rm′},C) ≥ |OS| (Inequality (4.7))
The upper bound cum of the mean number of recipient choices to disprove hypotheses
bounds the size |C| and thus the level of recursions required by the enhanced ExactHS
implemented by Algorithm 2 to disprove hypotheses.
4.1.4.1 Estimate
Since cum is the upper bound of the mean number of recipient choices in Algorithm 2,
we estimate from (4.15) in Section 4.1.3.3 that bcum is the upper bound of the mean
number of finalised sets computed by ExactHS for the unambiguous identification of
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HA . Applying (4.15), results in the following closed formula that estimates this mean:
bm−
1
2
−
√
u
b−1−m+ 14 ≈ bm− 12−
√
1
PN
−m+ 1
4 . (4.16)
The estimate of the upper bound of the mean time-complexity of ExactHS results from
the product of the above expression and tbm. This estimate is O(bcum tbm) and corre-
sponds to the worst case time-complexity of O(bmtbm), if cum = m.
From the relations PN = 1 − (1 − 1u)b−1 ≈ b−1u and PA = 1m we conclude from
(4.16), that:
• If every recipient not contacted by Alice is at least as likely to appear in an ob-
servation as recipients contacted by Alice, the upper bound of the mean time-
complexity roughly equals the worst case complexity O(bmtbm). That is if
PN =
1
m− 1
4
.
• The upper bound of the mean time-complexity becomes linear O(tbm) if every
recipient not contacted by Alice appears in observations with a probability close
to 1
m2
.
4.1.5 Evaluation
To support our mathematical analysis, we now show the ExactHS applied to randomly
generated observations. These observations are generated under the uniform commu-
nication model as analysed in Section 4.1.2. This is chosen to allow direct comparison
between the simulative and our theoretical results.
In each experiment, we apply the HS-attack on random observations that are gener-
ated according to the uniform communication model until the HS-attack is successful,
so that Alice’s set of friends is uniquely identified by ExactHS. The average of the
number of observations required in the experiments is the mean number of observation
to succeed the HS-attack. We repeat the experiments until 95% of these results fall
within 5% of the empirically observed mean; thereby each experiment is repeated at
least 300 times.
To demonstrate that our estimate closely predicts the empirical upper bound of
the mean time-complexity of ExactHS, we apply the HS-attack on observations of a
Mix with parameters u, b,m that are chosen according to (4.15), where cum = 2. It
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is therefore expected that when the HS-attack succeeds, the mean time-complexity of
ExactHS will be polynomial in O(b2tbm), while its upper bound of the mean number
of recipient choices (i.e., the level of recursion) will be bounded by 2. This illustrates
a range of concrete non trivial Mix parameters, where ExactHS is computationally
feasible despite its infeasible worst case complexity.
Upper Bound of Mean Number of Recipient Choices The left plot in Figure 4.2
draws the mean number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends
for the same Mix parameters as in Figure 4.3. The straight line (HS) represents the
mean of the least number of observations required by the HS-attack. The HS-attack
requires very few observations when it succeeds, so that the empirical distribution of
the cover-traffic strongly diverges from the function PN ≈ b−1u from which they are
drawn1. Due to the law of large numbers, this side effect diminishes for large number
of observations. We therefore additionally consider the application of ExactHS where
the number of observations is twice that required by (5.8). This is shown in the plot by
the dashed line (HS2).
The right plot in Figure 4.2 draws the mean maximal number of recipient choices
(i.e., level of recursion) for disproofs by ExactHS under the conditions represented by
the lines (HS) and (HS2). The line (HS) shows that the number of recipient choices is
notably higher than cum if ExactHS identifies HA with the least number of observa-
tions. This is because the probabilities of many non-friends exceed PN due to a low
number of observations, and because we consider the maximal number of recipient
choices for disproofs in each experiment. With more observations, as in (HS2), we can
see that the mean maximal number of recipient choices is about cum for all selected
u, b,m as predicted by (4.15). Collecting even more additional observations when ap-
plying ExactHS, does not noticeably change the mean maximal number of recipient
choices.
Upper Bound of Mean Time-Complexity Figure 4.3 draws the mean number of
finalised sets in the experiments. The number of recipients u is determined by (4.15)
with respect to a fixed cum = 2, batch size b = 50 and the number of Alice’s friends m
1For example, assume that PN = 1/400, but the HS-attack succeeds after |OS| = 100 observations.
The empirical probability of every recipient observed in OS exceeds PN by at least a factor of 4.
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Figure 4.2: Unique identification of HA for cum = 2 and u, b,m chosen by (4.15).
Left: Number of observations in HS-attack. Right: Level of recursion for disproofs by
ExactHS.
on the x-axis. The value of u ranges from 3200 for m = 10 to 70000 for m = 40. We
can observe that the mean number of finalised sets to uniquely identify Alice’s set of
friends is below bcum = 2500, as predicted by (4.15). This is considered for the least
number of observations required by ExactHS, labelled by (HS) and for the number of
observations that is twice that required by (5.8), labelled by (HS2). The mean number
of finalised sets computed under the condition HS2 is in the rage of 14 – 36.
Figure 4.3: Mean number of finalised sets for unique identification of HA : u is deter-
mined by (4.15) for cum = 2, b = 50 and varying value of m.
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4.2 Impact of Traffic Distribution on Mean
Time-Complexity
We analyses the impact of Alice’s traffic distribution, based on an estimate of a hy-
pothetical minimal mean time-complexity of ExactHS. This complexity assumes that
ExactHS disproves every hypothesis H 6= HA by choosing recipients, such that the
mean size of the set of chosen recipients C ⊆ H for that disproof is minimal. In gen-
eral, the lower the required number of recipient choices to disprove hypotheses, the
lower is the mean time-complexity of ExactHS. However, our assumption is hypothet-
ical, because it is probably computational infeasible to know for every hypothesis, the
recipient choices that minimises the mean number of recipient choices to disprove it.
Therefore, we consider the weaker assumption that ExactHS prefers choosing in each
level of recursion, the recipient first, that is most frequently contacted by Alice in that
level. We call the latter assumption the optimistic case assumption and propose anal-
yses of the mean time-complexity of ExactHS under this assumption. This leads to an
estimate of the hypothetical minimal mean time-complexity of ExactHS from above
that is dependent on the traffic distributions.
We show that the optimistic case assumption can be approached by the enhanced
ExactHS, if the probability that any recipient r ∈ R is contacted by any sender other
than Alice in an observation is below 1
m
. This is achieved by the modifications (Lines 5
to 7), provided by Algorithm 2. Therefore, the mean time-complexity of ExactHS
under the optimistic case assumption is approached by the mean time-complexity of
Algorithm 2, which we also confirm in simulations. The optimistic case assumption is
thus not purely hypothetical and can be approached efficiently.
We prove that the mean time-complexity of ExactHS under the optimistic case
assumption is maximal, if Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed. Analyses of the
Zipf(m,α) distribution of Alice’s traffic particularly show that this complexity ap-
proaches a polynomial function for increasing value of α. The Zipf distribution is
known to closely model Internet traffic, as evaluated by Almeida et al. [1996]; Breslau
et al. [1999]; Cunha et al. [1995]; Glassman [1994].
Let Po(H,C) be the potential of any hypothesis H 6= HA and chosen set C ⊆ H
in an observation set OS accumulated by the attacker, introduced in Section 4.1.1.
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Section 4.2.1 refines the formulation of Po(H,C) to distinguish the effect of the
single Alice’s friends and non-friends in H and C on the value of Po(H,C). This is
applied in Section 4.2.2 to determine a mean of the difference Po(H,C)− |OS| that is
specific to the distribution of Alice’s set of friends.
Section 4.2.3 analyses for every hypothesis H 6= HA the pair (cN , cA) of minimal
number of choices of non-friends and friends, where C = CN ∪ CA, |CN | = cN and
|CA| = cA, such that the mean of Po(H,C) − |OS| is negative.1 It determines the
maximal minimal number of choices of non-friends cmminN (cA) in those pairs, for the
values of cA = 0, . . . ,m − 1, with respect to the traffic distributions. We show that
the mean number of non-friends c′N and friends c
′
A to disprove a hypothesis H
′ 6= HA
by ExactHS, provided the optimistic case assumption, is approximately bounded by
(cmminN (c
′
A), c
′
A).
2
Section 4.2.4 applies this information to estimate the minimal mean time-complexity
of ExactHS from above that is dependent on the traffic distributions. That is the mean
time-complexity of ExactHS under the optimistic case assumption.
4.2.1 Refined Potential – Estimate of Number of Observations Hit
by a Hypothesis
In this section, we reformulate the potential Po in Section 4.1.1, such that the effect of
Alice’s traffic distribution and that of the cover-traffic are analytically distinguishable.
This provides the basis for an in depth analysis of the relation between the required
number of recipient choices to disprove hypotheses by ExactHS and Alice’s traffic
distribution, for the succeeding sections. Section 4.2.3.3 will deploy this analysis to
derive a strategy to choose recipients to approach the mean number of recipient choices
to disprove hypotheses by ExactHS under the optimistic case assumption. This strat-
egy is implemented in the enhanced version of ExactHS in Algorithm 2 and leads to a
significant lower mean time-complexity than Algorithm 1.
As defined in Section 4.1.1.3, each hypothesis H 6= HA is described by the following
1The number of these pairs (cN , cA) would determine the hypothetical minimal mean time-
complexity of ExactHS.
2We show that Algorithm 2 approaches this optimistic case assumption under realistic conditions.
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structure:
{n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA , ncN+1, . . . , nj, acA+1, . . . , am−j} .
We denote by the set C ⊆ H the chosen recipients in H, where C = CN ∪ CA.
The set CN = C \ HA = {n1, . . . , ncN} represents all chosen non-friends, while
CA = C ∩ HA = {a1, . . . , acA} represents all chosen Alice’s friends in H. The size of
C is denoted by c = cN + cA, where cN = |CN | and cA = |CA|.
We define the set of observations, in which Alice contacts a particular friend
a ∈ HA by
OSA[a] = {O ∈ OS | a ∈ O ∧ Alice contacts a in O} .
This set has the following properties:
• OSA[a] ⊆ OS[a], due to observations O ∈ OS[a] in which a was chosen by a
non-Alice sender, but not by Alice.
• For ai 6= aj , OSA[ai] ∩ OSA[aj] = ∅ and
⋃m
i=1OSA[ai] = OS.
We define the set of observations, in which any non-Alice sender contacts a partic-
ular recipient r ∈ R by
OSN [r] = {O ∈ OS | r ∈ O ∧ a non-Alice sender contacts r in O} .
This set has the following properties:
• For ri 6= rj , OSN [ri] ∩ OSN [rj] ⊆ OS[ri, rj].
• OSN [n] = OS[n], but OSN [a] ⊆ OS[a]. Note that OS[a] = OSA[a] ∪ OSN [a].
Reformulating the potential Po with respect to OSA and OSN , results in (4.17).
This equation is equivalent to (4.2) in Section 4.1.1, but explicitly formulates the pro-
portion of Alice’s traffic and that of the other senders in the observations evaluated by
the potential.
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Po(H,C) = |OSA[a1, . . . , acA ]| (4.17)
+ |OSN [n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ] \ OSA[a1, . . . , acA ]|
+
m−j∑
i=cA+1
|OSA[ai] \ OSN [n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ]|
+
m−j∑
i=cA+1
|OSN [ai] \ OSN [n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ] \ OSA[a1, . . . , acA , ai]|
+
j∑
i=cN+1
|OSN [ni] \ OSN [n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ] \ OSA[a1, . . . , acA ]|
The first two lines counts all chosen observations, that is, the set of observations
|OS[C]| = |OS[n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ]|. The third and fourth lines counts non-chosen
observations that contain an as-yet non-chosen Alice’s friend in H, i.e.,∑m−j
i=cA+1
|OS[ai] \ OS[n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ]|. The last line counts non-chosen ob-
servations that contain an as-yet non-chosen non-friend in H. This equals the number
represented by
∑j
i=cN+1
|OS[ni] \ OS[n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA ]|.
Example 4.2.1 (Refined Potential). Figure 4.4 visualises the potential function on the
set H = {a1, n1}. The square frame covers all observations in OS. Observations in
which Alice contacts one of her two friends a1, a2 are represented by triangles with the
labels OSA[a1] and OSA[a2] that partitions OS. The set of observations in which any
non-Alice sender contacts the recipient a1, respectively n1, is marked by circles.
The horizontal pattern marks all observations containing a1, that is OS[a1]. The
vertical pattern marks all observations in OS \C containing n1. (These are OS[n1] for
C = {} in the first picture and OS[n1] \ {a1} for C = {a1} in the second picture.)
The first picture in Figure 4.4 shows the case that no recipients in H are chosen,
i.e., |C| = |{}| = c = 0.
Po(H, {}) = |OS[a1]|+ |OS[n1]|
= |OSA[a1]|+ |OSN [a1] \ OSA[a1]|+ |OSN [n1]|
The first equation above is formulated in term of (4.2), while the second equation is in
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OSA[a1]
OSA[a2]
OSN [a1]
OSN [n1]
OSN [n1]\
OS[a1]
OS
OS[a1]
OSA[a2]\
OS[a1]
Figure 4.4: Potential ofH = {a1, n1} is sum of observations containing a1 (horizontal
line area) and observations containing n1 (vertical line area). Left: Po(H, {}). Right:
Po(H, {a1}).
term of (4.17).
The area of overlapping horizontal and vertical patterns visualises those observa-
tions that intersect with more than one recipient inH. These observations are counted
twice in Po(H,C) and thus lead to an overestimation of the real number of observa-
tions hit by OS[H].
The second picture in Figure 4.4 shows the case that C = {a1} is chosen, while n1
is non-chosen. That is |C| = c = 1.
Po(H, {a1}) = |OS[a1]|+ |OS[n1] \OS[a1]|
= |OSA[a1]|+ |OSN [a1] \ OSA[a1]|+ |OSN [n1] \ OSN [a1] \ OSA[a1]|
It illustrates that the estimated number of observations hit byH becomes more precise
the more recipients are chosen, i.e., the larger |C| = c is. This is because we know
OS[C] and can thus exclude it in the estimation of the number of observations hit by
the remaining recipients H \ C. In our example OS[C] = OS[a1] is exactly known in
Po(H,C). Only the number of observations hit by H \ {a1} = {n1} in OS \OS[a1] is
estimated in Po(H,C).
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4.2.2 Mean of Potential
In this section we determine the mean of the potential with respect to the distribution
of recipients contacted by non-Alice senders and the distribution of Alice’s friends.
This mean is applied to derive the mean number of recipient choices to disprove all
hypotheses H 6= HA in Section 4.2.3.
The probabilities that are known in our analysis are:
PA(a): Probability that Alice contacts recipient a in an observation, i.e
|OSA[a]|
|OS| . Note
that
∑
a∈ HA PA(a) = 1, since Alice contacts one friend in each observation.
PN(r): Probability that any of the (b − 1) non-Alice senders contact recipient r in
an observation, i.e., |OSN [r]||OS| . Note that
∑
r∈R PN(a) ≥ 1, since each observation
contains several recipients.
We consider the Chaum Mix in an open environment, so that every sender can
contribute messages to a batch. Since these senders are random individuals, we assume
that each single sender contacts its recipients independently from the behaviour of the
other senders.
Therefore, and to ease the maths, we assume that the distribution of Alice’s com-
munication to her friends is independent of the distribution of the traffic of other
senders, so that PA and PN are statistically independent. We similarly assume for
the sake of simplicity that PN is statistically independent with respect to any set of
recipients, thus assuming that PN(r1 ∧ . . . ∧ rk) =
∏k
l=1 PN(rl).
Let t = |OS| be the number of observations collected by the attacker. Let the proba-
bility P (r1, . . . , rl) abbreviates P (r1∨. . .∨rl) and P (r1 . . . rl) abbreviates P (r1∧. . .∧
rl). The expectation of the potential of a given setH and C = {n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA}
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that result from (4.17) is
E(Po(H,C))
= t
[
PA(a1, . . . , acA)
+ PN(n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA)(1− PA(a1, . . . , acA))
+
m−j∑
i=cA+1
PA(ai)
[
1− PN(n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA)
]
+
m−j∑
i=cA+1
PN(ai)
[
1− PN(n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA)
][
1− PA(a1, . . . , acA , ai)
]
+
j∑
i=cN+1
PN(ni)
[
1− PN(n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA)
][
1− PA(a1, . . . , acA)
]]
.
Note that OSA[ai] ∩ OSA[aj] = ∅, therefore PA(a1, . . . , acA) =
∑cA
i=1 PA(ai). The
disjunct probability PN(n1, . . . , ncN , a1, . . . , acA) is denoted by PcN for brevity, as its
specific value will be irrelevant to our succeeding analysis.
E(Po(H,C)) ≤ t
[ cA∑
i=1
PA(ai) + PcN
(
1−
cA∑
i=1
PA(ai)
)
+ (1− PcN)
(
1−
cA∑
i=1
PA(ai)
)
∗
(
m−j∑
i=cA+1
PA(ai)
1−∑cAi=1 PA(ai) +
m−j∑
i=cA+1
PN(ai) +
j∑
i=cN+1
PN(ni)︸ ︷︷ ︸
if E(Po) ≥ t, then this expression ≥ 1
)
]
(4.18)
Note that the first and second line right of (≤) within the outermost square bracket
of (4.18) adds up to 1 if the expression in the third line does not exist. Therefore if
E(Po(H,C)) ≥ t then the third expression must be at least 1. This criterion can be
deployed to determine the mean number of recipient choices to disprove H and we
show how to derive that mean number next.
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4.2.2.1 Simplified Analysis
Our purpose in analysing the expectation of the potential of a set H ∈ Hj is to de-
termine the mean number of non-friends |CN | = cN and Alice’s friends |CA| = cA
that needs to be chosen to disprove H, where C ⊆ H. This is the number of chosen
recipients such that E(Po(H,C)) < t. Using the last factor expression in (4.18), we
simplify this case by analysing the following basic equality in this section, instead:
1 =
∑m−j
k=cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al) +
m−j∑
i=cA+1
PN(ai) +
j∑
i=cN+1
PN(ni)
= fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) . (4.19)
The three (+) separated expressions on the right hand side of (=) above are (from left
to right) the probabilities that:
1. Alice contacts one of the (m − j − cA) non-chosen Alice’s friends HA \ C =
{acA+1, . . . , am−j} in OS \ OSA[CA]
2. Senders other than Alice contact one of the non-chosen Alice’s friends HA \ C
in OS
3. Senders other than Alice contact one of the (j − cN) non-chosen non-friends
HN \ C = {ncN+1, . . . , nj} in OS
4.2.3 Minimal Mean Number of Recipient Choices for Disproofs
This section analyses the hypothetical minimal mean number of recipient choices to
disprove hypotheses by ExactHS. We relate this with the mean number of recipient
choices to disprove hypotheses by ExactHS under the optimistic case assumption. It
is proved that the latter mean number of recipient choices is maximal for uniformly
distributed Alice’s traffic. We outline that the optimistic case assumption can be ap-
proximated by the implementation of ExactHS in Algorithm 2 in practice. This is
provided that the probability that any recipient r ∈ R is contacted by any sender other
than Alice in an observation is below 1
m
.
The function fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) reflects the mean difference between the po-
tential Po(H,C) and the number of observations as outlined in Section 4.2.2.1, for
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H ∈ Hj , C ⊆ H, |CN | = cN , |CA| = cA. If the value of this function is below 1,
then |C| recipient choices are sufficient to disprove H in most of the cases. Therefore,
the pair (cN , cA) of minimal number of choices of non-friends and friends, such that
minC⊆H fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) < 1 determines the hypothetical minimal mean number
of recipient choices to disproveH by ExactHS. Provided these pairs (cN , cA) for every
hypothesis H 6= HA , all pairs with the same value of cA represents a class induced by
cA, for cA = 0, . . . ,m− 1. Each class induced by cA contains a pair (cN , cA) with the
highest value of cN in that class and we refer to that value with respect to cA by the
function cmminN (cA).
Let (cN , cA) be the hypothetical minimal mean number of recipient choices to dis-
prove a hypothesis H 6= HA by ExactHS. We show that the mean number of recipient
choices to disprove H by ExactHS under the optimistic case assumption is approxi-
mately bounded by (cmminN (cA), cA). This is the relation between these two means.
Section 4.2.3.1 contributes an estimate of (cmminN (cA), cA) and deduces the choices
of recipients according to the optimistic case assumption from that. This assumption
constrains the mean number of choices of non-friends cN and friend cA to disprove a
hypothesis H by ExactHS, such that it is approximately bounded by (cmminN (cA), cA).
Section 4.2.3.2 provides analyses of cmminN (cA) with respect to Alice’s traffic distri-
bution. It shows for the Zipf distribution, that the mean number of recipient choices to
disprove hypotheses by ExactHS under the optimistic case assumption can be reduced
close to 0.
Section 4.2.3.3 shows that the optimistic case assumption can be approached by
the enhanced ExactHS, implemented by Algorithm 2.
4.2.3.1 Deriving Maximal Minimal Conditions
We define a classification for the hypothetical minimal number (cN , cA) of choices of
non-friends and friends to disprove hypotheses by ExactHS, according to the value
of cA. This is used to estimate the maximal minimal number of non-friend choices
cmminN (cA) in each of these classes, for cA = 0, . . . ,m − 1. We follow from this the
optimistic case assumptions that leads to a mean number of choices of non-friends c′N
and friends cA to disprove hypotheses by ExactHS that do not exceed (cmminN (cA), cA).
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Let a particular value of cA be given, we call a hypothesis H ∈ Hj , for j ≤ m − cA,
cA-disprovable1, if there is a C ⊆ H, where |CA| = cA, |CN | = cN and Po(H,C) < t.
It is called cA-average-disprovable if E(Po(H,C)) < t. For the sake of simplicity the
conditions fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) ≤ 1 will be analysed instead of the latter condition.
For each value cA, cmminN (cA) is such defined that there exists a cA-disprovable
hypothesis H ∈ Hj (for any j ≤ m − cA), where minC⊆H{fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j)} = 1
and cN = cmminN (cA). AndH is selected, such that all cA-disprovable hypothesesH
′ ∈
Hi (for i ≤ m− cA), fulfils minC′⊆H′{fPo(H′,C′, c′N , cA, i)} ≤ 1 and c′N ≤ cmminN (cA).
Using the definition of the function fPo in (4.19), we can estimate cmminN (cA) by
the following three steps.
1. The function maxH∈Hj minC⊆H{fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j)}with respect to given value
of cN , cA, j is estimated, for cN ≤ j ≤ m − cA and |CA| = cA, |CN | = cN . 2
We will refer to this estimated function by fmminPo (cN , cA, j). This is analysed in
Paragraph “Simple Analysis of fPo(cN , cA, j)” and Paragraph “Refined Analysis
of fPo(cN , cA, j)”.
2. The function maxj:cN≤j≤m−cA{fmminPo (cN , cA, j)}with respect to cN , cA is deter-
mined in Paragraph “Deriving fmminPo (cN , cA)”. It equals f
mmin
Po (cN , cA, cN), to
that we refer to by the term fmminPo (cN , cA) for brevity.
3. To estimate cmminN (cA), the equation f
mmin
Po (cN , cA) = 1 is solved for cN . This
will be demonstrated in Section 4.2.5.1.
Simple Analysis of fmminPo (cN , cA, j) This analysis refers to step one. We estimate
the maximum of fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) given that the chosen recipient set C minimise
1If j > m− cA, thenH is not cA-disprovable, but it is c′A-disprovable with respect to another value
c′A < cA. Note that every set H 6= HA is disprovable.
2Without violation of our definition of cmminN (cA), there is no need to restrict H to cA-average-
disprovable sets here.
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fPo with respect to given values of cN , cA, j.
max
H∈Hj
min
C⊆H
{fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j)}
≤ max
HA={a1,...,am−j}
min
{a1,...,acA}⊆HA
{∑m−j
k=cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al)
}
+ max
r1,...,rm−1−cA
{m−cN−cA∑
l=1
PN(rl)
}
(4.20)
To simplify notation, the first cA recipients inHA in the max function are the recipients
in the min function in the first expression right of (≤), without restriction of generality.
The expressions within the big brackets in (4.20) are relaxations of the expressions
in fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j). The second and third sums
∑m−j
l=cA+1
PN(al)+
∑j
l=cN+1
PN(nl)
in fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) are simplified by the single expression
∑m−cN−cA
l=1 PN(rl) for
any rl ∈ R, thus ignoring the requirement of {r1, . . . , rm−cN−cA} ⊆ H.
By relabelling the indices of the first and second expressions on the right side of
(≤), such that PA(ak) and PN(rl) are the k-th and l-th most likely recipients with
respect to the probability functions PA and PN , we obtain the following equivalent
formula for (4.20):
f m̂minPo (cN , cA, j) =
∑m−j
k=cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al) +
m−cN−cA∑
l=1
PN(rl). (4.21)
Proof. We now prove that the right had side of (4.20) and (4.21) are equal. It is obvious
that the second expression in (4.20) and in (4.21) are equal. Therefore, it remains to
show that the first expression in (4.20) and (4.21) are equal.
The first expression within the brackets in (4.20) is of the structure z−y
1−y , where
z =
∑
ak∈HA PA(ak), y =
∑
al∈CA PA(al), CA ⊆ HA, |HA| = m − j, |CA| = cA
and 1 ≥ z ≥ y ≥ 0. The function z−y
1−y is monotonically increasing with respect to z
and monotonically decreasing with respect to y. Since CA is determined by the min
function in (4.20), it must consist of the most likely recipients in HA to obtain a large
value of y.
Now let us assume thatHA consists of the most likelym−j Alice’s friends, so that
z is maximal. We proof by contradiction that z−y
1−y is maximal, given that CA consists
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of the most likely cA Alice’s friends in HA. Let us assume that there is a set H′A with
z′ = z − δ and most likely recipients C′A ⊆ H′A with y′ = y −  for δ > 0 and
δ ≥  ≥ 0, such that z′−y′
1−y′ >
z−y
1−y .
To maximise z
′−y′
1−y′ , the value of y
′ should be low, while the value of z′ should be
large. Therefore we consider the marginal case of δ = , so that z′ = z −  and
y′ = y − .
z′ − y′
1− y′ =
(z − )− (y − )
1− (y − ) =
z − y
1− y +  ≤
z − y
1− y .
This inequality however contradicts our initial assumption and thus proves z−y
1−y to be
maximal. It follows from the proof that (4.20) and (4.21) are equal.
This analysis shows that a strategy that always prefers choosing those recipients
who are most frequently contacted by Alice leads to a mean number of non-friend
choices to disprove cA-average-disprovable hypothesis that does not exceed cmminN (cA).
We call this the optimistic case strategy.
As will be shown in Section 4.2.3.3 and in Example 4.2.2, the optimistic case
strategy can be approaches, if in every level of recursion, ExactHS always chooses
the recipient first, that is most frequent in the observations remaining in that level of
recursion. This strategy is implemented in the enhanced version of ExactHS in Line 7
of Algorithm 2.
Refined Analysis of fmminPo (cN , cA, j) We assume in this analysis that the opti-
mistic case strategy can be realised in ExactHS. This implies that Alice’s friends who
are most frequently contacted by Alice would always be chosen and removed first when
constructing chosen sets C in ExactHS. We outline that this induces some constraints
on the structure of hypotheses that remain to be disproved by ExactHS. These con-
straints are accounted for in the estimation of maxH∈Hj minC⊆H fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j)
and leads to a more precise estimate of the number of recipient choices to disprove
hypotheses. While this refined estimate leads to a lower number of recipient choices
for disproofs, it does not change the optimistic case strategy of choosing recipients, as
we will see.
Let Ci = {r1, . . . , ri} be the set of chosen recipients when entering the i-th level
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of recursion in ExactHS. We assume w.l.o.g. in the remaining sections that Ci is an
ordered set, where the l-th recipient rl ∈ Ci represents the recipient added, when
entering the l-th level of recursion, for l = 1, . . . , i. The set of observations, when
entering the i-th level of recursion the first time1 is OSi, given that Ci was chosen.
Consider the case that the extension of Ci at the (i + 1)-th level of recursion is
Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {ai+1}, where ai+1 ∈ Oi is an Alice’s friend chosen at the i-th level of
recursion. Then, due to the optimistic case strategy, ai+1 must be the recipient who is
most frequently contacted by Alice in Oi.
Now, consider the other case that the extension at the (i + 1)-th level of recursion
is Ci+1 = Ci ∪ {ni+1}, where ni+1 ∈ Oi is a non-friend in the i-th level of recursion.
Then, due to the optimistic case strategy and Line 9 in Algorithm 1, ai+1 ∈ Oi must
be removed from all observations in OSi in level i, before a non-friend ni+1 ∈ Oi can
be added in the (i+ 1)-th level of recursion. Accounting this will lead to a refined for-
mulation of (4.21) as represented in (4.24) and a more precise estimate of the number
of recipient choices to disprove hypotheses.
Each chosen set Ci in ExactHS is therefore associated with a particular set of Al-
ice’s friends Ai = {a1, . . . , ai} that we denote by Ci ∼ Ai. Each recipient al ∈ Ai
represents Alice’s most frequent recipient contact in OSl−1 and there is an observation
Ol−1 selected by ExactHS in the (l − 1)-th level of recursion, such that al ∈ Ol−1 for
l = 1, . . . , i. If a recipient rl ∈ Ci is an Alice’s friend then it equals al ∈ Ai. If it is a
non-friend, then al, rl ∈ Ol−1 and al has been removed from all observations in OSl−1
prior to adding rl in the l-th recursion level.
In the optimistic case, every set Ci computed by ExactHS is associated to Ai con-
sisting of the i recipients who are most frequently contacted by Alice. Therefore,
the hypotheses H ⊇ Ci that are disproved by ExactHS are restricted by the condi-
tion H ∩ Ai \ Ci = ∅. That means that the non-chosen recipients in H must not
be any of the remaining most likely recipients Ai \ Ci and that the maximal value of
fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) is accordingly restricted.
Example 4.2.2 (Optimistic Case). This example illustrates the optimistic case strategy
applied to ExactHS. We demonstrate at the same time that this optimistic case strategy
1After entering the i-th level of recursion, recipients will be removed from observations in OSi. The
first time refers to the state of OSi prior to any modifications.
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is approached by the enhanced version of ExactHS as represented by Algorithm 2.1
Applying Algorithm 2 to the observations in this example will lead to the same recipient
choices as under the optimistic case strategy.
Let HA = {1, 2}, m = 2, b = 2. Let the attacker collects following 5 observations
OS = OS0:
{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {1, 5}
that are sufficient to uniquely identify HA by ExactHS. Hypotheses are referred to by
H. The frequency of a recipient is denoted by the pair (recipient [frequency]). They
are in OS:
1[3], 2[2], 3[2], 4[2], 5[1] .
Recursion level 0 refers to the initial invocation of Alg. 2 by ExactHS(OS0,m =
2,C0 = {}). In each level i, an observation Oi ∈ OSi is fixed and ExactHS chooses
one of the 2 recipients in Oi. We number the choices by a, b, the first choice leads to
Oi.a.
i.j Oi.j OSi.j Ci+1 Ai+1 OSi+1 maxH Po(H,Ci)
0.a {1, 3} {1, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 4},
{2, 3}, {1, 5}
{1} {1} {2, 4},
{2, 3}
5(≥ |OS|)
1.a {2, 4} {2, 4}, {2, 3} {1, 2} {1, 2} {} 5(≥ |OS|)
1.b {4} {4}, {3} {1,−} {1, 2} − 4(< |OS|)
0.b {3} {3}, {2, 4}, {4},
{2, 3}, {5}
{−} {1} − 4(< |OS|)
Figure 4.5: Choosing/removing recipients at i-th level of recursion in enhanced Ex-
actHS as implemented in Algorithm 2.
The enhanced version of ExactHS represented by Algorithm 2 approaches the opti-
mistic case strategy by choosing and removing in every level of recursion, the recipient
first that is most frequent in the observations at that level of recursion in Line 7.
We show the state of the chosen recipients and the potential in each level of recur-
sion in Algorithm 2 next.
0.a: O0 = {1, 3} is fixed by ExactHS, as it contains the most frequent recipient 1 in
OS0. maxH Po(H, {}) ≥ |OS|, thus recipient 1 is chosen and will be added at
recursion level 1, i.e C1 = {} ∪ {1}. See Fig. 4.5.
1A proof of this is provided in Section 4.2.3.3.
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1.a: O1 = {2, 4} is fixed by ExactHS, as it contains the most frequent recipient 2 in
OS1. maxH Po(H, {1}) ≥ |OS|, thus recipient 2 is chosen and will be added at
recursion level 2, i.e., C2 = {1} ∪ {2}. Level 2 ends with Hitting set C2. See
Figure 4.5.
1.b: Recipient 2 is removed from all observations in OS1, therefore
maxH Po(H, {1}) < |OS| in level 1; A2 = {1, 2}. All hypotheses
{H | {1} ∈ H ∧ {2} 6∈ H} are disproved. No recipient will be added (-).
0.b: Recipient 1 is removed from all observations in OS0, therefore
maxH Po(H, {}) < |OS| in level 0 and A1 = {1}. All H, where {1} 6∈ H
are disproved. No recipient will be added (-).
In this example, Alice’s friends are chosen and removed first in every recursion level in
Algorithm 2, as in each level, one of Alice’s friends becomes the most frequent recipi-
ent. Thus Algorithm 2 chooses those recipients who would be chosen if the optimistic
case strategy would be assumed and Section 4.2.3.3 shows that this case is approached
in realistic Mix configurations.
We can see in level 0 that all hypotheses that will be proved and disproved in level
1 fulfilH∩A1 \C1 = ∅, whereA1 = {1} andAi consists of the i most frequent Alice’s
friends in OS. That is the non-chosen recipients of any potential hypotheses do not
contain A1 \ C1. In level 0.a, the succeeding chosen recipient set will be C1 = {1},
thusH∩A1\C1 = ∅. In level 0.b, the succeeding chosen recipient set will be C1 = {3}
and 1 has been removed from all observations in OS0, thus H ∩ A1 \ C1 = ∅. We see
in level 1 similarly H ∩A2 \ C2 = ∅.
Let cN , cA, j,AcN+cA be given, where AcN+cA consists of the c = cN + cA Alice’s
friends who are most frequently contacted by Alice in OS. In the optimistic case, every
hypothesis H and chosen recipient set C ⊆ H must fulfil C ∼ AcN+cA , |CA| = cA
and H ∩ AcN+cA \ C = ∅.1 Therefore, provided H and AcN+cA , the set of chosen
Alice’s friends is determined by H ∩ AcN+cA = CA. Applying these constraints to
1This means that the cN + cA friends who are most frequently contacted by Alice must either be
chosen, or already removed.
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maxH∈Hj minC⊆H fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j) leads to the following formulation:
max
H∈Hj
min
C⊆H:CA=H∩AcN+cA
{fPo(H,C, cN , cA, j)}
≤ max
CA={a1,...,acA}⊆AcN+cA ,
HA\C={acA+1,...,am−j}⊆ HA \AcN+cA
{∑m−j
k=cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al)
}
+ max
r1,...,rm−cN−cA∈R
{m−cN−cA∑
l=1
PN(rl)
}
. (4.22)
The expression within the first brackets in (4.22) is of the structure
z − u
1− y , (4.23)
for invariant u =
∑
ar∈AcN+cA PA(ar) and variable y =
∑
al∈CA PA(al) and z =∑m−j+cN
i=1 PA(ai) (for arbitrary a1, . . . , am−j+cN ∈ HA ).1 The numerator in that ex-
pression is the cumulative probability
∑
a∈HA\CA:|HA\AcN+cA |=m−j−cA PA(a) which is
simplified by the less constrained expression z−u. The denominator in that expression
is 1− y. Since (4.23) is monotonically increasing with respect to increasing value of z
and y, it is maximal, if the value of z and y are maximal.
Let us relabel the indices in (4.22), such that PA(ak) and PN(rl) are probabilities
of the k-th and l-th most likely recipients with respect to PA(·) and PN(·). We obtain
the following formula that is equivalent to the right hand side of (4.22):
fmminPo (cN , cA, j) =
∑m−j+cN
k=cN+cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al) +
m−cN−cA∑
l=1
PN(rl) . (4.24)
The expression left of (+) in (4.24) equals (4.23) for maximal value of z and y. The
expression right of (+) in (4.24) equals the expression right of (+) in (4.22). The
condition that the friends in AcN+cA must either be chosen, or removed, such that
HA \ C ⊆ HA \ AcN+cA , is fulfilled by the numerator in the expression left of (+)
in (4.24). Therefore we can conclude that (4.24) and the right hand side of (4.22) are
equal.
1Expression (4.23) is less constrained than the expression in the brackets left of (+) in (4.22). We
will see that the conditions to maximise (4.23) also maximises the latter expression in (4.22).
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The equations (4.24) and (4.21) shows that fmminPo (cN , cA, j) ≤ f m̂minPo (cN , cA, j).
Accounting the effect of the optimistic case strategy on hypotheses in fmminPo (cN , cA, j)
thus leads to a more precise and lower estimate of the number of recipient choices to
disprove hypotheses than without accounting that effect. Therefore we only consider
fmminPo (cN , cA, j) in the remaining analyses.
Deriving fmminPo (cN , cA) Given that the values of cN , cA are fixed, the numerator of
the left expression in fmminPo (cN , cA, j) is monotonically decreasing with respect to j.
Since cN ≤ j ≤ m− cA, we conclude that fmminPo (cN , cA, j) is maximal, if j = cN . We
refer to this case by fmminPo (cN , cA), where
fmminPo (cN , cA) =
∑m
k=cN+cA+1
PA(ak)
1−∑cAl=1 PA(al) +
m−cN−cA∑
l=1
PN(rl) . (4.25)
To obtain cmminN (cA), we need to solve 1 = f
mmin
Po (cN , cA), which is by reformu-
lation equivalent to solving the more convenient equation 1 = f ′mminPo (cN , cA), where
f ′mminPo (cN , cA) equals
1−
cN+cA∑
k=cA+1
PA(ak) + (1−
cA∑
l=1
PA(al))
m−cN−cA∑
s=1
PN(rs) . (4.26)
Note that if PN(r) < 1m2 (as considered in Section 4.1.4.1), then (4.26) is less than
1, for cN ≥ 1. This is because the expression right of (+) is at most 1−
∑cA
l=1 PA(al)
m
, which
is less than
∑cN+cA
k=cA+1
PA(ak), for cN ≥ 1. We therefore deduce that cmminN (cA) ≤ 1 for
cA = 0, . . . ,m− 1, which is regardless of Alice’s traffic distribution. This implies due
to (4.29) in Section 4.2.4 a polynomially bounded mean time-complexity of ExactHS,
which confirms the corresponding analysis in Section 4.1.
4.2.3.2 Comparing Uniform and Non-Uniform Distribution
Provided the optimistic case assumption, we prove that if Alice’s traffic is non-uniformly
distributed, then fmminPo (cN , cA) in (4.25) is not higher than in the case of Alice’s uni-
form traffic distribution. All chosen sets constructed by ExactHS are thus assumed to
fulfil C ∼ AcN+cA , for |C| = cN + cA.
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We additionally analyse fmminPo (cN , cA) for the Zipf(m,α) distribution of Alice’s
friends. Our result proves that the mean time-complexity of ExactHS decreases with
respect to the weight α and approaches linear time for moderately large value of α.
The values of fmminPo for the non-uniform and uniform communication only differs
by the expression left of (+) in (4.25). Let us call that expression fn1 in the non-uniform
case and fu1 in the uniform case. We prove next that f
n
1 (cN , cA) ≤ fu1 (cN , cA) which
is of the structure
1− ( cN
m
+ δ)− ( cA
m
+ )
1− ( cA
m
+ )
≤
m−cN
m
− cA
m
1− cA
m
(4.27)
⇔ δ ≥ − cN
m− cA . (4.28)
If inequality (4.28) is fulfilled, then the number of recipient choices to disprove cA-
average-disprovable sets does not exceed the number of recipient choices, if Alice
communicates uniformly distributed. Assume that δ, cN and , cA in (4.28) are substi-
tuted by some other values δ′, c′N and 
′, c′A and that the resulting inequality is valid,
then we say that δ′, c′N and 
′, c′A applies to (4.28).
Proof. Let C ∼ AcN+cA be the chosen recipients who disprove a hypothesis H. CA ⊆
AcN+cA , where |CA| = cA and PA(CA) = cAm +  corresponds to the second bracketed
expression in the numerator left of (≤) in (4.27). The first bracketed expression in the
numerator left of (≤) in (4.27) corresponds to PA(AcN+cA \ CA) = cNm + δ.
Imagine that ExactHS computes C ∼ AcN+cA , but then keeps choosing additional
recipients, such that it arrives at C′ ∼ A′c′N+cA , where C
′
A = CA and A
′
c′N+cA
\ C′A =
HA \CA. Since PA( HA ) = 1, we deduce that PA(A′c′N+cA \C
′
A) =
m−cA
m
−  = c′N
m
+δ′
and that inequality (4.28) applies to c′N , δ
′ and cA, . The overall average probability
of every recipient in A′c′N+cA \ C
′
A is P¯A =
PA(A
′
c′
N
+cA
\C′A)
m−cA =
1
m
− 
m−cA . Since AcN+cA
consists of the most frequent Alice’s friends and AcN+cA \ CA ⊆ HA \ CA , we can
deduce that PA(AcN+cA \ CA) = cNm + δ ≥ cN P¯A = cNm − cN m−cA . Therefore inequality
(4.28) also applies to cN , δ and cA, .
Zipf Distribution Given that Alice follows a Zipf(m,α) distribution when choosing
her friend in each round, we prove that cmminN (cA) decreases with respect to α ≥ 0.
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Assume w.l.o.g. that cA is fixed, then cN = cmminN (cA) decrease with respect to α,
if the condition fmminPo (cN , cA) < 1 can be fulfilled by lower values of cN = c
mmin
N (cA)
for increasing α.
Proof. Note that fmminPo (cN , cA) < 1 if and only if the expressions right of the leading
number 1 in (4.26) is negative. Let w.l.o.g. Pm,αz (y) be the probability of Alice’s y-th
most frequently contacted friend ay for y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By applying the Zipf(m,α)
distribution of Alice’s friends to (4.26), that is setting PA(ay) = Pm,αz (y), we obtain
the following expression that is equivalent to the expression right of the leading number
1 in (4.26):
−(Fm,αz (cN + cA)− Fm,αz (cA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1(α)
) + (1− Fm,αz (cA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G2(α)
)
m−cN−cA∑
s=1
PN(rs) .
It is known that Fm,αz (y) is monotonically increasing with respect to α ≥ 0, where
limα→∞ Fm,αz (y) = 1 for any y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Therefore G2(α) is monotonically
decreasing with respect to α ≥ 0. Note that G2(α) ≥ G1(α) ≥ 0 and we prove by
G2(α)−G1(α) = 1− Fm,αz (cN + cA)
that the difference G2(α)− G1(α) decreases monotonically with respect to α. There-
fore the value of cN = cmminN (cA), such that −G1(α) +G2(α)
∑m−cN−cA
s=1 PN(rs) < 0,
decreases with respect to α.
Note that increasing α (i.e., the non-uniformness in the Zipf distribution) decreases
the number of recipient choices for disproofs and the exponent of ExactHS’s time-
complexity, due to (4.29) in Section 4.2.4. That is cmminN (·) approaches 0, so that the
mean time-complexity of ExactHS approaches a polynomial function.
4.2.3.3 Approaching Optimistic Case Strategy
This section analyses the mean time-complexity of ExactHS for the practical case, as
opposed to the optimistic case as yet considered in Section 4.2.3. In the practical case,
ExactHS might construct chosen sets C ∼ AcN+cA , where AcN+cA does not consists of
the cN + cA recipients who are most frequently contacted by Alice. We proof that the
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mean time-complexity of the practical case approaches that of the optimistic case, for
realistic Mix configurations.
For the formal correctness of the proofs, it is required that the traffic volume of
the cover-traffic to each single recipient is less than 1
m
of all observations, so that
PN(r) <
1
m
for all r ∈ R. This condition is therefore assumed in the remaining of this
section. Note that Alice’s traffic volume averaged over her m = | HA | friends covers
1
m
= 1
m
∑m
i=1 PA(ai) of all observations, even if PA(a) < PN(r) for many r ∈ R,
a ∈ HA .
We resolve the apparent caveat that ExactHS often prefers recipients a ∈ HA that
are most frequently contacted by Alice, even if PA(a) < PN(r) for many r ∈ R.
This results in the mean number of recipient choices in the practical case approaching
that in the optimistic case. Most importantly, we prove that if Alice traffic is non-
uniformly distributed, then the number of recipient choices for disproofs by ExactHS
is not greater than in the case of uniformly distributed traffic.
Note that the mean time-complexity of ExactHS is identical in the practical and
optimistic case, if Alice traffic is uniformly distributed. That is if PA(a) = 1m for all
a ∈ HA .
Claim 10. Let C ∼ AcN+cA be any set constructed and disproved by ExactHS. Let
PA(CA) =
cA
m
+  and PA(AcN+cA \ CA) = cNm + δ, where −1 <  < 1, −1 < δ < 1.
If the probability PN(r) that any recipient r contacted by senders, other than Alice is
below 1
m
, then inequality (4.28) applies to cN , δ and cA, .
Since non-friends are less likely observed than 1
m
, we deduce that the first recip-
ients a ∈ AcN+cA are the most likely Alice’s friends of probability PA(a) ≥ 1m . If
for all recipients a ∈ AcN+cA , PA(a) > maxr∈R PN(r), then inequality (4.28) ob-
viously applies as shown in Section 4.2.3.2. Therefore the remaining analyses of
this section refers to the case that AcN+cA = {a1, . . . , ai, ai+1, . . . , acN+cA}, contains
all Alice’s friends PA(a1) ≥ . . . ≥ PA(ai) ≥ 1m and some other Alice’s friends
PA(al) ≤ maxr∈R PN(r) < 1m for l = i+ 1, . . . , cN + cA.
Impact of Non Uniform Distribution Let C be the recipients chosen by ExactHS
that disproves a hypothesis H, where C ∼ AcN+cA . We define Ci ∼ AciN+ciA , where
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AciN+ciA consists of the first c
i
N + c
i
A Alice’s friends
1 who were added to AcN+cA . The
corresponding chosen Alice’s friend are CAi, where |CAi| = ciA ≤ cA and the chosen
non-friends are CNi, where |CNi| = ciN ≤ cN .
Let P iA(a) =
|OSAi[a]|
|OSi| denote the probability that Alice contacts a in OSi, where OSi
is the set of observations when ExactHS enters the i-th recursion level the first time
after choosing the i recipients in Ci. Since the communication of other senders are sta-
tistically independent of Alice’s communication, we follow |OSAi[a]||OSi| =
|OSA[a]\OS[CAi]|
|OS\OS[CAi]| =|OSA[a]|
|OS\OSA[CAi]| . This means that P
i
A(a) is only affected by the chosen Alice’s friends CAi
and that P iA(a) ≥ PA(a) = |OSA[a]||OS| . Thus the more Alice’s friends CAi are chosen, the
higher is the probability P iA(a) of the remaining recipients a ∈ CAi\AciN+ciA . We define
OS0 = OS and P 0A(a) = PA(a), therefore these notations are used interchangeably. We
further define P iA(CAi) =
ciA
m
+ i and P iA(AciN+ciA \ CAi) =
ciN
m
+ δi.
Let P iN(r) =
|OSNi[r]|
|OSi| denote the probability that senders other than Alice contact r
in OSi. We assume for large number of receivers u m that P iN(r) ≈ PN(r). To give
an intuitive justification, we consider the case that every single sender other than Alice
contacts a recipient with the uniform probability 1
u
. The probability that a recipient is
contacted by any sender other than Alice in an observation is PN = 1 − (1 − 1u)b−1.
If i recipients are chosen, then P iN = 1− (1− 1u+1−i)b−1. For example, let us assume
an extreme case with parameters m = 10, b = 400, u = 4000, then PN = 0.0949 and
choosing i = 10 recipients marginally changes the probability to P 10N = 0.0951.
We define P i(r) = |OSi(r)||OSi| as the probability that recipient r is observed in observa-
tions in OSi. Notably P i(n) = PN(n) and P i(a) =
|OSAi(a)∪OSNi(a)|
|OSi| ≤ P iA(a)+PN(a).
Let C ∼ AcN+cA be chosen by ExactHS to disprove some hypotheses in practice.
For i = 1, . . . , cN + cA, ai ∈ AcN+cA result from ExactHS preferring to choose and
remove the most likely recipient P i−1(r) in OSi−1 first. In general, ai will be in many
cases the recipient with the maximal probability P i−1(ai) in OSi−1 and close to the
i-th most likely Alice’s friend in OS, so that ExactHS approaches the optimistic case.
We assume as the general case that the communication of other senders to Alice’s
friends do not significantly skew the relative order of Alice’s communication, so that
for any ak, al, if P i−1A (ak) ≥ P i−1A (al), then P i−1(ak) ≥ P i−1(al) in most of the cases.
A justification is provided in the next Paragraph “Perturbations” in this section. For
simplicity we only use P i−1A (a) instead of P
i−1(a) in the remaining analyses to also
1i = ciN + c
i
A.
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cover the case that senders other than Alice do not contact Alice’s friends, which is
PN(a) = 0 for all Alice’s friends a.
We define P¯ iA =
PA( HA \CAi)
m−ciA
= 1
m
− i
m−ciA
as the overall average probability of
an Alice’s friend who is not in CAi. Since C0 = {}, c0A = 0, 0 = 0, we obtain
P¯ 0A =
1
m
. Most importantly, if there is a recipient a in OSi, where PA(a) ≥ P¯ iA,
then P iA(a) =
PA(a)
1−( c
i
A
m
+i)
≥ P¯ iA
1−( c
i
A
m
+i)
= 1
m−ciA
. Therefore, given that Ci is chosen,
ExactHS would in general still choose the most frequent Alice’s friend a first, although
PA(a) <
1
m
, as long as PA(a) ≥ P¯ iA.1 This is because the probability PN(n) of every
non-friend n remains lower than 1
m
and thus appears less frequently than a in OSi.
Proof. (Claim 10) Imagine that ExactHS chooses to successively extend Ci by j Al-
ice’s friend a′1, . . . , a
′
j , where PA(a
′
l) > P¯
i
A for l = 1, . . . , j. We assume for simplicity
and without restriction of generality that this result in Ci+j = Ci ∪ {a′1, . . . , a′j} and
CAi+j = CAi ∪ {a′1, . . . , a′j}. We prove next that choosing Alice’s friends a′, where
PA(a
′) ≥ P¯ iA leads to a lower overall average probability P¯ i+jA ≤ P¯ iA.
PA( HA \ CAi+j) = PA( HA \ CAi)− PA(a′1)− . . .− PA(a′j)
≤ m− c
i
A
m
− i − jP¯ iA
=
m− ciA − j
m
− i(m− c
i
A − j)
m− ciA
This therefore proves P¯ i+jA =
PA( HA \CAi+j)
m−ciA−j
≤ P¯ iA. Accordingly, if we imagine that
ExactHS chooses to extend Ci by Alice’s friend a, where PA(a) ≤ P¯ iA instead, the
overall probability would increase, so that P¯ i+jA ≥ P¯ iA.
Without restriction of generality, for any C ∼ AcN+cA there is a largest Ci ∼
AciN+ciA , such thatAciN+ciA consists of only the most frequently contacted Alice’s friends,
where PA(al) ≥ P¯ lA for l = 1, . . . , i and al ∈ AciN+ciA . And there must be no
a ∈ HA \ AciN+ciA , where PA(a) ≥ P¯ lA, unless AciN+ciA = AcN+cA and thus Ci = C.
The latter case, is the optimistic case for ExactHS, as considered in the Section 4.2.3.2,
hence (4.28) applies to cN , δ, cA, . The remaining analysis in this section therefore ad-
dresses only the first case, which is AciN+ciA ⊂ AcN+cA .
1To be more precise, ExactHS still chooses the most frequent Alice’s friend a, even if PA(a) ≤ P¯ iA,
as long as P iA(a) > maxn PN (n). However it is sufficient to consider PA(a) ≥ P¯ iA to prove Claim 10.
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To prove that inequality (4.28) applies to cN , δ, cA, , it is necessary and sufficient
to show that PA(AcN+cA \ CA) ≥ cN P¯ cN+cAA . This inequality is sufficiently proved, if
AcN+cA \ CA consists of only recipients a ∈ HA \ CA, where PA(a) ≥ P¯ cN+cAA , or if
all a, where PA(a) ≥ P¯ cN+cAA are in AcN+cA \ CA.
The relations P¯ iA ≤ P¯ cN+cAA and (AciN+ciA \ CAi) ⊆ (AcN+cA \ CA) implies that
AcN+cA \CA contains all Alice’s friends a, where PA(a) ≥ P¯ iA and thus also all recipi-
ents a′, where PA(a′) ≥ P¯ cN+cAA for a, a′ ∈ HA \CAi. This proves PA(AcN+cA \CA) =
cN
m
+ δ ≥ cN P¯ cN+cAA = cNm − cN m−cA and that inequality (4.28) applies to cN , δ, cA, .
This means that if ExactHS prefers to choose and remove the most frequent re-
cipients first, then it will in general compute Ci ∼ AciN+ciA at the i-recursion level.
No matter which recipients ExactHS will chose or remove at the succeeding levels,
it will not require more recipient choices to disprove H then in the case that Alice
communicates uniformly.
Perturbations There might be specific matches of communication behaviour of Al-
ice and other senders, so that the time-complexity of ExactHS could potentially be
higher than predicted by our analyses. Such a case might appear if the order of choos-
ing Alice’s friends by ExactHS is skewed by the traffic of other senders to Alice’s
friends. However, if c recipients are required for a disproof, then the relative order of
recipient choices within these c recipients has little effects on the time-complexity of
ExactHS. Perturbations also becomes negligible in cases of low communication fre-
quency of senders other than Alice, that is if maxr∈R PN(r) 1m .
4.2.4 Refined Mean Time-Complexity
Section 4.1.4 provides an estimate of the upper bound the mean time-complexity of
ExactHS with respect to the Mix parameters, which is invariant to the traffic distri-
butions. We estimate in this section the mean time-complexity of ExactHS under the
optimistic case assumption which models the effect of traffic distributions.
Number of Finalised Sets and Time-Complexity We classify each hypothesis ac-
cording to pair (cN , cA) of hypothetical minimal mean number of choices of non-
friends and Alice’s friends to disprove it. To avoid evaluating single pairs (cN , cA)
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for each hypothesis, we evaluate the pairs (cmminN (cA), cA) instead, where c
mmin
N (cA) is
the number of non-friends to disprove cA-average-disprovable hypotheses as defined
in Section 4.1.4. The value of cmminN and cA determines the structure of the finalised
sets computed by ExactHS. Applying the analyses of the quantity of these structures
of Section 5.1.1.2 finally derives the number of finalised sets computed by ExactHS
and thus its complexity with respect to distinct Alice’s traffic distributions.
For each pair (cmminN (cA), cA), cA ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, ExactHS chooses at most
cmminN (cA) + cA recipients to disprove cA-average-disprovable hypotheses. There are
exactly cA Alice’s friend choices that takes place in some of the cmminN (cA) + cA the
levels of recursion in ExactHS. We assume for simplicity that there is only one Alice’s
friend in each observation1, and thus one possible choice of Alice’s friend in each level
of recursion. This result in
(
cmminN (cA)+cA
cA
)
possibilities of choosing a set of cA Alice’s
friends2 in the cmminN (cA) + cA levels of recursion in ExactHS.
Let us consider a particular chosen set of cA friends and fix the level of recursion
in that these recipients are chosen. ExactHS must then choose a non-friend in each of
those levels of recursion, where no Alice’s friends were chosen. In each of those levels
of recursion, there are at most (b − 1) possible non-friends from which ExactHS can
choose one. This result in (b − 1)cmminN (cA) possibilities of choosing a set of cmminN (cA)
non-friends.3
Combining the possible cA Alice’s friend choices and cmminN non-friend choices, we
obtain the next estimate of the mean number of finalised sets computed by ExactHS
for the unique identification of HA :
g(b,m) =
m∑
l=0
(
l + cmminN (l)
l
)
(b− 1)cmminN (l) . (4.29)
The mean time-complexity of ExactHS is thus O(g(b,m)mtb), where t is the num-
ber of observations to identify HA derived in Section 3.1. To clarify that the num-
ber of finalised sets is dependent on the function cmminN (·), we also use the notation
1Observations with more than one friend can lead to some increase, or decrease of the number of
finalised sets.
2If ExactHS only chooses c′N < c
mmin
N (cA) non-friends to disprove cA-disprovable hypotheses,
then
(
c′N+cA
cA
)
<
(
cmminN (cA)+cA
cA
)
.
3Readers interested in a more detailed proof are referred to Section 5.1.1.2.
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g(b,m, cmminN (·)).
4.2.5 Evaluation
This section evaluates mathematically and simulatively the mean number of obser-
vations and time-complexity to unambiguously identify Alice’s set of friends using
the enhanced version of ExactHS in Algorithm 2. We consider the practical case,
where maxr∈R PN(r) < 1m . The evaluations illustrate the effect of Alice contacting
her friends according to a Zipf(m,α) distribution, chosen due to its known similarity
to Internet traffic Adamic and Huberman [2002]; Almeida et al. [1996]; Breslau et al.
[1999]; Glassman [1994].
4.2.5.1 Solving Number of Recipient Choices for Disproofs
In our evaluations, Alice chooses her friend according to the Zipf(m,α) distribution in
each observation. The remaining (b−1) senders are assumed to choose their recipients
arbitrarily, but such that the cumulative probability that a recipient is contacted by a
non-Alice sender is at most PN = 1− (u−1u )b−1.
To simplify the maths, we approximate the cumulative Zipf distribution function
Fm,αz (y) described in Section 2.2.4.1 by considering it as a continuous function. That
is Fm,αz (y) ≈
∫ y+1
i=1 i
−αdi∫m+1
j=1 j
−αdj
= (y+1)
1−α−1
(m+1)1−α−1 for α 6= 1. Applying this approximation to
(4.26) allows deriving the following closed formula:
f ′mminPo (cN , cA) ≈ 1−
(cN + cA + 1)
1−α − (cA + 1)1−α
(m+ 1)1−α − 1 +(
1− (cA + 1)
1−α − 1
(m+ 1)1−α − 1
)
(m− cN − cA)PN .
To simplify discussions, we consider f ′mminPo (cN , cA) as being equal the formula on the
right side of (≈) in the remaining of this section. We obtain the function cmminN (cA) by
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solving the next equation for cN , as sketched in Section 4.2.3:
1 = f ′mminPo (cN , cA)
= 1− (cN + cA + 1)
1−α − (cA + 1)1−α
(m+ 1)1−α − 1 +(
1− (cA + 1)
1−α − 1
(m+ 1)1−α − 1
)
(m− cN − cA)PN . (4.30)
We used Maple to solve (4.30) for cN . This result in the function cmminN (cA) that is
plotted on the left plot in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.
Theoretical Number of Recipient Choices for Disproofs The left plot in Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7 shows the number of recipient choices to disprove hypotheses by Ex-
actHS, when the HS-attack succeeds, for the Mix parameters (u = 400, b = 10,m =
23) respective (u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40). It shows cmminN (cA) on the y-axis for
the values of α = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5 and with respect to the values of cA on the x-axis. In
all plots, α is the weight in the Zipf(m,α) distribution of Alice’s traffic defined in
Section 2.2.4.1.
We observe that the number of recipient choices to disprove cA-average-disprovable
sets is maximal, if Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed (α = 0) and decreases with
respect to α. This observation complies to our proof in Section 4.2.3.2 and confirms it.
α g(10, 23, cmminN (·)) Empirical g
0.0 3.2× 108 8.3× 106
0.5 1.1× 107 1.2× 106
1.0 7.5× 105 5.8× 104
1.5 1.0× 105 6.3× 103
Figure 4.6: Number of recipient choices for disproofs and of finalised sets. Left: Num-
ber of choices cmminN (·). Right: Theoretical vs. empirical number of finalised sets.
Theoretical and Empirical Number of Finalised Sets The right table in Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7 enlists the theoretical and empirical number of finalised sets computed
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α g(50, 40, cmminN (·)) Empirical g
0.0 1.8× 107 1.7× 106
0.5 1.0× 105 1.5× 105
1.0 8.7× 103 2× 104
1.5 2.2× 103 1.7× 103
Figure 4.7: Number of recipient choices for disproofs and of finalised sets. Left: Num-
ber of choices cmminN (·)). Right: Theoretical vs. empirical number of finalised sets.
by ExactHS, when the HS-attack succeeds, for the Mix parameters (u = 400, b =
10,m = 23) respective (u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40).
The second column in the table determines the theoretical mean number of fi-
nalised sets by (4.29), for the given values of u, b,m, α and the corresponding function
cmminN (·) illustrated on the left plot in the same figure.
The third column in the table represents the empirical mean number of finalised
sets obtained from simulations described in Section 2.2.4. These simulations apply
the HS-attack to the same Mix configurations as considered in the theoretical analyses.
Their results are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.8 (for u = 400, b = 10,m = 23)
and in Figure 2.9 (for u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40) in Section 2.2.4.2.
We observe that the theoretical and empirical mean number of finalised sets de-
creases with respect to α. This complies to our analytical analysis of the function
cmminN (·) represented on the left plot. That is cmminN (cA) decreases for all cA with re-
spect to α and therefore implies that the number of finalised sets (4.29) also decreases.
Let without loss of generality Alice’s set of friends be HA = {1, . . . ,m}, where
a ∈ HA is the a-th most frequently contacted by Alice. For the Mix parameters
(u = 400, b = 10,m = 23), the traffic volume of the cover-traffic to any recipient
r ∈ R is PN ≈ 0.02. This is higher than Alice’s traffic volume to her friends a ≥ 13
in case of α = 1 and a ≥ 8 in case of α = 1.5. That is PN > Pm,1z (a) for a ≥ 13
and PN > Pm,1.5z (a) for a ≥ 8. Figure 4.6 thus reveals that the mean number of fi-
nalised sets computed by ExactHS decreases with respect to α, although Alice’s traffic
volume to an increasingly number of friends becomes lower than the cover-traffic vol-
ume. This relation seems to be robust, as it mainly remains, even in simulation where
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we attempted to perturb the recipient choices by ExactHS to increase its mean time-
complexity. In those simulations that are not presented in this thesis, we considered
non-uniformly distributed cover-traffics that skew the order of the recipients chosen by
ExactHS. However, due to a lack of analytical analyses for those simulations we do
not detail them in this thesis and just mention them as a side note.
4.3 Summary
Provided that the attacker has collected sufficiently many observations for a unique
identification of Alice’s set of friends, we provided analytical analyses of the mean
time-complexity of ExactHS for that identification. They allow mathematical identifi-
cation of non trivial and practical Mix configurations, where the UMHS problem can
be efficiently solved by ExactHS, despite the exponential worst case time-complexity
of ExactHS. This shows that the anonymity protection provided by an anonymity sys-
tem is more appropriately measured by the mean complexity of an attack, than by its
worst case complexity. At the same time our results proves that the HS-attack is not
a purely theoretic measure of the least number of observations to uniquely identify a
user’s set of friends, but also a practical one, as it is in many case computationally
feasible.
Section 4.1 contributed an estimate of the upper bound of the mean time-complexity
of ExactHS with respect to the Mix parameters. This bound is invariant to Alice’s
traffic distribution and can be applied to obtain bounds for non-uniformly distributed
cover-traffic. Our analyses allow mathematical identification of those Mix parameters
that lead to a mean time-complexity of ExactHS that is bounded by an arbitrary desired
upper bound. Section 4.1.4.1 showed that ExactHS succeeds within linear mean time-
complexity, if for every recipient, the probability PN that it is contacted in an observa-
tion by any sender of the cover-traffic does not exceed 1
m2
. In other words, ExactHS
can uniquely identify HA within linear mean time-complexity, for any Mix configura-
tion, where the distribution of the cover-traffic provides a probability PN ≤ 1m2 . This
time-complexity is independent of Alice’s traffic distribution1.
Simulations in Section 4.1.5 revealed that the variance of the mean time-complexity
1That is Alice’s traffic distribution does not increase this time-complexity.
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of ExactHS might me high, in the case that HA is identified with the least number of
observations. This was caused by high variances of the traffic distributions, due to the
low number of observations required to succeed the HS-attack. This variance becomes
negligible, if ExactHS is reapplied with more than the least number of observations
to succeed the HS-attack, by collecting additional observations. However, the mean
time-complexity of ExactHS does not decrease, even for significantly more additional
observations. This indicates that that complexity is mainly independent of the number
of observations that is significantly beyond the least number of observations to succeed
the HS-attack.
Section 4.2 investigated the effect of the distribution of Alice’s traffic on the mean
time-complexity of ExactHS, thus extending and refining Section 4.1. It provided a
mathematical estimate of that complexity with respect to various Mix parameters and
traffic distributions. Section 4.2.3.2 proved that, if for every recipient, the probability
PN that it is contacted in an observation by any sender of the cover-traffic is below
1
m
, then the mean time-complexity of ExactHS is maximal, if Alice’s traffic distri-
bution is uniform. Although our analyses apply to arbitrary distributions, we chose
the Zipf(m,α) distribution of Alice’s friends to study the decrease of ExactHS’s mean
time-complexity in detail. We proved in Section 4.2.3.2 that the mean time-complexity
of ExactHS decreases with respect to α and approaches a polynomially bounded com-
plexity. That is despite the computational infeasibility of the mean time-complexity of
ExactHS, when Alice’s traffic is uniformly distributed.
It could be concluded from Section 3.1.1.2 and Section 4.2.4 that the mean number
of observations to uniquely identify HA decreases with respect to α, while the mean
time-complexity of that identification decreases. This proved that the uniform distribu-
tion of Alice’s traffic minimises the mean number of observations to uniquely identify
HA , while maximising the mean time-complexity of that identification.
We also observed that the number of observations increases reasonably with α,
while the mean time-complexity seems to decrease exponentially fast with increas-
ing value of α. Although we can estimate the mean time-complexity mathematically
with respect to various Mix configurations, the equations are yet not simple enough to
provide a direct proof of that observation. Proving this relation is left for future works.
The mathematical analyses in this chapter referred to the case that PN(r) < 1m .
Our simulations (that are not evaluated in this thesis) indicated cases where ExactHS
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can be efficiently applied, even if PN(r) ≥ 1m . The mathematical analyses of these
cases remain for future works.
It cannot be excluded that there will be an algorithm in the future that solves the
UMHS problem with a lower mean time-complexity than ExactHS. Therefore, our
analyses of the practical limit of anonymity protection estimates the maximal, but not
the least anonymity protection provided by a Mix configuration.
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Chapter 5
Extension
The previous chapters analysed the least number of observations to uniquely identify
Alice’s set of friends, as well as the worst case and mean time-complexity of ExactHS
for that identification. These analyses are based on the following two assumptions:
First, the attacker can evaluate sufficiently many observations for the unique identifi-
cation of Alice’s set of friends. Second, the observed information about the senders and
recipients of the messages relayed in a Mix round is exact and complete1. This chapter
investigates the HS-attack for the case that one of these two assumptions is omitted,
which we call the case of “relaxed assumptions”. We show that the basic idea of the
HS-attack, the evaluation of minimal-hitting-sets, remains applicable in that case and
allows deducing knowledge about Alice’s friends. This only requires slight adaptations
of the HS-attack described in Chapter 2.
By relaxing the first assumption, we aim to study the gain of partial or likely infor-
mation about Alice’s friends, when the attacker can only observe a restricted number of
observations. We investigate by the relaxation of the second assumption, the identifica-
tion of Alice’s friends, even if some of the attacker’s observations are erroneous. This
addresses practice-oriented Mix and attacker models, where an attacker has incomplete
knowledge about the sender-anonymity set or recipient set in around, cf. Section 1.2.3.
Section 5.1 analyses the information that can be disclosed about Alice’s friends, if
there are not sufficiently many observations for a unique identification of Alice’s set of
1Recall that the links between the senders and recipients of single messages are hidden by the Mix.
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friends. Section 5.2 considers the case that the attacker occasionally collects so-called
erroneous observations that miss Alice’s friends. It analyses conditions, where Alice’s
set of friends can still be identified with a high certainty despite these errors.
5.1 Partial Information
The HS-attack determines all specified hypotheses for Alice’s set of friends. The past
chapters evaluated these specified hypotheses for the unique identification of Alice’s
set of friends that we call the full disclosure.
This section studies the case, where the number of observations might not be suf-
ficient for a full disclosure by the HS-attack. For this case, we evaluate the specified
hypotheses for the unique identification of subsets of Alice’s set of friends, that we call
the partial disclosure.
In essence, each of Alice’s friend is uniquely identifiable if he is contained by every
specified hypothesis. This is equivalent to being contained by every
(minimal-) hitting-set computed by ExactHS, since every specified hypothesis is a su-
perset of a minimal-hitting-set1. Therefore, by computing the intersection
⋂
H∈HSHS
of all (minimal-) hitting-sets computed by ExactHS (Algorithm 1, 2), we obtain the
unique identification of a subset of Alice’s friends, a partial disclosure. A partial dis-
closure can be illustrated by Example 2.1 in Section 2.1.2.3. In that example, applying
the intersection of all minimal-hitting-sets, respectively of all specified hypotheses in
i = 6 leads to the unique identification of the subset {1, 2} of Alice’s set of friends
{1, 2, 3}.
This section contributes analytical analyses of the number of observations for the par-
tial disclosure of Alice’s friends for the uniform communication model, as a first step in
that direction. We provide a mathematical description of the evolution of the minimal-
hitting-sets (i.e., the minimal-hitting-sets that remain after applying ExactHS) with
respect to the number of observations collected by the attacker. This allows conclud-
ing the information that can be partially disclosed, as it is derived from those remaining
minimal-hitting-sets.
1We refer to minimal-hitting-set of at most size m and hypothesis definitions in Section 2.1.2.3.
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To aid describing the evolution of minimal-hitting-sets, Section 5.1.1 provides a
quantification of all distinct minimal-hitting-set classes. This reveals that the quantity
of the minimal-hitting-sets is non monotonous with respect to the number of observa-
tions collected by the attacker, so that it would be difficult to describe the minimal-
hitting-sets mathematically.
As a solution to this problem, Section 5.1.2 introduces an abstract structure called
extensive-hypotheses. The set of extensive-hypotheses covers all information repre-
sented by the minimal-hitting-sets, while being monotonous with respect to the number
of observations. Section 5.1.3 outlines that the evolution of the extensive-hypothesis
can be easily described and provides conclusions about the evolution of the minimal-
hitting-sets.
5.1.1 Quantification of Minimal-Hitting-Sets in a Class
Section 2.3.1 introduced a classification of minimal-hitting-sets. We are interested in
an analytical quantification of the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets in each of
those classes, in this section.
Section 5.1.1.1 determines for each class Hi, for i = 0, . . . ,m, all those minimal-
hitting-sets computed by ExactHS that are in that class, with respect to the attacker’s
observation set OS. This is realised by a modified invocation of Algorithm 2. While
this modified invocation allows computing all minimal-hitting-sets as before, it also
enables a simple quantification of the number of minimal-hitting-sets in each class Hi,
as shown in Section 5.1.1.2.
5.1.1.1 Computing Minimal-Hitting-Sets in a Class
In this section, we provide an algorithm to reveal all minimal-hitting-sets in a partic-
ular class, that are computed by ExactHS with respect to a given observation set OS.
While this algorithm is based on a modified invocation of ExactHS, it solely serves to
aid analytical analyses and should not be confused with an attack.
Let a particular subset C ⊆ HA of Alice’s friends of size m − i be fixed and OS
be the observations collected by the attacker, for i = 0, . . . ,m. Executing the fol-
lowing three steps computes all minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m, that contains
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exactly all Alice’s friends in C, by using Algorithm 2:
1. All observations containing any friend in C are removed from the initial observation-
set OS, thus obtaining OS \ OS[C].
2. All remaining friends in HA \ C are removed from observations in OS \ OS[C],
resulting in the modified observation set
OS′ = {O \ HA | O ∈ OS \ OS[C]}.
3. Algorithm 2 is applied on OS′ to computes all minimal-hitting-sets containing C
and at most i non-friends, by invoking ExactHS (OS′, i,C).
Step 1 aids the computation of minimal-hitting-sets H′ in OS \ OS[C]. Due to
Claim 2 in Section 2.2.2.1, this allows determining all minimal-hitting sets H ⊇ C in
OS by setting H = H′ ∪ C. Step 2 constrains H′ to not contain any Alice’s friends, so
that every H = H′ ∪ C is a hitting-set in OS that contains exactly |C| = m− i Alice’s
friends.
Applying the above three steps for all possible sets C ⊆ R\ HA , where |C| = m−i
thus determines the subset of all minimal-hitting-sets in Hi, for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, by
ExactHS. Note that we do not exclude the computation of non minimal-hitting-sets for
the same reason as in Section 2.2.2.3, as it does not change the maximal number of
minimal-hitting-sets in the classes as shown in the next section.
5.1.1.2 Maximal Number of Minimal-Hitting-Sets in a Class
There are
(
m
m−i
)
possibilities to choose (m − i) different friends out of Alice’s set of
friends HA . Calling Algorithm 2 in Step 3 will compute at most (b − 1)i different
minimal-hitting-sets. The base of (b−1) is due to Step 2, that removes all friends from
all observations in OS \ OS[C]. Let H∗i ⊆ Hi denote the maximal set of all minimal-
hitting-sets in Hi that ExactHS can compute, then
|H∗i | =
(
m
m− i
)
(b− 1)i =
(
m
i
)
(b− 1)i (5.1)
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is the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets in the class Hi. We prove that this
bound is tight by showing observation sets, where the number of all minimal-hitting-
sets is exactly bm, while the number of minimal-hitting-set in each class Hi is exactly
|H∗i | for i = 0, . . . ,m, next.
Proof. We prove that the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets |H∗i | in each class
Hi, for i = 0, . . . ,m is tight, by considering the same observation sets as in the proof
of Claim 3 in Section 2.2.3.1. That is the set of m pairwise disjoint observations
OS = {O0, . . . ,Om−1}, where |Oi| = b, for i = 0, . . . ,m − 1. Due to the proof
of Claim 3, there are exactly bm minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m in OS. Each
of these minimal-hitting-sets H consists of m recipients and is of the structure H =
{r1, . . . , rm}, where rj ∈ Oj−1 for j = 1, . . . ,m. Since each O ∈ OS contains
exactly one Alice’s friend, the observationsO0, . . . ,Om−1 contain allm distinct Alice’s
friends. Let H ∈ Hi be a minimal-hitting-set in OS, then the (m − i) Alice’s friends
in HA can be chosen from
(
m
m−i
)
possible sets of (m − i) observations in OS. The
remaining i non-friends inHN can be chosen from the remaining i observations. Since
each observation contains (b − 1) non-friends, there are (b − 1)i sets of i non-friends
for HN . Therefore, there are |H∗i | =
(
m
m−i
)
(b− 1)i minimal-hitting-sets H in Hi.
Note that the cumulative sum of the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets in all
classes Hi is exactly the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets of bm. That is
m∑
i=0
|H∗i | =
m∑
i=0
(
m
m− i
)
(b− 1)i =
m∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(b− 1)i1(m−i) = bm .
Example 5.1.1 (Tightness of Estimated Number Minimal-Hitting-Sets). We show a
concrete set of observations that contains exactly bm minimal-hitting-sets, where the
number of minimal-hitting-sets in each class is exactly |H∗i | for i = 0, . . . ,m. Let
Alice’s set of friends be HA = {1, 2, 3}, m = 3 and b = 3 in our example. The m
disjoint observations {O0, . . . ,Om−1} collected by the attacker are:
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 6, 7}, {3, 8, 9} .
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The minimal-hitting-sets in the classes H0, . . . ,Hm are:
H∗0 = {{1, 2, 3}}
H∗1 = {{1, 2, 8}, {1, 2, 9}, {1, 6, 3}, {1, 7, 3}, {4, 2, 3}, {5, 2, 3}}
H∗2 = {{1, 6, 8}, {1, 6, 9}, {1, 7, 8}, {1, 7, 9}, {4, 2, 8}, {4, 2, 9}, {5, 2, 8}, {5, 2, 9},
{4, 6, 3}, {4, 7, 3}, {5, 6, 3}, {5, 7, 3}}
H∗3 = {{4, 6, 8}, {4, 6, 9}, {4, 7, 8}, {4, 7, 9}, {5, 6, 8}, {5, 6, 9}, {5, 7, 8}, {5, 7, 9}}
The reader can verify for all classes H∗i , for i = 0, . . . ,m that |H∗i | =
(
m
m−i
)
bi,
which is |H∗i | =
(
3
3−i
)
2i in this example. The number of all minimal-hitting-sets is∑3
i=0
(
3
3−i
)
2i = 1 + 6 + 12 + 8 = 33, which is bm.
5.1.2 Description of Minimal-Hitting-Sets by Extensive-Hypotheses
This section provides a description of the minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m in the
sequence of observations sets OS0,OS1, . . . ,OSt collected by the attacker. We define
that OS0 = {}, OSi = OSi−1 ∪ Oi, where Oi is the i-th observation collected by the
attacker, for i = 1, . . . , t. For all i = 1, . . . , t, the minimal-hitting-sets in OSi+1 result
from removing and extending the minimal-hitting-sets in OSi, such that all resulting
hitting-sets hit the new observation Oi+1. A hitting setH in OSi that is no hitting-set in
OSi+1, is removed, if |H| = m, otherwise it is replaced by an extension H ∪ r for any
r ∈ Oi+1. We call these changes of the minimal-hitting-sets due to new observations,
an evolution of the minimal-hitting-sets. Our description of the minimal-hitting-sets is
called extensive-hypotheses. It aids deriving a simple mathematical model for the evo-
lution of the minimal-hitting-sets with respect to the number of observations collected
by the attacker.
We observe that the number of minimal-hitting-sets of at most size m tends to increase
at the beginning with respect to the number of observations collected by the attacker.
At some turning point, that number tends to decrease for increasing number of observa-
tions, until it arrives at a unique minimum-hitting-set that identifies all Alice’s friends.
At the same time the sizes of the minimal-hitting-sets approach m with increasing
142
number of observations. Due to the alternating quantity of the minimal-hitting sets
and their changing sizes, modelling the evolution of the minimal-hitting-sets with re-
spect to the attacker’s observations, would be mathematically complex.
However, analyses of ExactHS in Section 5.1.1 provide information about the clas-
sification of all potential minimal-hitting-sets of size m as well as their quantity in
each class, even if they are not yet computed by ExactHS. We call these potential
minimal-hitting-sets of size m extensive-hypotheses. They will be such defined, that
every minimal-hitting-set of at most size m in an observation set is a subset of an
extensive-hypothesis. Therefore, the set of extensive-hypotheses that remain valid
in a given observation set OS will be dual to the set of minimal-hitting-set in OS,
so that partial information that are derivable by minimal-hitting-sets are derivable by
extensive-hypotheses.
As illustrated by the example in Table 5.1, the number of extensive-hypotheses only
decreases with respect to the number of observations collected by the attack, while the
size of an extensive-hypothesis is always m. This allows for mathematical descrip-
tion of the evolution of the extensive-hypotheses that is less complex than describing
minimal-hitting-sets.
5.1.2.1 Evolution of Extensive-Hypotheses
Table 5.1 shows the set of all minimal-hitting-setsMi, the set of all extensive-hypotheses
Li and the disproved sets that result from evaluating the observation set
OSi = {O1, . . . ,Oi} collected by the attacker. It is an example, where Alice’s set
of friends is HA = {1, 2, 3} and the batch size is b = 2.
For i = 0 there is no observation and thus no minimal-hitting-set, however, we
know by Section 2.3.1 the initial classes of all extensive-hypotheses, as represented in
L0 in Table 5.1. Each element H ∈ Li is called an extensive-class1. We will index
these classes by their order from left to right and from top to bottom by subscripts,
such that Hu is the u-th class in the set of all extensive-hypotheses.
An extensive-class is unspecified, if it contains a variable x,2 otherwise it is speci-
1Writing H ⊆ L0 would be formally more correct, as H represents several extensive-hypotheses,
but we entirely use the element-notation and -operations withH to simplify notations and explanations.
2We address by x any indexed variable xvu thereof.
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i Oi MHS Mi Extensive-hypotheses Li Disproved
0 H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, x31}, {2, 3, x41};
H2 : {1, x51, x52}, {2, x61, x62}, {3, x71, x72};
H3 : {x81, x82, x83}
1 {1, 4} {1},
{4}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, x31}, {2, 3,4};
H2 : {1, x51, x52}, {2,4, x61}, {3,4, x71};
H3 : {4, x81, x82}
2 {2, 5} {1, 2},
{1, 5},
{4, 2},
{4, 5}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3,5}, {2, 3, 4};
H2 : {1,5, x51}, {2, 4, x61}, {3, 4,5};
H3 : {4,5, x81}
3 {1, 6} {1, 2},
{1, 5},
{4, 2, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, 5};
H2 : {1, 5, x41}, {2, 4,6};
H3 : {4, 5,6}
{2, 3, 4},
{3, 4, 5}
4 {3, 4} {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4},
{1, 5, 3},
{1, 5, 4},
{4, 2, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2,4}, {1, 3, 5};
H2 : {1, 5,4}, {2, 4, 6};
H3 : {4, 5, 6}
Table 5.1: Evolution of minimal-hitting-sets (MHS) and extensive-hypotheses for Al-
ice’s set of friends HA = {1, 2, 3} and batch size b = 2.
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fied. Each variable x represents any (b−1) unspecified recipients1 who are non-friends
n ∈ R \ HA , while numbers or a, r, n denote concrete recipients who we also call
specified recipients for clarity. Variables xuv , x
u
w ∈ Hu, where v 6= w always represent
distinct unspecified recipients. Therefore, each unspecified extensive-class determines
the structure of extensive-hypotheses that are not yet fully specified, while a specified
extensive-class describes a single fully specified extensive-hypothesis and we inter-
changeably refer to the latter by the term specified extensive-hypothesis. The only
specified extensive-hypothesis in L0 is H1 = {1, 2, 3}. Recipients who are Unspeci-
fied and become specified when evaluating the i-th observation are bold highlighted in
Table 5.1.
The benefit of considering extensive-hypotheses is illustrated in Table 5.1 by the
case of i = 3. It reveals the disproof of extensive-hypotheses (i.e., {2, 3, 4} and
{3, 4, 5}) and thus the decrease of the number of extensive-hypotheses that are not
apparent if considering the minimal-hitting-sets and their quantity. Firstly, we observe
that the number of minimal-hitting-sets is increasing with respect to i = 1, . . . , 4,
while the number of extensive-hypotheses and thus the number of potential minimal-
hitting-sets of size m is actually decreasing. Secondly, we can see that given sufficient
many observations (i.e., i = 4 in this table), the set of extensive-hypotheses equals the
set of all minimal-hitting-sets. In summary, the evolution of extensive-hypotheses are
monotonous and equal that of minimal-hitting-set for large number of observations,
and remains monotonous even for lower number of observations, where the quantities
and sizes of minimal-hitting-sets alternate.
5.1.2.2 Construction of Extensive-Hypotheses
We show the construction ofLi with respect to the observation setOSi = {O1, . . . ,Oi}
and the minimal-hitting-sets Mi for i ≥ 1. It is based on the adapted application of
ExactHS and allows the classification and quantification of extensive-hypotheses ac-
cording to the classification and quantification of minimal-hitting-set and hypotheses
in Section 2.3.1 and in Section 5.1.1, by slight adaptations of the definitions.
1That is the concrete recipient is as yet unknown.
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Let w.l.o.g. every extensive-class be described by
H = {a1, . . . , am−j, n1, . . . , nl, xl+1, . . . , xj} ,
for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ l ≤ j and |H| = m.
We adapt the terminology for hypotheses and minimal-hitting-sets to extensive-
classes and -hypotheses as follow:
H ∈ Hj: If H does not contain j Alice’s friends1.
HN : Set of specified non-friends in H, that is HN = H ∩R \ HA = {n1, . . . , nl}.
HA: Set of Alice’s friends in H, that is HA = H ∩ HA = {a1, . . . , am−j}.
Li: For every subset of Alice’s friends {a1, . . . , am−j} ⊆ HA , the set
H = {a1, . . . , am−j, n1, . . . , nl, xl+1, . . . , xj} is in Li that is denoted H ∈ Li,
if and only if {n1, . . . nl} is a minimal-hitting-set in OS′i = {O \ HA | O ∈
OSi \ OSi[a1, . . . , am−j]}, for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ l ≤ j. We call these extensive-
classes minimal extensive-classes (if clarity is needed), thus Li consists of solely
minimal extensive-classes. Note, ifOS′i = {}, then {} is by definition a minimal-
hitting-set in that set. Therefore L0 contains exactly the m+ 1 extensive-classes
H = {a1, . . . , am−j, x1, . . . , xj} for j = 0, . . . ,m.
Let H′ be a minimal-hitting-set in OSi, then due to Claim 1 and Claim 2 in Sec-
tion 2.2.2.1,H′\H′A is a minimal-hitting-set inOS′i = {O\ HA | O ∈ OSi\OSi[H′A]}.
Therefore, for every minimal-hitting-set H′ in OSi, there is a H ∈ Li, such that
HA = H
′
A and HN = H
′
N .
For every subset of Alice’s friends {a1, . . . , am−j} ⊆ HA and observation set OS,
we can compute all minimal-hitting-sets {n1, . . . , nl}, for l ≤ j in OS′ = {O \ HA |
O ∈ OS\OS[a1, . . . , am−j]} as in Section 5.1.1.1. This allows quantifying the maximal
number of extensive-hypotheses represented by each minimal extensive-class based on
Section 5.1.1.2. The initial number of extensive-hypotheses in L0 that is in Hj is equal
1Again, writing H ⊆ Hj , would be formally more correct, but we entirely use the set-notation and
-operation with H to simplify notations and discussions.
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the maximal number of minimal-hitting-sets in Hj , which is due to (5.1),(
m
j
)
(b− 1)j ,
for j = 0, . . . ,m. And the number of extensive-hypotheses represented by each mini-
mal extensive-class H = {a1, . . . , am−j, n1, . . . , nl, xl+1, . . . , xj} is
(b− 1)j−l , for 0 ≤ l ≤ j .
However, to provide a better illustration of the evolution of the minimal extensive-
classes and the extensive-hypotheses represented by it, we additionally provide an iter-
ative computation of Li, for i ≥ 1. This algorithm computes Li in OSi = OSi−1 ∪ Oi,
for given Li−1 and is presented next.
1. Set Li = {} before the start of its construction below.
2. For each extensive-class H ∈ Li−1, where H ∈ Hj for some 0 ≤ j ≤ m, let
{r1, . . . , rk} = H ∩ R be the set of all specified recipients for k ≤ m. Apply
either 3. or 4. to each H.
3. If {r1, . . . , rk} ∩ Oi 6= ∅, then add H to Li, i.e., Li = Li ∪ {H}, since all
extensive-hypotheses described by H remain valid in OSi.
4. Else if {r1, . . . , rk} ∩ Oi = ∅ and k < m, then add for each non-friend n ∈
Oi \ HA the extensive-class H′ = {r1, . . . , rk, n, x1, . . . , xm−k−1} ∈ Hj to Li,
only if H′ is a minimal extensive-class in OSi.
Exclusion of Extensive-Hypotheses We can observe form the algorithm above and
in Table 5.1 that unspecified recipients in an extensive-classH become specified when-
ever an observation O is collected, where H ∩ O = ∅, unless H is already a specified
extensive-hypothesis, so that it becomes disproved. In the usual case, all extensive-
classes become specified extensive-hypotheses prior to being disproved. Since there
are initially bm extensive-hypotheses, we can mathematically model their disproofs
with respect to the attacker’s number of observations to predict the partial information
that can be revealed by the attacker, as will be presented in Section 5.1.3.
147
5. EXTENSION
However, in some exceptional cases, some extensive-hypotheses can be excluded,
even if they are not specified, thus leading to a faster exclusion of extensive-hypotheses
and a faster disclosure of partial information. Modelling these exceptional cases would
refine our analyses, but increases the complexity of the analyses. This thesis provides
the basic to analyse partial information and therefore leaves this refinement for future
works. Nevertheless we outline the exceptional cases next for completeness.
An exception can only arise in point 4 in the computation of Li and consists of
following cases:
Case 1: The extensive-class H′ ∈ Hj resulting from specifying a recipient in H ∈ Hj
is not minimal in OSi.
Case 2: There are fewer than (b− 1) non-friends in the next observation Oi.
These exceptions are illustrated in the example in Table 5.2, where Alice’s set of
friends is HA = {1, 2, 3} and the batch size is b = 3.
For i = 2, the extensive-classes {3, 4, 8}, {4, 8, x} that are highlighted by the grey
colour are not minimal and therefore they are excluded, as stated in exception Case 1.
These extensive-classes are not minimal, as {3, 4, 8}∩R\ HA = {4, 8} and {3, 4, x}∩
R\ HA = {4, 8} are not minimal-hitting-sets in OS2. Note that these extensive-classes
hit the observations in OS2.
For i = 3, the observation Oi = {1, 6} only contains 2 recipients instead of 3 and
leads to a reduction of the number of extensive-hypotheses that remain to be disproved,
as stated in exception Case 2. Observe that the extensive-classes
{2, 4, x91}, {2, 8, x101 }, {3, 8, x121 }, {4, 5, x131 }, {8, x141 , x142 } in OS2 do not hit O3, so that
due to Step 4, an unspecified recipient in each of these classes must be replaced by a
non-friend in O3 in i = 3. In the non exceptional case, an observation would contain
b−1 non-friends, so that an unspecified extensive-classH would result in at most b−1
extensive-classes by specifying an unspecified recipient in H. However, O2 contains
only one non-friend, so that each unspecified extensive-class only result in only one
extensive-class by specifying an unspecified recipient.
The last column in Table 5.2 enlists the extensive-classes that are explicitly ex-
cluded by the algorithm described in “Construction of Extensive-Hypotheses”. These
are exclusions due to the exceptional Case 1 (as in i = 2) and due to normal disproofs
(as in i = 4). In opposite to that, exclusions due to Case 2 are not explicitly computed
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i Oi MHS Mi Extensive-hypotheses Li Excluded
0 H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, x31}, {2, 3, x41};
H2 : {1, x51, x52}, {2, x61, x62}, {3, x71, x72};
H3 : {x81, x82, x83}
1 {1, 4, 8} {1},
{4},
{8}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, x31}, {2, 3,4},
{2, 3,8};
H2 : {1, x61, x62}, {2,4, x71}, {2,8, x81},
{3,4, x91}, {3,8, x101 };
H3 : {4, x111 , x112 }, {8, x121 , x122 }
2 {2, 5, 8} {1, 2},
{1, 5},
{4, 2},
{4, 5},
{8}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3,5}, {1, 3,8},
{2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 8};
H2 : {1,5, x71}, {1,8, x81}, {2, 4, x91},
{2, 8, x101 }, {3, 4,5}, {3, 8, x121 };
H3 : {4,5, x131 }, {8, x141 , x142 }
{3, 4,8},
{4,8, x}
3 {1, 6} {1, 2},
{1, 5},
{4, 2, 6},
{4, 5, 6},
{8, 1},
{8, 6}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2, x21}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 8},
H2 : {1, 5, x51}, {1, 8, x61}, {2, 4,6},
{2, 8,6}, {3, 8,6};
H3 : {4, 5,6}, {8,6, x112 }
{2, 3, 4},
{2, 3, 8},
{3, 4, 5}
4 {3, 4, 7} {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 4},
{1, 2, 7},
{1, 5, 3},
{1, 5, 4},
{1, 5, 7},
{4, 2, 6},
{4, 5, 6}
{8, 1, 3},
{8, 1, 4},
{8, 1, 7},
{8, 6, 1},
{8, 6, 3},
{8, 6, 7}
H0 : {1, 2, 3};
H1 : {1, 2,4}, {1, 2,7}, {1, 3, 5},
{1, 3, 8},
H2 : {1, 5,4}, {1, 5,7}, {1, 8,4},
{1, 8,7}, {2, 4, 6}, {3, 8, 6};
H3 : {4, 5, 6}, {8, 6,4}, {8, 6,7}
{2, 8, 6}
Table 5.2: Disproof of extensive-hypotheses with exceptions for Alice’s set of friends
HA = {1, 2, 3} and batch size b = 3. Minimal-hitting-sets is abbreviated by (MHS).
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and are therefore not enlisted in the last column.
Let k = |H ∩ R| be the number of specified recipients in an unspecified extensive-
class H and H ∩ Oi = ∅ as in Step 4. We determine the maximal number of excluded
extensive-hypotheses in each exceptional case below.
Case 1: Let specifying a recipient inH result in an extensive-classH′ that is not mini-
mal in OSi. H′ contains (m−k−1) unspecified recipients, each representing
(b− 1) non-friends. Therefore, excluding H′ leads to an exclusion of at most
(b− 1)m−k−1 distinct extensive-hypotheses.
Case 2: Let l = (b− 1)− |Oi \ HA | be the number of non-friends missed in Oi. As in
Case 1, each non-friend missed in Oi would determine an extensive-class that
represents at most (b − 1)m−k−1 distinct extensive-hypotheses. Therefore at
most l(b− 1)m−k−1 extensive-hypotheses are excluded in total.
We observe that most extensive-classes become specified very fast and logically at
least as fast as minimal-hitting-sets reach the size m, so that k = H ∩ R is usually
close to m. The impact of exclusions by exceptions on the number of the extensive-
hypotheses is therefore moderate in comparison to normal (non-exceptional) exclu-
sions. For the sake of simplicity, we only mathematically model the normal exclusion
of extensive-hypotheses from the initial bm extensive-hypotheses in this thesis.
5.1.3 Modelling Evolution of Extensive-Hypotheses
The last section shows that we can model the evolution of minimal-hitting-sets by the
evolution of minimal extensive-classes. In this section, we simplify modelling the
evolution of minimal extensive-classes by mathematically modelling the evolution of
those specified extensive-hypotheses that would result from specifying the minimal
extensive-classes. That is we consider all extensive-hypotheses as being specified ini-
tially, so that we solely model the evolution of specified extensive-hypotheses.
5.1.3.1 Mean Number of Extensive-Hypotheses
In this section, we derive closed formulas for the mean number of specified extensive-
hypotheses that remain in distinct classes after a given number of t observations. Since
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all extensive-hypotheses are considered to by specified initially, the number of speci-
fied extensive-hypotheses for t = 0 is bm (i.e., the maximal number).
Let Vi be a random variable, where Vi = 1 is the event that a particular specified
extensive-hypothesis H ∈ Hi remains valid after t observations, while Vi = 0 denotes
the inverse event. Note that a specified extensive-hypothesis is a hitting-set. To sim-
plify the maths, we assume that Alice contacts her friends statistically independently
and that the observations are also statistically independent. The probability of Vi = 1
therefore corresponds to t statistically independent Bernoulli trials, where the outcome
of each of the t trials shows that H remains a hitting-set. Thereby a single Bernoulli
trial corresponds to the outcome, whether H remains a hitting-set at the next collected
observation.
P (Vi = 1) = [P (H remains hitting-set in next observation)]t
The probability that a specified extensive-hypothesis H ∈ Hi is excluded in the
next observation is:
pexc(u, b,m, i) =
i
m
(
1− m
N
)b−1
. (5.2)
The first factor i
m
is the probability that Alice contacts any of her i = | HA \ HA|
friends who are not in H. The probability that a non Alice sender does not contact any
of the recipients in H is 1 − m
N
. Therefore, the second factor is the probability that
the remaining (b − 1) senders of a batch who are other than Alice, do not contact any
recipients in H.
By formulating the probability P (Vi = 1) in terms of pexc(u, b,m, i), we obtain the
following equation:
P (Vi = 1) = (1− pexc(u, b,m, i))t .
LetH∗i = {H1, . . . ,H|H∗i |} be the maximal set of all specified extensive-hypotheses
in Hi and Vij be the event that Hj ∈ H∗i remains valid after t observations, for j =
1, . . . , |H∗i |. The expectation E of the number of specified extensive-hypotheses in H∗i
after t observations is thus the expectation of the convolution of the random variables
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Vi1 , . . . , Vi|H∗
i
| . This is described by the following equation:
E(Vi1 , . . . , Vi|H∗
i
|) =
|H∗i |∑
j=1
E(Vij) (5.3)
=
|H∗i |∑
j=1
P (Vij = 1)
= |H∗i |P (Vi = 1) . (5.4)
In (5.3), the additivity of the expectation function allows splitting the complex expec-
tation on the left of (=) to a sum of expectations of single Vij events on the right side of
(=). The probability of the outcome P (Vij = 1) is identical for every fixed specified
extensive-hypothesis Hj ∈ H∗i (i.e., P (Vij = 1) = P (Vi = 1)), hence the right side of
the former equation can be simplified to (5.4).
To clarify that (5.4) depends on the parameter u, b, m and t we denote by the
function
EHi(u, b,m, t) = |H∗i |(1− pexc(u, b,m, i))t =
(
m
i
)
(b− 1)i(1− i
m
(1− m
u
)b−1)t ,
(5.5)
the mean number of specified extensive-hypotheses that remain in H∗i and thus in Hi
after t observations, for given Mix parameters u, b,m.
Formula (5.3) can be easily extended to cover the mean number of specified extensive-
hypotheses for any combination of classes including the consideration of all classes.
The mean number of specified extensive-hypotheses in H (i.e., in all classes) that re-
main after t observations for given Mix parameters u, b,m, is
EH(u, b,m, t) =
m∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(b− 1)i(1− i
m
(1− m
u
)b−1)t
≤ ((b− 1)e− tm (1−mu )b−1 + 1)m . (5.6)
Number of Observations and Threshold of Hypotheses The expectations EHi and
EH of the number of specified extensive-hypotheses after t observations can be easily
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reformulated to derive the number of observations, such that δ specified extensive-
hypotheses remains on average.
By a transformation of (5.5), where δ denotes the left side of the equation, we
obtain
tHi =
ln δ − ln (m
i
)− i ln (b− 1)
ln (1− i
m
(1− m
u
)b−1)
, for δ > 0 . (5.7)
This equation represents the number of observations, such that at most δ specified
extensive-hypotheses remain on average in the class Hi for i ≥ 1.
Similarly we reformulate (5.6) to obtain the number of observations tH, such that
there are on average fewer than δ specified extensive-hypotheses in H. Alice’s set of
friends HA always remains in H, therefore δ > 1 in the expression below.
tH ≤ m(ln (b− 1)− ln (δ
1/m − 1))
(1− m
N
)b−1
, for δ > 1 (5.8)
Note that modelling the quantity of the classes of specified extensive-hypotheses
also models that of the classes of the minimal-hitting-set computed by ExactHS. There-
fore the analyses in this section and the remaining sections also refer to the minimal-
hitting-sets (and hypotheses) computed by ExactHS. We keep use the terms extensive-
hypotheses and specified extensive-hypothesis, instead of the plain term hypothesis
solely to remain precise and consistent in their usage.
5.1.3.2 Partial Disclosure
The partial disclosure is the unambiguous identification of a subset HA
′ ⊆ HA of
Alice’s set of friends. The full disclosure introduced in Chapter 2 and analysed in the
previous chapters is a special case of the partial disclosure.
Probability to Identify k Particular Recipients. The probability to identify k par-
ticular friends HA
′ ⊆ HA after at most t observations is the probability that all hy-
potheses are disproved that do not contain all of these k = | HA ′| friends after at most
t observations. That probability specifies a discrete distribution with respect to t and
we refer to it by the term fid.
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To obtain fid, we determine the number of all specified extensive-hypotheses in
each class Hi, for i = 1, . . . ,m that have to be disproved to identify HA
′. Accord-
ing to (5.1), |H∗i | =
(
m
i
)
(b − 1)i, so that (m−k
i
)
(b − 1)i is the number of specified
extensive-hypotheses in Hi that contain all k recipients in HA
′. The number of speci-
fied extensive-hypotheses in Hi that have to be excluded to enable the identification of
HA
′ is therefore
exNoi(b,m, k, i) =
((m
i
)
−
(
m− k
i
))
(b− 1)i . (5.9)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume for any distinct specified extensive-hypotheses
Hu,Hv, that the probability of their disproof by a random observation is statisti-
cally independent. The probability to disprove a given specified extensive-hypothesis
H ∈ Hi is provided by pexc(u, b,mi) in (5.2). Applying this probability function to the
single specified extensive-hypotheses that have to be disproved to identify HA
′ results
in the function fid with respect to the parameters u, b,m, t and k = | HA ′|.
fid(u, b,m, k, t) =
m−k∏
i=1
(1− (1− pexc(u, b,m, i))t)((
m
i )−(m−ki ))(b−1)i (5.10)
m∏
i=m−k+1
(1− (1− pexc(u, b,m, i))t)(
m
i )(b−1)i
Probability to Identify at Least k Recipients. Based on the function fid of the last
section, we derive the probability distribution fidany that at least k of Alice’s friends
can be identified after at most t observations. In contrast to the previous section we
are not focusing on identifying particular recipients, but on the probability to identify
a certain number of recipients.
Let Y k be a random variable denoting the event that particular k friends in Alice’s
set of friends HA are identified. That is Y
k = 1 if the designated recipients are identi-
fied else Y k = 0 for the inverse case. To simplify the notation we will abbreviate the
probability P (Y k = 1) by the term P (Y k).
Let Y k1 , . . . , Y
k
(mk)
be
(
m
k
)
distinct random variables. Each of this variable represents
the event that distinct subsets of HA of cardinality k are identified. In order to compute
the probability that at least k of Alice’s friends can be identified, we have to determine
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the probability that any of these Y ki events, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
m
k
)} takes place. Thereby
it would be imprecise to simply sum up the probabilities P (Y ki ) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
m
k
)},
because the events Y ki are not statistically independent. We can solve this problem by
applying the inclusion-exclusion-formula below.
P (Y k1 ∨ . . . ∨ Y k(mk)) = P (Y
k
1 ) + . . .+ P (Y
k
(mk)
) (5.11)
− P (Y k1 , Y k2 )− . . .− P (Y k(mk)−1, Y
k
(mk)
)
+ . . .+ . . .
− . . .− . . .
...
Assume that {ai1 , ai2} and {aj1 , aj2} are those recipients who are identified by the
event Y ki respectively Y
k
j (for k = 2). The above expression P (Y
k
i , Y
k
j ) is the proba-
bility that all recipients of the joint set {ai1 , ai2 , aj1 , aj2} are identified1. Let us de-
note the joint event by the term Y k′ , where k′ = |{ai1 , ai2 , aj1 , aj2}| ≤ 2k, then
P (Y ki , Y
k
j ) = P (Y
k′) can be computed by (5.10). It is also obvious that this trans-
formation can even be applied to an arbitrary number of joints of events, i.e., we can
transform P (Y k1 , . . . , Y
k
z ) to P (Y
k′) for any z ≥ 1 accordingly.
The next formula is an elaborate formulation of (5.11) for the special case of k = 1.
It is the probability to identify at least one of Alice’s friends after at most t observa-
tions.
fidany (u, b,m, t, 1) =
m∑
s=1
(
(−1)s−1
(
m
s
)
fid(u, b,m, s, t)
)
(5.12)
The general probability for arbitrary values of k is shown below. It is the probability
to identify at least k ≤ m of any Alice’s friends after at most t observations.
fidany (u, b,m, t, k) =
(mk)∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(mk)−(i−1)∑
j1=1
· · ·
(mk)−(i−i)∑
ji=ji−1+1
fid(u, b,m, |
i⋃
z=1
Y kjz |, t) ,
1Note that the size of the joint set might be smaller that the sum of the single sets’ sizes.
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where
⋃i
z=1 Y
k
jz is the union of the set of recipients identified by each Y
k
jz .
Provided the distribution fidany (u, b,m, t, k), the probability that at least k recipi-
ents can be identified after exactly t observation, is
pidany (u, b,m, t, k) = fidany (u, b,m, t, k)− fidany (u, b,m, t− 1, k) .
Mean Number of Observations for Partial Disclosure We are now able to provide
the formula for the mean number of observations to unambiguously identify at least k
Alice’s friends which we call MTTD-k. This mean is expressed by:
Eidany (u, b,m, t, k) =
∞∑
t=1
t pidany (u, b,m, t, k) . (5.13)
Note that Eidany (u, b,m, t, 1) particularly determines the mean number of observations
to identify at least one of Alice’s friends (MTTD-1). This provides a more refined
measurement of the information theoretic limit of anonymity protection, based on the
least number of observations to reveal the first unambiguous piece of information about
Alice’s friends as opposed to that considered in Chapter 2.
5.1.3.3 Beyond Unambiguous Information
Provided the model for the evolution of the specified extensive-hypotheses in the pre-
vious sections, we are also able to analytically analyse the attacker’s information that
is beyond the condition for unambiguous identification of friends.
As a demonstration, we estimate the probability that a random minimal-hitting-set
computed by ExactHS contains a certain number of Alice’s friends. This determines
the probability to correctly guess any friend, as well as the closeness of the attacker’s
knowledge about Alice’s set of friends, for a given number of observations.
Figure 5.1 plots the number of observations to reduce the number of minimal-
hitting-sets in each class Hi, for i = 1, . . . ,m, to a value lower than δ by using (5.7).
The figure shows this for δ = 1 by the straight line (HS1) and for δ = 0.1 by the
dashed line (HS0.1), for the Mix parameters u = 400, b = 10, m = 10.
We can see that the number of those minimal-hitting-sets that contain less of Alice’s
friends, decreases faster than the number of those minimal-hitting-sets that contain
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Figure 5.1: Number of observation to reduce number of minimal-hitting-sets in Hi
below 1 (HS1) and 0.1 (HS0.1).
more of Alice’s friends. Thus after a particular number of observations t, the number
of hypotheses containing fewer than k Alice’s friends are negligible, since EHi(t) < δ
for i > (m − k). This is interesting, as the initial number of minimal-hitting-sets in a
class Hi is higher than that in a class Hj , for i < j, as shown by (5.1).
Figure 5.1 also illustrates that after about t = 40 observations, the attacker will
unlikely find a minimal hitting set containing fewer than 7 of Alice’s friends. Thus
any minimal-hitting-set computed by ExactHS contains with a high probability at least
70% of Alice’s friends. If we assume for simplicity that minimal-hitting-sets are ex-
cluded statistic independently from each other, then the probability to find at least k of
m Alice’s friends after at most t observations, is
fidk(N, b,m, k, t) ≥
m∏
i=m−k−1
(1− (1− pexc(u, b,m, i))t)|H∗i | .
5.1.4 Evaluation
We compare the mathematical mean number of observations for partial disclosure of
Alice’s friends in Section 5.1.3 with that for the full disclosure of Alice’s friends pro-
vided by our simulations in Chapter 2.2.4. The analytical analyses in this section are
provided for the uniform communication model. Therefore we compare them with
the simulation results from applying the HS-attack on observations that are randomly
generated from the Alice’s uniformly distributed traffic and the uniformly distributed
cover-traffic.
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Partial Disclosure Figure 5.2 compares the expected number of observations to dis-
close at least one recipient (MTTD-1) by using Eidany (u, b,m, t, 1) in (5.13) with the
simulation result for the mean number of observations for full disclosure (HS) and the
mean number of observation to reduce the set of specified extensive-hypotheses to a
size below 2 (HS2) computed by (5.8). The comparison is with respect to different pa-
rameters u, b, m. We can see that the partial disclosure (MTTD-1) appears noticeable
earlier than full disclosure (HS) and before the set of specified extensive-hypotheses is
reduced to a size below 2. This difference increases, the more observations are required
for full disclosure.
Figure 5.2: Number of observations for: full disclosure in simulation (HS), disclosure
of at least one recipient (MTTD-1), reduction of number of minimal-hitting-sets below
2 (HS2).
5.2 Vague Information
All analyses so far assume that the attacker has full knowledge about the senders and
recipients of the messages relayed in a Mix round. In contrast to that, this section
assumes that the attack’s information can be incomplete, or erroneous. We consider
an adaptation of the HS-attack (using ExactHS) that tolerates random occasional er-
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roneous observations that miss Alice’s friends. Those erroneous observations could
result from Alice occasionally contacting recipients other than her core friends1, or by
observations of a non deterministic Mix flushing strategy, like the pool-Mix in Sec-
tion 1.2.3. The goal of applying the HS-attack is to identify Alice’s core set of friends,
despite erroneous observations. Our attack and analytical analyses apply to various
Mix parameters and traffic distributions, as considered in Chapter 3.
Section 5.2.1 shows the application of ExactHS to uniquely identify Alice’s core set
of friends despite unknown erroneous observations. However, due to the randomness
of the number of erroneous observations, there is a certain probability that the re-
sult of ExactHS is biased. This bias is caused by an underestimate of the number of
erroneous observations2 when applying ExactHS. Therefore, Section 5.2.2 provides
analytical analyses to identify Mix configurations and probability bounds of erroneous
observations, such the probability of biases can be monotonically decreased towards 0
by increasing the number of observations.
5.2.1 Application of Hitting-Set Attack on Vague Observations
This section introduces a model of the erroneous observations that only assume the
knowledge of the probability of erroneous observations in Section 5.2.1.1. That model
can be used to model random deviances from normal user behaviour, or to model errors
induced by indeterministic Mix flushing strategies.
Section 5.2.1.2 shows that it is possible to apply ExactHS on the set of observations
and erroneous observations, such that the result of ExactHS can be evaluated to identify
Alice’s set of friends.
5.2.1.1 Vague and Erroneous Observations
Let us denote by O˜− an erroneous observation, that is a recipient set in a Mix round
that lacks Alice’s friends, so that O˜− ∩ HA = ∅. The set of all erroneous observations
collected by the attacker is denoted by O˜S− , that we call the erroneous observation
1We do not consider occasional contacts, or dummy traffic as friends of Alice and therefore do not
refer to them by the term friends.
2Some friends might be missed, or non-friends might be misidentified as friends.
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set. We refer to the union set of ordinary observations1 OS and erroneous observations
by the set O˜S = OS ∪ O˜S− that we call the vague observation set. The observations
in the vague observation set are called vague observations and they are denoted by O˜.
Thus each O˜ ∈ O˜S is either an ordinary observation, or an erroneous observation.
Error Model This section considers a simple probability model for the event of col-
lecting an erroneous observation. We assume for every vague observation, that the
probability that it is an erroneous observation is per and that this probability is statis-
tically independent from the past observations. Let t˜ = |O˜S| be the number of vague
observations collected by the attacker, the probability that there are  erroneous obser-
vations in O˜S is binomially distribution with the probability mass function
P (| O˜S− | = ) =
(
t˜

)
perp
t˜−
er (5.14)
and mean and variance
E(| O˜S− |) = t˜per ,
Var(| O˜S− |) = t˜per(1− per) .
Application of Error Model to Pool-Mix A pool-Mix collects b messages in every
round that are prepared similarly for relay like in the threshold Mix. In contrast to
threshold Mixes, pool-Mixes always keep a pool of η messages. If a batch of messages
arrives at the pool-Mix, then b out of the (b + η) messages are randomly chosen to be
flushed, so that there is a probability greater 0 that Alice’s message remains in the pool
instead of being flushed. Pool-Mixes thus represent an indeterministic Mix concept.
The probability that Alice’s message is flushed after exactly l rounds2, is
pf (l) =
b
b+ η
(
η
b+ η
)l
, l ≥ 0 . (5.15)
An attacker might additionally decrease the probability of an erroneous observation
as follow: Whenever Alice sends a message, the attacker can merge the pool-Mix
1That is an observation as defined in Section 2.1.2.1.
2l = 0 means that a message is flushed at the same round of its arrival.
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output in that round with those of l consecutive rounds (where Alice is not active),
to one vague observation. The probability that this vague observation is an erroneous
observation is
per = 1−
l∑
i=0
pf (i) .
The merged (l + 1) outputs corresponds to a vague observation of size b˜ = (l + 1)b
for a value of l ≥ 0 chosen by the attacker. Thus the drawback of reducing per for a
pool-Mix is the increase of the size of vague observations.
5.2.1.2 Applicability of ExactHS
We determine the value of m˜, such that the invocation of ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}
results in a set of all hitting-sets HS, where
⋂
H∈HSH = HA , if O˜S is sufficiently
large. We call this case the unique identification of HA despite erroneous observations,
or simply the unique identification of Alice’s friends by ExactHS.
In this section, we treat the number of erroneous observations as static during the
HS-attack to simplify explanations. However, the analyses provided here also apply to
the non static case, if the proportion of erroneous observations | O˜S− | in O˜S does not
exceed some ratio during the HS-attack1, as we will prove in Section 5.2.2.
Claim 11. Let O˜S be a vague observation set collected by the attacker. Given that
the number of erroneous observations  = | O˜S− | in O˜S is fixed, HA becomes the
subset of all hitting-sets of at most size m˜ = (m + ), if |O˜S| is sufficiently large.
This is equivalent to
⋂
H∈HSH ⊇ HA , where HS contains all hitting-sets computed
by invoking ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}.
Claim 12. Let O˜S be a vague observation set collected by the attacker and  = | O˜S− |
be the number of erroneous observations in it. Provided that no erroneous observation
in O˜S− is a singleton
2, the intersection of all hitting-set of at most size m˜ = (m + )
in O˜S does not contain any recipient r 6∈ HA . This is equivalent to
⋂
H∈HSH ⊆ HA ,
whereHS contains all hitting-sets computed by invoking ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}.
1The HS-attack repeats adding new vague observations to O˜S and applying ExactHS on O˜S, until it
succeeds.
2We exclude this case, since it is pathological.
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Claim 11 and Claim 12 show, that if the number of observations in O˜S = OS ∪
O˜S− can be sufficiently increased, while the number of erroneous observations remains
static, then
⋂
H∈HSH uniquely identifies Alice’s set of friends for a sufficient large O˜S.
This is forHS computed by ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {} and m˜ = m+ | O˜S− |, where
no erroneous observation in O˜S− is a singleton.
In the case that | O˜S− | is unknown, or non static, it can be estimated by (5.14).
Overestimating | O˜S− | and m˜ would just increase the number of vague observations
required for the identification of HA . Given a sufficiently large O˜S, if | O˜S− | and
m˜ is underestimated, then there will be no hitting-set of at most size m˜′ for some
m ≤ m˜′ < m˜ in O˜S, while the result of invoking ExactHS (O˜S, m˜′′,C), C = {}, for
m˜′ < m˜′′ < m˜ will be arbitrary.
Proof of Claim 11. Let H′ be a hitting-set in O˜S, then H′ must be a hitting set in OS
and in O˜S− .
1 Let the number of erroneous observations  be fixed in O˜S. Provided
this, We show that all hitting-set of at most size m˜ = m +  in O˜S will contain HA
with almost certainty, if the number of ordinary observations in O˜S can be increased.
LetH′ 6⊇ HA be a hitting-set of at most size m˜ in O˜S, then there is a probability q < 1
that H′ hits a random ordinary observation, as considered in Section 2.1.2.4. The
probability that H′ remains a hitting-set in OS (and thus also in O˜S) after collecting x
additional observations is qx and is negligible even for moderate value of x.
Consequently, by collecting sufficiently many vague observations when invoking
ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}, we obtain ⋂H∈HSH ⊇ HA with almost certainty, pro-
vided that  is fixed.
Proof of Claim 12. It is sufficient to prove that the intersection of all hitting-sets H of
at most size m˜ = (m + ), where H ⊇ HA cannot contain a recipient r 6∈ HA .
This equivalently proves
⋂
H∈HS:H⊇ HA H ⊆ HA , where HS result from invoking
ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C).
Using Claim 2 in Section 2.2.2.1, a set H is a hitting-set in O˜S if and only if
HN = H\ HA is a hitting-set in O˜S\ O˜S[ HA ] = O˜S− . The latter equality holds, since
erroneous observations do not contain any Alice’s friends by definition. Therefore,
let  = | O˜S− | and O˜S− = { O˜− 1, . . . , O˜− }, then every set HN = {r1, . . . , r}, for
ri ∈ O˜− i, i = 1, . . . ,  is a hitting-set of at most size  in O˜S− and everyH = HA ∪HN
1Note that if new observations are collected by the attacker, then O˜S is extended by them.
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is a hitting-set of at most size m˜ in O˜S. In the non-pathological case, every erroneous
observation contains at least two recipients, therefore for every recipient ri ∈ HN ,
there is a recipient r′i 6= ri, where ri, r′i ∈ O˜− i, so that for every i = 1, . . . , , H′N =
{r1, . . . , ri−1, r′i, ri+1, . . . , r} is another hitting-set in O˜S− . Therefore, the intersection
of all hitting-sets H′N in O˜S− , for i = 1, . . . , , results in an empty set. Consequently,
the intersection of all hitting-sets H = HA ∪ H′N in O˜S, for i = 1, . . . , , is HA .
This implies that
⋂
H∈HSH ⊆ HA , where HS contains all hitting-sets computed by
invoking ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}.
We show that m˜ = (m + | O˜S− |) is even the least value for ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C),
C = {}, such that ⋂H∈HSH ⊆ HA for every vague observation set, by constructing a
vague observation set O˜S = OS∪ O˜S− , where all hitting-sets are of at least size m˜. Let
every erroneous observation O˜ ∈ O˜S− be disjoint to any other observation O˜′ ∈ O˜S,
that is O˜∩ O˜′ = ∅ for O˜ 6= O˜′, then the size of the smallest minimal-hitting-sets in O˜S−
is | O˜S− |. Let HA be the unique minimum-hitting-set in OS, then m˜ = (m + | O˜S− |)
is the size of the smallest minimal-hitting-sets in O˜S and
⋂
H∈HSH = HA . This is
illustrated in Example 5.2.1.
Example 5.2.1 (Unique Identification Despite Errors). This example shows a vague
observations set O˜S with  = | O˜S− | erroneous observations, where the size of the
smallest minimal-hitting-sets in O˜S is m˜ = (m + ) and
⋂
H∈HSH = HA , where HS
results from invoking ExactHS (O˜S, m˜,C), C = {}.
We consider a batch size of b = 2, Alice’s set of friends HA = {1, 2} and an
observations set O˜S = OS ∪ O˜S− that contains  = 2 erroneous observations that are
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
1
3
O˜1
2
4
O˜2
1
5
O˜3
2
6
O˜4
7
8
O˜5
9
10
O˜6
OS O˜S−
Figure 5.3: Unique identification despite erroneous observations.
In Figure 5.3, Alice’s set of friends {1, 2} is the unique minimum-hitting-set in OS.
Every erroneous observation O˜5, O˜6 is disjoint to all other vague observation in O˜S.
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Therefore, every set {r5, r6}, where r5 ∈ O˜5 and r6 ∈ O˜6 is a smallest minimal-hitting-
set in O˜S− and every {1, 2} ∪ {r5, r6} is a smallest minimal-hitting-set in O˜S. These
sets are enlisted in
HS = {{1, 2, 7, 9}, {1, 2, 7, 10}, {1, 2, 8, 9}, {1, 2, 8, 10}} .
The size of all smallest minimal-hitting-sets in O˜S are m˜ = (m+ ), which is 2 + 2
and
⋂
H∈HSH = {1, 2}, where HS results from invoking ExactHS (O˜S, 4,C), C = {}.
This uniquely identifies Alice’s set of friends, provided  is known.
5.2.2 Analytical Analyses of Conditions for Unique Identification
This section considers the HS-attack for the case that the exact number of erroneous
observations is unknown, but can be estimated by the attacker’s knowledge of the value
of per . We analytically determine Mix configurations and ranges of probabilities per ,
such that Alice’s set of friends can be uniquely identified by the HS-attack with a prob-
ability that increases monotonically with the number of vague observations |O˜S|. This
probability approaches 1 for |O˜S| → ∞.
Section 5.2.2.1 identifies properties of ordinary observations, such that Alice’s sets
of friends can be uniquely identified, despite a given maximal number of erroneous
observations.
Section 5.2.2.2 relates those properties of ordinary observations to the probability
of erroneous observations to mathematically derive Mix configurations and error prob-
abilities, such that Alice’s set of friends can be uniquely identified by ExactHS with a
probability that monotonically increases with respect to |O˜S|.
5.2.2.1 Properties of Ordinary Observations for Unique Identification
We provide a “sufficient condition” for ordinary observations, that if fulfilled allows
the unique identification of all Alice’s friends by ExactHS despite a bounded number
of erroneous observations. It is aimed to aid analytical analyses and identification of
Mix configurations, where ExactHS can uniquely identify Alice’s friends.
However, this sufficient condition is too complex for mathematical analyses. There-
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fore, we introduce in Claim 13 the necessary condition of that sufficient condition. The
condition provided by Claim 13 will be analysed instead of the sufficient condition to
identify Mix configurations that allow unique identifications by ExactHS in the re-
maining of Section 5.2.2.2.
Sufficient Condition Let O˜S = OS ∪ O˜S− be the vague observations collected by
the attacker and  = | O˜S− |. Observe that every hitting-set in O˜S must be a hitting-set
inOS, which particularly holds for hitting-sets of at most size m˜ = m+. Therefore, if
all (minimal-)hitting-sets1 of at most size m˜ in the ordinary observation set OS contain
HA , then this must be the case for all hitting-sets of at most size m˜ in O˜S. This
condition is thus a sufficient condition for the unique identification of Alice’s set of
friends HA .
It is not a necessary condition, as the identifiability of HA in O˜S does not re-
quire every (minimal-) hitting-set of at most size m˜ in OS to be a superset of HA ,
as demonstrated by Example 5.2.1. That example shows the unique identification of
HA = {1, 2} in a set O˜S, where m = 2,  = 2, m˜ = 4, whereas the minimal-hitting-
sets of at most size m˜ in OS are {1, 2}, {1, 4, 6}, {2, 3, 5}, {3, 4, 5, 6}.
Relaxation of Sufficient Condition The above sufficient condition is hard to anal-
yse, as it is equivalent to the unique-minimum-hitting-set problem for the special case
of no erroneous observations, that is  = 0.
We therefore consider a necessary condition of that sufficient condition instead,
that is the (2 + )×-exclusivity of all Alice’s friends in Claim 13. Note that (2 + )×-
exclusivity closely models the unique identification of Alice’s set of friends for the
case of no erroneous observations  = 0, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006].
Claim 13. If there is no (minimal-) hitting-set H of at most size m˜′ = (m + ′) in OS
(for integers ′ ≥ 0), where H 6⊇ HA , then every Alice’s friend must be (2 + ′)×-
exclusive in OS.
Proof of Claim 13. The special case of ′ = 0 is known as 2×-exclusivity and was
already proven by Kesdogan et al. [2006]. We provide a straight forward proof for
integers ′ > 0 below, which is a proof by contradiction.
1Recall that every hitting-set is a superset of a minimal-hitting-set, so that it is sufficient to consider
minimal-hitting-sets.
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Assume that there is no hitting-set H 6⊇ HA of at most size m˜′ = (m + ′) in OS,
although there is an Alice’s friend a ∈ HA that is not at least (2 + ′)×-exclusive.
Note that HA = {a1, . . . , am} is a hitting-set of size m in OS. Let without loss of
generality a = a1, then {a2, . . . , am} hits all observations in OS except those ob-
servations O1, . . . ,Ol that contains a exclusively, where l ≤ (1 + ′). Therefore,
H′ = {a2, . . . , am} ∪ {n1, . . . , nl}, for ni ∈ Oi \ HA , i = 1, . . . , l would be a hitting-
set of size (m − 1 + l) ≤ m˜′ in OS, where H′ 6⊇ HA . This is a contradiction to the
initial assumption and thus proves that (2 + ′)×-exclusivity of all Alice’s friends is a
necessary condition, so that every hitting-set of at most size m˜′ in OS is a superset of
HA .
5.2.2.2 Probability Bound of Erroneous Observations for Unique Identification
We provide a formula based on Claim 13 that estimates for every given Mix configu-
ration, pairs (t, ′) of mean number of ordinary observations and maximal number of
acceptable erroneous observations such that HA can be identified by ExactHS.
This formula is related to the probability of erroneous observations per to determine
the bound of per , such that the probability of at most ′ erroneous observations mono-
tonically increases with respect to t and the number of vague observations t˜ = t+ ′.
Mean Number of Ordinary Observations and Number of Acceptable Errors
Based on Claim 13, we provide an estimate (5.16) of the mean number of ordinary
observations E(T(2+′)×e), such that all Alice’s friends are (2 + ′)×-exclusive. It esti-
mates for every given Mix configuration with parameters (u, b,m) and the least prob-
ability p = mina∈ HA PA(a) of Alice’s communication, pairs (t, 
′) of mean number of
ordinary observations and maximal number of erroneous observations, such that HA
can be identified by ExactHS. This estimate is due to Claim 5 and is as follow:
E(T(2+′)×e) ≈
(
1
p
(lnm+ γ) +
1
p
ln lnm
)(
u− (m− 1)
u
)1−b
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t2
+ ′
(
1
p
ln lnm
)(
u− (m− 1)
u
)1−b
︸ ︷︷ ︸
t1
, (5.16)
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where t2 and t1 are constants and t = t2 + ′t1 is the estimate of E(T(2+′)×e), so that
(5.16) determines pairs of (t, ′). Whenever we refer to t or ′ in this section, we always
mean t or ′ determined by (5.16), so that a large value of t implies a corresponding
large value of ′.
Note that t2 estimates the mean number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s
set of friends, provided no erroneous observations, in (5.16). Thus, each erroneous
observation would require t1 additional observations for the unique identification by
the HS-attack. It can be seen that the value of t1 is just a logarithmic fraction of the
value of t2.
Probability of Erroneous Observations The mean number of ordinary observa-
tions that is needed to identify Alice’s friends, if at most ′ of the attacker’s vague
observations are erroneous is estimated by the number t of ordinary observations for
(2 + ′)-exclusivity. Provided such a t and ′, we determine the probability of at most
′ erroneous observations with respect to the number of vague observations t˜ = t+ ′.
This is deployed to derive the bound per of the probability of erroneous observations
in (5.17). It shows that increasing the number t˜ of vague observations monotonically
increases the probability of identifying Alice’s set of friends by ExactHS, if the prob-
ability of erroneous observations is below per .
Claim 14. Let O˜S = OS ∪ O˜S− denote a set of vague observations and  = | O˜S− |
the number of erroneous observations. Let per be the probability that a random vague
observation is an erroneous observation.
The sufficient and necessary condition, such that all Alice’s friends are (2 + )×-
exclusive in OS with a monotonically increasing probability approaching 1 for
|O˜S| → ∞, is
per <
1
(1
p
ln lnm)
(
u−(m−1)
u
)1−b
+ 1
, (5.17)
where p = mina∈ HA PA(a).
Proof of Claim 14. Let t˜ denote the number of vague observations, such that all Alice’s
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friends are (2 + ′)×-exclusive, while there are ′ erroneous observations. Therefore,
t˜ = t+ ′
= t2 + 
′(t1 + 1)
and whenever we refer to t˜ in this proof, we always mean a t˜ that result from this
equation.
The probability (5.14) that there are ′ erroneous observations, given t˜ vague obser-
vations and the error probability per , specifies a binomial distribution. For large values
of t˜, that distribution can be closely approximated by the normal distribution N(µ, σ2)
with the probability density and cumulative distribution function
f(′) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e
1
2
( 
′−µ
σ
)2
F (′) =
1√
2pi
∫ ′−µ
σ
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx , (5.18)
where µ = t˜per and σ2 = t˜per(1− per)) are the same mean and variance as in (5.14).
We derive the bound for per , such that increasing t˜ = t+′ increases the probability
F (′) that there are at most ′ erroneous observations1 with F (′) → 1 for t˜ → ∞,
while all Alice’s friends are (2 + ′)×-exclusive.
Observe that the value of F (′) is monotonically increasing and approaches 1 if the
upper limit of the integral in (5.18),
′ − µ
σ
=
t˜−t2
t1+1
− t˜per√
t˜
√
per(1− per))
=
√
t˜( 1
t1+1
− per)√
per(1− per)
−
t2
t1+1√
t˜
√
per(1− per))
(5.19)
is monotonically increasing and approaches infinity for t˜→∞. This is only the case,
if the factor ( 1
t1+1
−per) in the numerator of the expression left of (−) is positive. That
1Recall that t˜ and ′ are interlaced, so that increasing t˜ increases ′ accordingly and vice versa.
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is if the following inequality is fulfilled:
per <
1
t1 + 1
=
1
(1
p
ln lnm)
(
u−(m−1)
u
)1−b
+ 1
(t1 replaced as in (5.16)) . (5.17)
Inequality (5.17) determines the bound for per , such that F (′) is monotonically in-
creasing with respect to t˜, such that F (′)→ 1 for t˜→∞.
This inequality is thus a sufficient condition, such that the probability that all Al-
ice’s friends are (2 + )×-exclusive is monotonically increasing and approaches 1 for
|O˜S| → ∞, where O˜S = OS ∪ O˜S− ,  = | O˜S− |. It is even a necessary condition for
that, because per = 1t1+1 would imply
′−µ
σ
→ 0 and thus F (′)→ 1
2
, for t˜→∞.
5.2.3 Evaluation
We mathematically evaluate the limit of the probability that a random vague obser-
vation is an erroneous observation, such that Alice’s set of friends can be uniquely
identified by the HS-attack in Section 5.2.1.2 with a high probability. This limit is
determined by (5.17). Provided that the real error probability is below that limit, the
attacker can control the probability to succeed the HS-attack estimated by (5.18), by
increasing the number of vague observations.
The limit of the probability of erroneous observations is evaluated with respect
to the same Mix parameters (u, b,m) and uniformly distributed cover-traffic and Zipf
distributed Alice’s traffic, as considered in Section 2.2.4. That is the recipients of the
cover-traffic are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the set of all recipients R. Al-
ice’s is assumed to contact her friends in HA according to the Zipf(m,α) distribution.
Limit of Probability of Erroneous Observations for Unique Identification
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 draw on the y-axis the limit of the probability of erroneous
observations that can be tolerated by ExactHS. We provide this by using (5.17), for
various Mix parameters u, b,m and Zipf weight α of Alice’s traffic distribution.
Comparing the graphs in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 with that of (Figure 2.6, Fig-
ure 2.8) and (Figure 2.7, Figure 2.9) in Section 2.2.4.2 reveals the tendency that chang-
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ing parameters that strongly increases the number of observations required by the
HS-attack strongly decreases the probability of erroneous observations tolerable to the
HS-attack. Depending on the Mix configurations, the tolerable erroneous observations
could cover 0.1% – 28% of the vague observations collect by the attacker, as illustrated
in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Limit of probability of erroneous observations for full disclosure.
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Figure 5.5: Limit of probability of erroneous observations for full disclosure.
5.3 Summary
The previous chapters analysed the HS-attack for the case that the attacker can collect
sufficiently many observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends and that these
observations are exact. In this chapter we analysed the HS-attack under the condition
that one of these two assumptions is not fulfilled.
Section 5.1 considered the case that the attacker does not collect sufficiently many
observations for a unique identification of Alice’s set of friends. It provided a mathe-
matical model for the evolution of the minimal-hitting-sets computed by ExactHS on
the set of observations available to the attacker. This model solely refers to cases,
where Alice traffic and the cover-traffic are uniformly distributed. Deploying this
model allows estimating the mean number of observations to uniquely identify sub-
sets of Alice’s set of friends, as shown in Section 5.1.3.2.
We also suggested analyses for the case that the number of observations avail-
able to the attacker is even too low for a unique identification of any of Alice’s friend
in Section 5.1.3.3. Our model of the evolution of the minimal-hitting-sets computed
by ExactHS shows that the class of minimal-hitting-sets that contain less of Alice’s
friends, diminishes faster than those that contain more of Alice’s friends. This allows
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estimating the number of observations, such that the minimal-hitting-sets computed by
ExactHS contain a high number of Alice’s friends. That is ExactHS provides several
hypotheses for Alice’s set of friends, if it cannot find a unique solution. Applying the
analysis in Section 5.1.3.3 reveals the probability that the attacker correctly identifies
a certain number of Alice’s friend by choosing one of those hypotheses.
Section 5.2 studied the case that Alice has a static set of friends, but the attack
occasionally collects erroneous observations that miss her friends. The term vague
observation comprises erroneous and non-erroneous observations. Section 5.2.1 con-
tributed an adaptation of the HS-attack to identify Alice’s set of friends HA , despite
erroneous observations. That attack uniquely identifies HA with a certain probability
that is dependent on the number of observations, the fraction of erroneous observation,
and the Mix parameters and traffic distributions.
Provided this concrete adaptation of the HS-attack, we contributed analytical anal-
yses of the mentioned dependencies, such that HA can be uniquely identified by the
HS-attack with a high probability. These analyses apply to various Mix parameters
and arbitrary distributions of Alice’s traffic. Section 5.2.2.2 derived the limit of the
probability of an erroneous observation in each round, such that the probability that
HA is uniquely identified by the HS-attack approaches 1 for increasing number of
vague observations occurred. Equation (5.16) shows that each erroneous observation
just requires the HS-attack to collect a constant number of additional observations to
uniquely identify HA . This additional number of observations is just a logarithmical
fraction of the number of observations required to uniquely identify HA provided no
erroneous observations.
The case that the probability of erroneous observations is too high for a unique
identification of HA has not been considered yet. This can be considered as a case,
where ExactHS provides several hypotheses, each containing some subsets of HA . We
might obtain those analyses by combining the analyses induced by Section 5.1 and by
Section 5.2. This is left for future works.
172
Chapter 6
Related Works
Traffic analyses aim at modelling the information leakage of an anonymity system and
its accumulation over time as a means to measure the anonymity protection provided
by a system.
The problem of traffic analysis for anonymous communication was presented by
Raymond [2001]. In the meantime, a broad range of traffic analysis approaches have
been provided by the literature, cf. Danezis [2004]; Kesdogan [2006]; Murdoch and
Danezis [2005]; Serjantov [2004]; Troncoso [2011]; Wang et al. [2007]; Wright et al.
[2002], that refer to distinct anonymity systems and attacker models. However, this
thesis is concerned with the fundamental limit of anonymity protection against a strong
attacker, in open environments. Therefore, we only focus on traffic analyses that apply
to the Chaum Mix in open environments, with respect to a strong attacker. These ap-
proaches deploy the immanent information leakage of the Mix concept, the anonymity
sets and recipient sets, accumulated over several rounds. They mainly consider a pas-
sive attacker, as such an attacker is sufficient to gain information about a user’s profile,
while being hard to detect, or to thwart1. These attacks thus represent a fundamental
threat for the Mix concept in open environments.
We distinguish traffic analyses on the Chaum Mix between combinatorial and
heuristic analyses. Combinatorial analyses are basically concerned with the disclo-
sure of exact information about a user’s set of friends that is consistent to the obser-
vations of the anonymity system. They can determine all potential set of friends of a
1Because these attacks just make use of information immanently available to all users.
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user from the attacker’s observations, as well as the least number of observations to
unambiguously identify the friends, as outlined in Section 2.
In contrast to that, heuristic analyses are concerned with providing estimates of a
targeted user’s set of friends, or of its profile. A profile assigns to every observed recip-
ient the probability that it receives a message from the targeted user. Heuristic analyses
usually deploy statistical properties of the communication traffic and relax constraints
that would be necessary to infer exact information about a user’s communication. This
can provide computational efficient and easily applicable attacks. Statistical proper-
ties usually become significant, if the number of accumulated observations is large.
However, a small number of observations might lead to distorted statistics and less
predictive biases, so that heuristic approaches are less suitable to estimate the hard
limit of anonymity protection. Section 3.1.3 particularly shows for the SDA that de-
ploying statistics does not generally lead to a number of observations to guess Alice’s
profile that is lower than, or close to that to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends by
the HS-attack.
6.1 Combinatorial Analyses
Combinatorial analyses pick up the fact that users tend to have a persistent set of
friends. How long the set of friends is persistent with respect to the number of commu-
nication rounds in an anonymity system is up to the individual users and might range
from one round to all observed rounds.
Given that a user’s set of friends is persistent for a sufficient number of rounds,
combinatorial approaches can exactly identify that user’s friends from observations
collected during all the rounds of the anonymity system. This applies to the case of
no erroneous observations and non-pathological communication traffic1. The number
of observations required by the combinatorial approaches for that exact identification
determines when an anonymity system fails to protect its users and the class of user,
whose friends can be exactly identified2.
1Cases, where the same recipients are contacted all the time and thus appear in every observation
are considered pathological, as they are not typical communication traffic.
2Those are all users, whose set of friends are persistent for a number of rounds that is not less than
the number of observations required to identify those friends.
174
Attacks based on combinatorial analyses are powerful attacks, as they do not rely
on any special assumptions about traffic distributions and traffic patterns, apart from
the fact that the attacked user’s set of friends remains persistent during the attack1.
They are unbiased under this condition. This thesis follows the line of these analyses
and extends them.
6.1.1 Attacks for Unique Identification
6.1.1.1 Intersection Attack
The Intersection attack introduced by Berthold and Langos [2003] applies to the spe-
cial case of m = 1. That is a targeted user who we call Alice repeatedly contacts the
same recipient, as in case of sending a long stream of data packets to a single recipi-
ent. In that case, whenever Alice sends a message through the anonymity system, the
set of active recipients at that round always contains Alice’s recipient. The attacker
therefore computes the intersection of all sets of active recipients, where Alice is an
active sender, that is referred to by the term observation in Section 2.1.2.1. As users
are only active in an open environment2, if they have to send, or receive messages, the
intersection of sufficiently many observations, will result in a singleton that uniquely
identifies Alice’s recipient. This combinatorial analysis of the set of active senders
and recipients at several rounds thus uncovers the relationship-anonymity of Alice and
exactly identifies her recipient.
6.1.1.2 Disclosure Attack
The Disclosure attack introduced by Kesdogan et al. [2003]; Agrawal et al. [2003a,b]
was the first approach that generalised the idea of the intersection attack to users with
a persistent set of friends of any size m ∈ N. Similar to the intersection attack, the
attacker targets a user Alice, to uncover her relationship-anonymity, that is her set of
friends. Whenever Alice sends a message, the active set of recipients at the same round,
i.e., the observation, will contain at least one of her friends.
The Disclosure attack consists of two phases, the learning phase and the excluding
1This is motivated by the observation that humans tend to have persistent contacts.
2This is in contrast to the closed environment, where all users are always active.
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phase, in which combinatorial analyses are applied to observations collected by the
attack. These phases are described next.
Learning phase: The attacker collects m mutually disjoint observations that is called
the basis set, so that each of theses observations contains exactly one Alice’s
friend.
Excluding phase: The attacker repeats collecting a new observation to exclude those
recipients in the basis set that are non-friends, until the basis set entirely consists
of singletons1. Recipients in a basis set can be excluded, whenever the attacker
finds a new observation that intersects exactly one set in the basis set. In that
case, he replaces the set in the basis set that is intersected by the new observation,
by the intersection of these two sets, thus resulting in an update of the basis set.
The authors derived mathematical estimates of the mean number of observations
required by the Disclosure attack to uniquely identify all of Alice’s friends, for the case
that Alice contacts her friends according to a uniform distribution, cf. Agrawal et al.
[2003a,b].
The combinatorial analyses deployed by the Disclosure attack are not specifically
restricted to the Chaum Mix, but applies to all anonymity systems that provide sender
and recipient anonymity sets. However the Disclosure attack requires solving an NP-
complete problem, cf. Agrawal et al. [2003a].
6.1.1.3 Hitting-Set Attack
The Hitting-Set attack (HS-attack) proposed by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] en-
ables disclosing the relationship-anonymity of a targeted user Alice, who has a persis-
tent set of friends of any size m ∈ N. This attack is applicable to all systems where
the Disclosure attack is applicable. In contrast to the Disclosure attack, the HS-attack
provably requires the least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s friends
as proved by Kesdogan et al. [2006]. It thus determines a hard limit for the anonymity
protection provided by the considered anonymity system.
The idea of the HS-attack is based on the fact that every set of active recipients,
where Alice is an active sender (i.e., observation), must contain at least one of Alice’s
1In that case, each singleton represents one of Alice’s friends.
176
friends. Consequently, the set of Alice’s friends must hit every observation, implying
that Alice’s set of friends must be a hitting-set. If the attacker collects sufficiently
many observations, then Alice’s set of friends becomes a unique minimum-hitting-set.
The HS-attack initially computes all
(
u
m
)
possible sets ofm recipients and excludes
all those sets that do not hit all collected observations. The attack repeats this exclusion
of possible sets of friends and collection of new observations until only one possible set
of friends remains. In that case, this set of friends is a unique minimum-hitting-set with
respect the observations collected by the attacker and uniquely identifies Alice’s set of
friends. Computing minimum-hitting-sets is known to be an NP-complete problem,
according to Garey and Johnson [1990].
In retrospect, the Intersection respectively Disclosure attack also compute the unique
minimum-hitting-set for the special case of m = 1, respectively for the general case of
m ∈ N. The Intersection attack is thus equivalent to the HS-attack for m = 1. How-
ever, the Disclosure attack disregards all observations that do not provide m mutually
disjoint sets in the learning-phase and all observations that are not disjoint to (m− 1)
sets in the basis set of the excluding-phase. These are sufficient, but not necessary
conditions to identify the unique minimum-hitting-set. In opposite to that, the identi-
fication of the unique minimum-hitting-set by the HS-attack is based on a necessary
and sufficient condition, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006], that exploits all observations and
thus requires fewer observations than the Disclosure attack. Consider, for example, for
m = 2 and HA = {1, 2} the following observation set:
OS = {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 7}, {2, 3, 6}} .
The unique minimum-hitting-set in OS is HA , although there are no two mutually
disjoint sets in OS, as required by the learning-phase of the Disclosure attack. Since
the HS-attack was proven to require the least number of observations for the unique
identification of friends by Kesdogan et al. [2006], this example sufficiently proves that
the Disclosure attack usually requires more than that least number of observations.
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6.1.2 Least Number of Observations for Unique Identification
6.1.2.1 Unicity-Distance
An abstract analysis of the least number of observations that are theoretically necessary
to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends, based on a probabilistic model of observa-
tions and information was provided by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006]. That analysis
applies Shannon’s unicity-distance, cf. Shannon [1949], to the traffic analysis problem.
By applying the Entropy functions of Shannon [1949] to this probabilistic model,
the approach of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006] measures the theoretical reduction of
uncertainty about Alice’s set of friends provided by each observation. Following the
idea of Shannon’s unicity-distance, cf. Shannon [1949], the least number of observa-
tions, such that the uncertainty about Alice’s set of friends is 0, provides a theoretical
lower bound for the number of observations required to uniquely identify Alice’s set
of friends, cf. Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006].
This lower bound is solely derived for the case that Alice’s traffic and the cover-
traffic are uniformly distributed. Another limitation is that it makes no suggestion
whether there is an algorithm that can identify Alice’s set of friends with a number of
observations that is close to that theoretical lower bound. Thus it remains an abstract
measure. Indeed, the HS-attack that provably requires the least number of observations
to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006], requires notice-
ably more observations than this purely theoretical lower bound, as shown by Pham
[2006, p. 89].
6.1.2.2 2×-Exclusivity
The 2×-exclusivity of all Alice’s friends, proposed by Kesdogan et al. [2006] and dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.2.2 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the unique
identification of Alice’s set of friends. Providing an exact formula for the mean number
of observations, such that all Alice’s friends are 2×-exclusive determines a provable
lower bound for the least number of observations required by the HS-attack to uniquely
identify Alice’s set of friends Kesdogan et al. [2006]. This bound was mathematically
derived, solely for the case that Alice’s traffic and the cover-traffic are uniformly dis-
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tributed. It was introduced by Kesdogan et al. [2006].1
The bound derived from the 2×-exclusivity realistically measures the least num-
ber of observations for the unique identification of Alice’s set of friends, as the 2×-
exclusivity condition is concrete and verifiable for any set of collected observations.
Indeed evaluations of the application of the HS-attack on simulated observations, cf.
Kesdogan et al. [2006], confirm that this bound is rather close to the real mean number
of observations required by the HS-attack, as opposed to the abstract unicity-distance
of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006] for traffic analysis, cf. Pham [2006, p. 89].
6.2 Heuristic Analyses
Heuristic analyses are concerned with guessing Alice’s friends with a probability that
is higher than a purely random guess. This is orthogonal to combinatorial analyses
that investigate the (least) number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of
friends to determine a hard limit of anonymity protection provided by a system.
We distinguish between approaches, where a guess specifies a possible set of Al-
ice’s friends, i.e., a probable unique minimum-hitting-set, and those where it specifies
a possible profile of Alice. In Alice’s profile, every friend is assigned to the probability
that Alice contacts that friend, while the probability assigned to all non-friends is 0.
Given a possible profile of Alice, her possible set of friends can be specified by the set
of all recipients in that profile who are assigned to a probability higher than 0. Note that
this resulting set might be larger than the number of Alice’s friends and might consist
of all recipients in the anonymity system in the worst case. A profile thus subsumes
the definition of a set of possible Alice’s friends. However, this distinction emphasises
that guessing the unique minimum-hitting-set is central to the first approach, but not
assigning probabilities to observed recipients, as opposed to the second approach.
Heuristic approaches relax the problem of identifying Alice’s friends from exactly
to with some probabilities. They deploy statistical properties of the traffic and heuris-
tics for the estimate of the possible friends to reduce the complexity of that estimate.
Guesses provided by these approaches thus carry some bias that can be complexly in-
terleaved and thus difficult to estimate. However, it is crucial to estimate these biases
1Note Section 3.1.2 provides a closed formula for this bound that applies to arbitrary non-uniform
distributions.
179
6. RELATED WORKS
to precisely measure the anonymity provided by a system, such that the measurement
is meaningful.
6.2.1 Likely Set of Friends
6.2.1.1 Statistical-Hitting-Set Attack
Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] suggested a statistical version of the HS-attack, the
Statistical-Hitting-Set (SHS) attack that provides a low computation complexity at the
cost of possibly biased results. The idea of the SHS-attack Kesdogan and Pimenidis
[2004] is to avoid the evaluation of all possible sets of m recipients to find a unique
minimum-hitting-set, by just evaluating a fixed number of sets that are assumed to be
most likely.
The basic assumption of the SHS-attack is that the recipients who are most fre-
quently observed in the observation set aggregated by the attacker, are also most likely
to be Alice’s friends. Therefore, the SHS-attack prefers evaluating sets of those re-
cipients who appear most frequently in the observations collected by the attacker and
have not been evaluated. By evaluating the fixed number of sets of m recipients, the
attack either finds a probable unique minimum-hitting-set1, or none, or several hitting-
sets of size m. The attack is terminated in the first case by assuming that the probable
unique-minimum-hitting-set is Alice’s set of friends, while it is repeated with addi-
tional observations in the latter cases2.
As the SHS-attack does not evaluate all sets of m recipients, it might never find
any probable unique minimum-hitting-set, or only one that is not Alice’s set of friends.
These biases arise, if the number of collected observations is too small, or if there are
some recipients who are more frequently contacted than some of Alice’s friends. This
could be due to statistical variances, or due to Alice’s traffic and cover-traffic that are
non-uniformly distributed.
1The attacker cannot be sure that it is a unique-minimum-hitting-set, as he does not consider all sets
of m recipients.
2The attacker can exit this loop by stopping the attack.
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6.2.1.2 Variants of Statistical-Hitting-Set Attack
Two further variants of the SHS-attack have been suggested by Kesdogan et al. [2009],
that are based on the same basic assumption.
The first attack (A1) assumes by collecting a sufficient large number of observa-
tions that the smallest hitting-set H that consists of the |H| most frequently contacted
recipients in those observations is Alice’s set of friends. This attack can be considered
as a special case of the SHS-attack, where only one probable set of Alice’s friends
is evaluated. For the case of uniform communication of Alice and the other senders,
the paper proposes a formula for the sufficient number of observations to find Alice’s
recipients being the m most frequently contacted recipients with a high probability.
The second attack (A2) is an extension of the first attack, which additionally eval-
uates, whether the hitting-set H of most frequent recipients in the collected observa-
tions is a probable unique minimum-hitting-set. In this evaluation, H is identified as
a unique minimum-hitting-set, if the cumulative frequency of the recipients of any set
that result from replacing a single recipient in H is lower than the number of collected
observations. However this evaluation of an attack would fail, for example, if H is a
unique minimum-hitting-set, but the cumulative frequency of a proper subset of H is
higher than the number of collected observations1. Applying this attack, thus requires
additional constraints on the statistical properties of the frequencies of the recipients,
cf. Kesdogan et al. [2009]. The authors also provide a formula for the number of ob-
servations required by the attack to correctly identify Alice’s set of friends with a high
probability. This formula solely applies to the case that Alice’s traffic and the cover-
traffic are uniformly distributed and comply with the previously mentioned constraints.
The conditions2 specified by these variants of the SHS-attacks also apply to the
SHS-attack and show that it is under those particular conditions possible to efficiently
identify Alice’s set of friends with a high probability, if the required number of obser-
vations is of no concern. As illustrated by Table 6.1, the average number of observa-
tions required by the attacks A1 and A2 to identify Alice’s set of friends in 99% of
the cases is significantly higher than that required by the HS-attack to exactly identify
1This is possible, as Alice’s friends are also contacted by senders other than Alice, which increases
the corresponding frequencies.
2Those are the statistical properties of the frequencies of the recipients and the number of observa-
tions that should be collected for the attack.
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u b m HS A1 A2
20000 50 20 119 66468 580094
50000 50 20 113 66259 1449190
Table 6.1: Mean number of observations for identification of Alice’s set of friends with
99% chance by attack (A1), (A2), versus unique identification by HS-attack (HS).
Alice’s set of friends, although all conditions required by A1 and A2 are fulfilled.
Due to relying on the basic assumption, the HS-attack as well as its variants prefer
evaluating sets of most frequently contacted recipients, so that the more of Alice’s
friends are less frequently contacted than other recipients, the more inductive biases are
caused by these attacks. This inauspicious situation is likely for realistic non-uniform
communication distributions of Alice and the other senders, as the Zipf distribution,
cf. Adamic and Huberman [2002]; Breslau et al. [1999]. Therefore more observations
might not lead to less biases.
6.2.1.3 HS*-Attack
The HS*-attack proposed by Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] aims at reducing the
computational complexity of the HS-attack and has a binary outcome: Either it pro-
vides a correct disclosure of Alice’s set of friends, or no results.
The HS*-attack consists of two steps: Firstly, the computation of a minimal-
hitting-set and secondly, the evaluation of the uniqueness of the minimal-hitting-set.
In the first step, the SHS algorithm of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] is applied to
efficiently determine a possible set of Alice’s friends, i.e., a minimal hitting-set H in
the set of observation OS collected by the attack. In the second step, an algorithm is
applied that either proves that H is a unique minimum-hitting-set in OS, or provides
another minimal-hitting-set to disprove thatH is not unique. The HS*-attack uniquely
identifies Alice’s set of friends in the first case and terminates, while it repeats the
attack for additional observations in the latter case.
As the HS*-attack relies on computing minimal-hitting-sets by the SHS-attack, it
might require more observations for the unique identification of Alice’s set of friends
than the HS-attack. In cases of inauspicious traffic distributions, where the SHS-attack
cannot find a minimal-hitting-set, the HS*-attack might not terminate.
The HS*-attack is claimed to provide a super-polynomial worst case time-complexity
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for the identification of Alice’s set of friends, cf. Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004], that
is determined by the complexity of its second step. This is due to the belief that the
uniqueness of a given minimal-hitting-set can be verified in super-polynomial runtime,
which is unfortunately wrong. As proved by Pham [2006, pp. 27 – 31], the worst case
time-complexity of the HS*-attack remains exponential.
6.2.2 Likely Profiles
6.2.2.1 Statistical Disclosure Attack
The Statistical Disclosure attack (SDA) introduced by Danezis [2003] is solely based
on evaluating the ratio of the number of messages received by each recipient in the
observations collected by the attacker. It aims at estimating the traffic distribution of
Alice that is also called the profile of Alice.
Due to the law of large numbers, the ratio of the number of messages sent by
Alice to her friends becomes statistically distinguishable from that sent by the other
senders to the recipients in the cover-traffic, for large number of observations, if the
ratio largely remains static. The SDA deploys this property by estimating the ratios
of messages received by recipients in the cover-traffic (i.e., without Alice’s traffic)
and computing its difference to the ratios of messages received by the recipients in
all collected observations. Evaluating this difference provides an estimate of Alice’s
traffic distribution with respect to the set of all recipients in the anonymity system.
This thus represents an estimate of Alice’s profile and aids guessing Alice’s likeliest
friends, cf. Danezis [2003].
The advantage of the SDA is its efficiency and simplicity by just relying on statis-
tics, thus allowing it to be applied to various anonymity systems, as outlined by Danezis
and Serjantov [2005]; Danezis et al. [2007]; Mathewson and Dingledine [2005].
The error probabilities of the guessed Alice’s friends depend on the variance of
the real traffic distributions1 from the estimated traffic distributions, the characteristics
of the traffic distributions and the number of collected observations. In the case of
static and uniformly distributed cover-traffic and static distribution of Alice’s friends,
the number of observations required by the SDA to classify a given Alice’s friend
as a friend within a given probability, is mathematically derived by Danezis [2003,
1Those are Alice’s traffic and that of the other senders.
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2004]. This mathematically analyses the true-positive rate, the correct classification
of an Alice’s friends as a friend by the SDA. However, it does not provide analytical
analyses of the false-positive rate, the classification of a non-friend as an Alice’s friend.
That rate might be arbitrarily large when applying the SDA. Therefore, the bias of the
estimate of Alice’s profile by the SDA is still not well understood, as outlined by Pe´rez-
Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012].
6.2.2.2 Variants of Statistical Disclosure Attack
The Perfect Matching Disclosure attack (PMDA) and the Normalised Statistical Dis-
closure attack (NSDA) proposed by Troncoso et al. [2008] apply the SDA to initially
estimate the profiles of all observed senders. That initial estimate serves as a start point
to re-estimate those senders’ profiles for new observations. The NSDA relaxes some
constraints considered in the PMDA to decrease the complexity of the attack at the
expense of increasing biases, as PMDA might be computationally infeasible for large
anonymity systems, as outlined by Troncoso et al. [2008].
The SDA estimates Alice’s profile from the single observations collected by the
attacker, thereby a-priori assuming in each observation that every recipient in that ob-
servation has the same probability of being Alice’s friend. The re-estimate of Alice’s
profile by the PMDA and the NSDA is similar to this estimate by the SDA, with the ex-
ception that in each single observation, the recipient with the highest probability in the
initial profile is assigned a high probability to be Alice’s friend, while the remaining
recipients are assigned the same low probability.
Troncoso et al. [2008] state that this re-estimate reduces the bias of the estimated
sender profiles below the bias caused by the SDA, in some cases. However, Danezis
and Troncoso [2009]; Diaz et al. [2008] report that arbitrary small biases in the estimate
of a profile can lead to arbitrarily large inductive biases, when reusing that profile. The
PMDA and the NSDA do not provide analytical analyses of the bias of the estimate of
users’ profiles, as outlined by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012]. In contrast to the
SDA, Troncoso et al. [2008] also do not provide analytical analyses of the true-positive
rates of their attacks.
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6.2.2.3 Bayesian-Interference
The attack by Bayesian-interference of Danezis and Troncoso [2009] provides a co-
estimate of the likely friends of every sender and the likely matching between senders
and recipients of messages in the batches relayed by the Mix. This co-estimate is
applied to the sender-anonymity sets and recipient sets accumulated by the attacker. It
is based on the similar idea like the PMDA and the NSDA, that gaining information
about the users’ friends induces information about the likely senders and recipients
of messages in a batch and vice versa. According to Danezis and Troncoso [2009],
Bayesian-interference avoids inductive errors due to reusing biased profiles in the co-
estimate, in contrast to the PMDA and the NSDA.
The attack suggested by Danezis and Troncoso [2009] formulates the estimate of
users’ profiles and of the matching between senders and recipients of batches from
observations collected by the attacker as a Bayesian interference problem. This pro-
vides an a-posteriori probability distribution of the users’ profiles and of the matchings
with respect to the given observations. Describing this a-posteriori probability distri-
bution mathematically is due to its high complexity difficult, so that it is estimated
by sampling from marginal distributions of that probability distribution. According to
Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012], an analytic analysis of the bias of the estimated
profile has not been provided.
6.2.2.4 Least Square Disclosure Attack
The Least Square Disclosure attack (LSDA) of Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012]
suggest an algorithm that aims at estimating a user’s profile and quantifying the bias of
that estimate analytically.
The LSDA considers the number of messages sent by a sender, e.g., Alice to a
recipient in a round as a random event that depends on the unknown probability p
with which Alice contacts that recipient. The attack tries to estimate for every possible
recipient of Alice, that corresponding probability, to estimate Alice’s profile. The basic
idea of the LSDA is to assume that this random event isN(µ, σ2) normally distributed,
with unknown mean µ and variance σ2 that is determined by p. This allows applying
the well know least-square approach to estimate the unknown parameters µ, σ2 of
the normal distribution of the number of messages exchanged between Alice and that
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recipient, from the observed number of transmitted messages in the single collected
observations, cf. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012]. Since p is linked to µ, σ2, this
also provides an estimate of the probability p of communications between Alice and
the considered recipient.
Applying this estimate to all pairs of Alice and a possible recipient provides an esti-
mate of Alice’s profile. The least-square approach provides reliable analytical analyses
of the bias of the estimates, if the considered random events are normally distributed.
The LSDA, as evaluated by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012] analyses a quite
“artificial case” of user communication, in which all users have the same number of
friends and contact their friends according to the same uniform distribution. The com-
munication distribution in this special case provides mathematical properties that sup-
port the application of the least-square approach1 and thus leads to reasonable estimates
of user profiles.
However, as assumed by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012], the number of mes-
sages transmitted between senders and recipients can be arbitrarily distributed. There-
fore, more realistic communications would add inductive errors to the estimate of the
user profiles that are not accounted for by the least-square approach and by the LSDA.
Realistic communications might also be hard to evaluate, since the LSDA requires
modelling the traffic distribution of all individual users in the anonymity system, to
estimate a single profile, cf. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012].
6.3 Summary
The Intersection attack of Berthold and Langos [2003] and the Disclosure attack of
Agrawal et al. [2003a,b]; Kesdogan et al. [2003] are combinatorial attacks that uniquely
identifies Alice’s set of friends. They are the first attacks that prove that the Chaum Mix
does not provide anonymity protection against a strong passive attacker who observes
the anonymity and recipient sets generated by the Mix.
Succeeding works on the combinatorial attack increase the effectiveness of the
Disclosure attack and provide estimates of the least number of observations required
for the unique identification of Alice’s set of friends. These are represented by the
1The number of messages a friend receives from Alice is not normally distributed, but the number
of messages it receives from all senders is in this special case similar to a normal distribution.
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HS-attack of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] and the 2×-exclusivity of Kesdogan
et al. [2006] and the unicity-distance analysis of Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2006]. The
HS-attack requires the provably least number of observations for that unique identifi-
cation, but it is computationally intractable. The mathematical estimates of the least
number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends solely apply to the
case of uniformly distributed Alice’s traffic and cover-traffic.
Due to the computational infeasibility of the Disclosure attack, heuristic attacks
have been suggested. They provide efficient guesses of Alice’s friends at the expense
of biases. Among those heuristic attacks, we distinguish two categories: Attacks in
the first category try to guess a probable unique minimum-hitting-set and are based
on the HS-attack. These attacks are represented by the SHS-attack of Kesdogan and
Pimenidis [2004], its variants and by the HS*-attack, cf. Kesdogan and Pimenidis
[2004]; Kesdogan et al. [2009]. The heuristics applied by those attacks to decrease the
complexity of identifying a probable set of Alice’s friends refer to the case of uniformly
distributed Alice’s traffic and cover-traffic. Analyses of Kesdogan et al. [2009] show
that the number of observations required by those attacks to identify Alice’s set of
friends with a sufficiently high probability is by orders of magnitudes higher than that
required by the HS-attack
Attacks in the second category are more general and provide guesses of Alice’s
traffic distribution, called Alice’s profile. They assign each recipient a probability that
it is Alice’s friend. The idea of those attacks on the Chaum Mix was introduced by the
SDA of Danezis [2003]. According to the evaluations published by Danezis [2003];
Troncoso et al. [2008], this attack and its variants provide reasonable true-positive rates
for the classification of an Alice’s friend as a friend. The false-positive rate in these at-
tacks might be arbitrary and is difficult to determine, as mentioned by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez
and Troncoso [2012]. The Bayesian-interference aims to decrease inductive biases
due the heuristics deployed in the former heuristic attacks. However, as outlined by
Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012] the heuristic nature of heuristic attacks makes it
generally hard to provide a precise estimate of the biases. The LSDA aims at provid-
ing analytical analyses of the biases in its guesses of Alice’s profile. However, those
analyses are solely applied to an artificial Mix configuration. It is not clear from the
paper, cf. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Troncoso [2012], how more realistic Mix configurations
could be analysed and whether those analyses would be computationally feasible. To
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the best of our knowledge, only the SDA has been demonstrated to be applicable to the
pool-Mix, cf. Danezis and Serjantov [2005]; Mathewson and Dingledine [2005], with
respect to all attacks mentioned in this section.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis addressed the fundamental limit of anonymity protection provided by
anonymity sets constructed with the Chaum Mix technique. It proposed an analytical
analysis of the least number of observations1 and of the time-complexity to uniquely
identify Alice’s set of friends. These analyses showed that both quantities depend on
each of the Mix parameters (i.e., the number of recipients, friends and the batch size),
as well as on the traffic distributions (i.e., the cover-traffic and Alice’s traffic distri-
bution). This dependency was mathematically derived and described for the case that
Alice’s set of friends is static. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show
that dependency with respect to non-uniform traffic distributions. As it turned out in
this thesis, non-uniform traffic distributions can significantly effect the least number of
observations and the mean time-complexity to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends.
This basic work was extended to address the two novel cases of insufficient number
of observations and of erroneous observations. In the first case, we proposed analyt-
ical analyses of the number of observations to disclose partial, or likely information
about Alice’s friends. It addressed the situation, where the attacker’s observations are
insufficient to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends.
In the second case, we investigated the effect on the full disclosure of Alice’s set
of friends, if the attacker does not have full knowledge about the anonymity sets and
recipient sets (i.e., the observations) in each Mix round. It provided bounds for the rate
of erroneous observations, such that a full disclosure of Alice’s set of friends is still
1Observations derived from the attacker’s aggregation of the sender anonymity sets and recipient
sets of the Chaum Mix.
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possible.
All analyses in this thesis referred to the HS-attack that represents combinatorial
analyses of the observations of the Chaum Mix. The HS-attack provably requires the
least number of observations to uniquely identify Alice’s set of friends, provided that
the set of friends is static, cf. Kesdogan et al. [2006]. Since the observations are the
only information leaked by the Chaum Mix to a strong attacker, the HS-attack therefore
measures the fundamental limit of anonymity protection provided by the Chaum Mix.
We showed by a redesign of the originally computationally infeasible HS-attack of
Kesdogan and Pimenidis [2004] that the unique identification of Alice’s set of friends
is for many realistic Mix configurations, computational feasible. This was proved by
corresponding analyses of the least number of observations and of the mean time-
complexity. We considered the mean time-complexity, as it turned out to be by orders
of magnitude lower than the worst case time-complexity, in case of our redesigned HS-
attack. It thus represents a more realistic measure of the protection against an attacker
than the worst case time-complexity analysed in the past. By means of the before
mentioned extensions, we demonstrated that our HS-attack and analyses can be even
adapted to the more general cases of partial disclosure and of full disclosure, despite
erroneous observations. They thus contribute a basis to also analyse more practice-
oriented attacker models and Mix models as discussed in Section 1.2.3.
7.1 Future Works
Continuation of Analyses This thesis contributed analyses of the fundamental limit
of anonymity protection provided by the Chaum Mix for various Mix configurations.
They mainly referred to the case that Alice’s set of friends is static and that sufficiently
many observations can be aggregated by the attacker to uniquely identify Alice’s set
of friends. The extension of those analyses to the more general case of insufficient
number of observations and erroneous observations still remains to be completed. That
is analysing the least number of observations to gain partial information about Alice’s
friends with a certain probability, despite erroneous observations. Chapter 5 proposed
works towards that direction and we outline those issues that remain for future works
next.
The analyses of the disclosure of partial information in Section 5.1 refer to the
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case, where the attacker’s observations are insufficient to uniquely identify Alice’s set
of friends. Since up to now, these analyses only refer to uniformly distributed traffic,
they remain to be extended to non-uniformly distributed traffic.
The information gain about Alice’s friends in case of insufficient number of obser-
vations for a full disclosure and in case of erroneous observations have been analysed
separately in Chapter 5. It remains for future works to provide analyses that also ac-
count for the combination of these two cases of insufficient number of observations
and erroneous observations.
The mean time-complexity to gain partial information despite erroneous observa-
tions has not been investigated yet and remains to be investigated in future works. It
might reveal traffic distributions, where gaining that information is computationally
feasible. Recall that until now, the feasibility of the HS-attack has only been analysed
for the case that there are sufficiently many observations and no erroneous observa-
tions.
Application of Analyses Assume that analytical analyses of the number of observa-
tions, the mean time-complexity, and the probability to gaining correct partial infor-
mation about Alice’s friends by the HS-attack was provided: Then finding a practical
strategy for the Mix to efficiently achieve a desired level of anonymity would still be
an open issue. The Chaum Mix with continuous dummy traffic and broadcast provides
perfect preservation of anonymity, but is not practical, as outlined in Section 1.2.1.2.
Finding a practical strategy is thus not trivial.
Kesdogan [2006, pp. 31 – 37] suggested a strategy, where users monitor their
anonymity by evaluating the number of observations that remain to be aggregated to
succeed the HS-attack. It sketches the idea that Alice’s set of friends could remain
anonymous, if Alice could selectively send dummy traffic that is dynamically adapted
to her current traffic to extend the number of observations to succeed the HS-attack.
This generally raises the open question of the rate, the distribution and the injection
strategy of dummy traffic that provides an optimal trade off between throughput and
anonymity protection. Answering this might not be trivial, as the attempts of users to
optimise their own protection might lead to a decrease of the protection of other users.
That is due to the dependence of a user’s anonymity protection on the cover-traffic that
changes, if individual users changes their traffic. Therefore, future works might need
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to incorporate game theory to find Pareto-optimal strategies to increase the anonymity
protection and throughput for all users. Given such a strategy, the coordination and
enforcement of users to follow that strategy need to be investigated in future works.
This might be an issue in open environments, as the set of users of the anonymity
network are volatile.
Beyond Anonymous Communication In this thesis, we analysed the protection pro-
vided by the Chaum Mix, a concrete technique that constructs anonymity sets on a
simple way. As anonymity sets also model other anonymity systems, future works
could investigate the applicability of our analyses to other anonymity techniques and
that of those techniques to the Chaum Mix. This targets at finding a uniform and
comprehensive evaluation of anonymity protection. Since anonymity protection solu-
tions in practice are usually composed of anonymity techniques of distinct layers (e.g.,
application- and network-layer), providing a uniform evaluation of single components
is crucial to evaluate composed systems.
The following two research areas consider, for example, anonymity techniques to
that our analyses of anonymity sets might be adaptable. Investigating this adaptation
could be the next research step toward finding a uniform anonymity evaluation.
The concept of providing anonymity sets by the Mix of Chaum [1981] is applied
in the concept of Mix-zones of Beresford and Stajano [2003]; Freudiger et al. [2007] in
the research area of location-privacy. Location-privacy addresses the hiding of a user’s
current and past positions, despite the user’s use of location-based-services that request
position information. A Mix-zone is described by Beresford and Stajano [2003] as a
spatial area, where user’s cannot be located. The Mix-zone enables users to change
their appearance (e.g., pseudonym) and time characteristic (e.g., their positions relative
to each other) to provide unlinkability of the users entering and leaving the Mix-zone.
This is in accordance to providing unlinkability for messages entering and leaving a
Mix. Similar to communication patterns, users might have movement patterns and
location preferences that could be disclosed.
Anonymity sets are also investigated in the research area of privacy-preserving
data publishing, as surveyed by Fung et al. [2010], like the k-anonymity of Sweeney
[2002] and the l-diversity of Machanavajjhala et al. [2007]. Privacy-preserving data
publishing addresses the release of attributes of sets of users for evaluations, such that
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the exact link between individual users and their privacy sensitive attributes remain
hidden to the evaluator. To achieve k-anonymity or l-diversity, released attributes are
modified, such that for each set of privacy sensitive attributes, there is a sufficient large
anonymity set of users who are possibly linked to those attributes. As summarised
by Fung et al. [2010], all existing privacy-preserving data publishing techniques leak
some information about individual users, provided the existence of background knowl-
edge. Therefore observing a certain number of released data would disclose a user’s
sensitive attributes. This is similar to the case that every observation of a Mix leaks
some information out a user’s communication pattern.
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Appendix A
Simulation Condition
A.1 Hardware
The simulations in this thesis were executed on servers that are equipped with two Intel
Xeon X5650 processors that run at 2.67GHz with 12GB RAM. Each of these servers
contains in total 12 dedicated cores. We used simultaneously up to 6 servers for the
simulations.
A.2 Software
The simulation of random observations and the HS-attack using the ExactHS algorithm
in this thesis were implemented in C++. To ensure that our results are statistically
significant, every experiment1 is repeated until at least 95% of the considered results
fall within 5% of the empirically observed mean. The least number of repetitions of
an experiment is set to 300 to avoid strong variances of the empirical mean due to a
low number of repetitions. We used Pthreads to run several experiments in parallel to
mitigate the time required by these large number repetitions.
1Recall that, in each experiment, we repeatedly apply the HS-attack on simulated random observa-
tions until Alice’s set of friend can be uniquely identified.
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A. SIMULATION CONDITION
A.3 Computational Time and Memory Usage
The time required to complete an experiment is dependent on the Mix configurations.
For example, the observed maximal time required by an experiment for the Mix pa-
rameters (u = 20000, b = 5,m = 20) was below 1 second in the case that Alice’s
traffic and the cover-traffic were uniformly distributed. In contrast to this, we occa-
sionally observed peak times of up to 29 days for an experiment, for the Mix param-
eters (u = 20000, b = 50,m = 40). However, we could complete all (about 430)
experiments in less than 2 months with the latter Mix configuration.
The observed maximal memory usage of a single experiment was less than 200MB
with respect to all observed experiments. Since each of our servers executed at most
12 experiments in parallel, the memory usage of each server was below 2.4GB.
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